Modern Moral Philosophy

Original · #1

MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Translation

现代道德哲学

Original · #2

I WILL begin by stating three theses which I present in this paper.

Translation

我将以陈述本文提出的三项论断为开端。

Original · #3

The first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking. The second is that the concepts of obligation, and duty— moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say—and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of "ought," ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible; because they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics which no longer generally survives, and are only harmful without it. My third thesis is that the differences between the wellknown English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance.

Translation

第一是：就目前而言，从事道德哲学对我们并无益处；至少在我们拥有一套足够完善的心理学哲学之前——而这恰恰是我们明显所缺乏的——应当把它搁置。 第二是：“义务”与“责任”这两个概念——也就是说，道德义务与道德责任——以及关于在道德上何为正当、何为不正当的概念，和“ought”一词的道德意义，如果在心理上可行，就应当予以抛弃；因为它们是源自一种较早伦理学观念的遗存，或由这些遗存衍生出的东西，而这种观念如今已不再普遍存续；脱离了它，这些概念只会有害。 我的第三个论断是：从Sidgwick直到当下，著名英国道德哲学家之间的差异并无多大重要性。

Original · #4

Anyone who has read Aristotle's Ethics and has also read modern moral philosophy must have been struck by the great contrasts between them. The concepts which are prominent among the moderns seem to be lacking, or at any rate buried or far in the background, in Aristotle. Most noticeably, the term "moral" itself, which we have by direct inheritance from Aristotle, just doesn't seem to fit, in its modern sense, into an account of Aristotelian ethics. Aristotle distinguishes virtues as moral and intellectual. Have some of what he calls "intellectual" virtues what we should call a "moral" aspect? It would seem so; the criterion is presumably that a failure in an "intellectual" virtue—like that of having good judgment in calculating how to bring about something useful, say in municipal government—may be blameworthy. But—it may reasonably be asked—cannot any failure be made a matter of blame or reproach? Any derogatory criticism, say of the workmanship of a product or the design of a machine, can be called blame or reproach. So we want to put in the word "morally" again: sometimes such a failure may be morally blameworthy, sometimes not. Now has Aristotle got this idea of moral blame, as opposed to any other? If he has, why isn't it more central? There are some mistakes, he says, which are causes, not of involuntariness in actions, but of scoundrelism, and for which a man is blamed. Does this mean that there is a moral obligation not to make certain intellectual mistakes? Why doesn't he discuss obligation in general, and this obligation in particular? If someone professes to be expounding Aristotle and talks in a modern fashion about "moral" such-and-such, he must be very imperceptive if he does not constantly feel like someone whose jaws have somehow got out of alignment: the teeth don't come together in a proper bite.

Translation

读过亚里士多德《伦理学》又读过现代道德哲学的人，不可能不注意到二者之间的巨大反差。那些在现代道德哲学中居于显要地位的概念，在亚里士多德那里似乎要么阙如，要么至少被埋没在远处的背景中。最显眼的是，“moral”这个术语本身：我们固然是直接从亚里士多德那里继承而来，但就其现代意义而言，它似乎并不适合嵌入对亚里士多德伦理学的叙述。 亚里士多德把德性区分为道德的与理智的。他所谓“理智的”德性中，是否有些在我们看来具有“道德的”的一面？似乎如此；其标准大概是：在某种“理智的”德性上的失败——比如在市政治理中，计算如何实现某种有益之事时缺乏良好判断——可能会招致责备。可是——不无道理地有人会问——任何失败难道不都可以成为责难或非难的事由吗？对某件产品的做工或某台机器的设计所作的任何贬抑性批评，都可以算作责难或非难。因此我们又想把“morally”这个词加进去：有时候这样的失败在道德上可受责备，有时候则不然。那么，亚里士多德是否确有一种与其他责备相区分的“道德责备”的观念？若有，为何它不更居于中心？ 据他说，有些错误并非导致行动之非自愿的原因，而是败德的原因，人也因此受责备。这是否意味着：有一种道德上的义务，要求人们不犯某些理智性错误？他为什么既不讨论义务这一总体问题，也不专门讨论这种义务？若有人自称在阐释亚里士多德，却以现代的方式谈论“道德的”这个那个，而他如果不时时觉得自己好像下颌有些错位——牙齿总也咬不出一个合适的咬合——那他就未免过于迟钝了。

Original · #5

We cannot, then, look to Aristotle for any elucidation of the modern way of talking about "moral" goodness, obligation, etc. And all the best-known writers on ethics in modern times, from Butler to Mill, appear to me to have faults as thinkers on the subject which make it impossible to hope for any direct light on it from them. I will state these objections with the brevity which their character makes possible.

Translation

因此，对于近代有关所谓“道德”的善、义务等的说法，我们不能指望从亚里士多德那里得到任何阐明。在我看来，近代伦理学中所有最著名的作者——从巴特勒到密尔——作为这一主题的思想者都存在一些缺陷，这些缺陷使我们不可能指望从他们那里就此问题获得任何直接的阐释。鉴于这些异议本身的性质所许可，我将尽可能简要地陈述它们。

Original · #6

Butler exalts conscience, but appears ignorant that a man's conscience may tell him to do the vilest things.

Translation

巴特勒尊崇良心，却似乎未曾意识到，一个人的良心也可能驱使他去做最卑劣的事。

Original · #7

Hume defines "truth" in such a way as to exclude ethical judgments from it, and professes that he has proved that they are so excluded.

Translation

休谟以一种足以将伦理判断排除在“真理”之外的方式界定“真理”，并声称自己已证明它们确被如此排除。

Original · #8

He also implicitly defines "passion" in such a way that aiming at anything is having a passion. His objection to passing from "is" to "ought" would apply equally to passing from "is" to "owes" or from "is" to "needs." (However, because of the historical situation, he has a point here, which I shall return to.)

Translation

他还隐含地把“passion”界定得如此宽泛：只要对任何事物有所指向，就等于拥有一种激情。他对从“is”过渡到“ought”的反对，同样适用于从“is”过渡到“owes”或“needs”。（不过，考虑到当时的历史处境，他此处的看法并非毫无根据；我稍后会再回到这一点。）

Original · #9

Kant introduces the idea of "legislating for oneself," which is as absurd as if in these days, when majority votes command great respect, one were to call each reflective decision a man made a vote resulting in a majority, which as a matter of proportion is overwhelming, for it is always i-o. The concept of legislation requires superior power in the legislator. His own rigoristic convictions on the subject of lying were so intense that it never occurred to him that a lie could be relevantly described as anything but just a lie (e.g. as "a lie in such-and-such circumstances"). His rule about universalizable maxims is useless without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it.

Translation

康德提出了“为自己立法”的观念；这就荒谬得仿佛在当今这个多数表决备受推崇的时代，有人把个人每一次经反思作出的决定都称作一次以多数通过的表决，而且从比例上看还是压倒性的，因为票数总是1比0。立法这一概念本就要求立法者拥有更高的权力。他在说谎问题上的严格主义立场强烈到这样一种程度：他从未想到，对谎言作出相关的描述，除了直接称其为“谎言”之外，还可以是“在某种情境中的谎言”之类的说法。他那条关于可普遍化的行为准则的规则，若不先界定在为某一行为构造相应准则时，哪些描述才算与之相关，便毫无用处。

Original · #10

Bentham and Mill do not notice the difficulty of the concept "pleasure." They are often said to have gone wrong through committing the "naturalistic fallacy"; but this charge does not impress me, because I do not find accounts of it coherent. But the other point— about pleasure—seems to me a fatal objection from the very outset. The ancients found this concept pretty baffling. It reduced Aristotle to sheer babble about "the bloom on the cheek of youth" because, for good reasons, he wanted to make it out both identical with and different from the pleasurable activity. Generations of modern philosophers found this concept quite unperplexing, and it reappeared in the literature as a problematic one only a year or two ago when Ryle wrote about it. The reason is simple: since Locke, pleasure was taken to be some sort of internal impression. But it was superficial, if that was the right account of it, to make it the point of actions. One might adapt something Wittgenstein said about "meaning" and say "Pleasure cannot be an internal impression, for no internal impression could have the consequences of pleasure."

Translation

边沁和密尔都没有注意到“快乐”这一概念所包含的困难。人们常说，他们之所以出错，是因为犯了“自然主义谬误”；但这一指控并不能让我信服，因为在我看来，关于这一谬误的种种说明并不融贯。不过，另一点——即关于快乐的那一点——在我看来，从一开始就是一个致命的反驳。古人发现，这一概念着实令人困惑。它竟使亚里士多德陷入十足的胡言乱语，大谈什么“青春面颊上的光彩”，因为出于充分的理由，他既想说明快乐与令人愉悦的活动是同一的，又想说明它与这种活动并不相同。近代一代又一代哲学家却觉得这一概念根本不成问题；直到一两年前赖尔论及它时，它才重新作为一个有问题的概念出现在文献之中。原因很简单：自洛克以来，快乐一直被视为某种内在印象。但如果那真是对它的正确说明，那么把它当作行动的目标，就未免流于肤浅。我们不妨借用维特根斯坦谈“意义”时的一句话，改成这样说：“快乐不可能是一种内在印象，因为任何内在印象都不可能产生快乐那样的后果。”

Original · #11

Mill also, like Kant, fails to realize the necessity for stipulation as to relevant descriptions, if his theory is to have content. It did not occur to him that acts of murder and theft could be otherwise described. He holds that where a proposed action is of such a kind as to fall under some one principle established on grounds of utility, one must go by that; where it falls under none or several, the several suggesting contrary views of the action, the thing to do is to calculate particular consequences. But pretty well any action can be so described as to make it fall under a variety of principles of utility (as I shall say for short) if it falls under any.

Translation

穆勒也和康德一样，没有意识到：如果他的理论要有内容，就必须先对相关描述作出明确规定。他没有想到，谋杀和偷窃之类的行为还可以有别的描述方式。他认为，如果一个拟议中的行动属于这样一种情况，即它可被归入某一条基于功利根据而确立的原则之下，那么人们就必须依此行事；如果它不归入任何原则，或者归入若干原则，而这些原则又对该行动提示出彼此相反的看法，那么应当做的就是计算其具体后果。然而，几乎任何行动，只要它能够被描述为落在某一条功利原则之下（为简便起见，我将如此称呼），也同样可以被描述为落在各种不同的功利原则之下。

Original · #12

I will now return to Hume. The features of Hume's philosophy which I have mentioned, like many other features of it, would incline me to think that Hume was a mere—brilliant—sophist; and his procedures are certainly sophistical. But I am forced, not to reverse, but to add to, this judgment by a peculiarity of Hume's philosophizing: namely that although he reaches his conclusions—with which he is in love—by sophistical methods, his considerations constantly open up very deep and important problems. It is often the case that in the act of exhibiting the sophistry onefinds oneself noticing matters which deserve a lot of exploring: the obvious stands in need of investigation as a result of the points that Hume pretends to have made. In this, he is unlike, say, Butler. It was already well known that conscience could dictate vile actions; for Butler to have written disregarding this does not open up any new topics for us. But with Hume it is otherwise: hence he is a very profound and great philosopher, in spite of his sophistry. For example:

Translation

我现在回到休谟。休谟哲学中我已经提到的那些特征，连同其中许多其他特征，都会使我倾向于认为，休谟不过是个——尽管才华横溢——的诡辩家；而且他的论证方式也确实带有诡辩性质。然而，由于休谟哲学思考中的一个特殊之处，我不得不对这一判断有所补充，而不是将其推翻：也就是说，尽管他是通过诡辩的方法得出那些他所钟爱的结论，他的思考却不断打开一些极其深刻而重要的问题。情况往往是这样：恰恰在揭露其诡辩的过程中，人们会注意到一些值得大力探究的事情；由于休谟假装已经论证了某些要点，那些原本显而易见的东西反而显得有待考察了。在这一点上，他不同于比如说巴特勒。良知可能会指示卑劣的行为，这一点原本早已为人所知；巴特勒写作时对此置若罔闻，并不会为我们开启任何新的论题。但休谟却不是这样：因此，尽管他有诡辩的一面，他仍是一位极其深刻而伟大的哲学家。例如：

Original · #13

Suppose that I say to my grocer "Truth consists in either relations of ideas, as that 20s. = £1, or matters of fact, as that I ordered potatoes, you supplied them, and you sent me a bill. So it doesn't apply to such a proposition as that I owe you such-and-such a sum."

Translation

假定我对杂货商说：“真理无非在于两类东西：要么是观念之间的关系，比如20先令 = 1英镑；要么是事实之事，比如我订了土豆，你供了货，而且你还给我寄来了账单。因此，真理并不适用于这样一个命题：我欠你这么一笔钱。”

Original · #14

Now if one makes this comparison, it comes to light that the relation of the facts mentioned to the description "X owes Y so much money" is an interesting one, which I will call that of being "brute relative to" that description. Further, the "brute" facts mentioned here themselves have descriptions relatively to which other facts are "brute"—as, e.g., he had potatoes carted to my house and they were left there are brute facts relative to "he supplied me with potatoes."

Translation

如果作出这种比较，就会发现，上述事实与“X欠Y这么多钱”这一描述之间存在一种颇有意思的关系；我将把这种关系称为相对于该描述而言的“粗事实”。进一步说，这里提到的这些“粗”事实本身也有其对应的描述；相对于这些描述，另一些事实又是“粗”的。比如，“他让人把土豆运到我家”以及“土豆被留在那里”，就是相对于“他给我供应了土豆”这一描述而言的粗事实。

Original · #15

And the fact X owes Y money is in turn "brute" relative to other descriptions—e.g. "X is solvent." Now the relation of "relative bruteness" is a complicated one. To mention a few points: if xyz is a set of facts brute relative to a description A, then xyz is a set out of a range some set among which holds if A holds; but the holding of some set among these does not necessarily entail A, because exceptional circumstances can always make a difference; and what are exceptional circumstances relatively to A can generally only be explained by giving a few diverse examples, and no theoretically adequate provision can be made for exceptional circumstances, since a further special context can theoretically always be imagined that would reinterpret any special context. Further, though in normal circumstances, xyz would be a justification for A, that is not to say that A just comes to the same as "xyz"; and also there is apt to be an institutional context which gives its point to the description A, of which institution A is of course not itself a description. (E.g. the statement that I give someone a shilling is not a description of the institution of money or of the currency of this country.) Thus, though it would be ludicrous to pretend that there can be no such thing as a transition from, e.g., "is" to "owes," the character of the transition is in fact rather interesting and comes to light as a result of reflecting on Hume's arguments.^1 That I owe the grocer such-and-such a sum would be one of a set of facts which would be "brute" in relation to the description "I am a bilker." "Bilking" is of course a species of "dishonesty" or "injustice." (Naturally the consideration will not have any effect on my actions unless I want to commit or avoid acts of injustice.)

Translation

而且，X 欠 Y 钱这一事实，反过来相对于其他描述——例如“X 有偿付能力”——也是“粗粝”的。所谓“相对粗粝性”的关系，其实相当复杂。略举几点：如果 xyz 是一组相对于描述 A 而言是粗粝的事实，那么，xyz 就是这样一系列事实组合中的一组：若 A 成立，则这一系列组合中总有某一组会成立；但其中某一组事实的成立，并不必然推出 A，因为例外情形随时都可能造成差异。而且，何谓相对于 A 的例外情形，通常只能通过列举若干彼此不同的例子来说明；对于例外情形，也不可能给出任何在理论上充分完备的规定，因为在理论上，人们总还能设想出进一步的特殊语境，从而重新解释任何一种特殊语境。再者，虽然在正常情形下，xyz 会构成 A 的一种证成，但这并不是说，A 就无非是“xyz”的意思；而且，往往还存在某种制度性语境，使描述 A 之所以成为这样的描述，但 A 本身当然并不是对该制度的描述。（例如，“我给了某人一个先令”这一陈述，并不是对货币制度或本国货币体系的描述。）因此，虽然硬说根本不存在从例如“是”到“欠”的过渡，显然荒谬可笑，但这种过渡事实上颇有意思，而这一点正是在反思休谟论证时显现出来的。^1 我欠杂货商若干钱这一点，会是一组事实中的一项；而相对于“我是个赖账者”这一描述，这组事实将是“粗粝”的。“赖账”当然是不诚实或不正义的一种。（自然，除非我想要做出或避免不正义的行为，这种考虑否则不会对我的行动发生任何影响。）

Original · #16

So far, in spite of their strong associations, I conceive "bilking," "injustice" and "dishonesty" in a merely "factual" way. That I can do this for "bilking" is obvious enough; "justice" I have no idea how to define, except that its sphere is that of actions which relate to someone else, but "injustice," its defect, can for the moment be offered as a generic name covering various species. E.g.: "bilking," "theft" (which is relative to whatever property institutions exist), "slander," "adultery," "punishment of the innocent."

Translation

到目前为止，尽管“bilking”、“injustice”和“dishonesty”彼此有着强烈的关联，我仍只是从一种纯粹“事实性”的角度来理解它们。对“bilking”而言，我显然可以这样做；至于“justice”，除了知道它所涉及的是那些与他人相关的行为之外，我不知道该如何界定它。不过，作为“justice”的缺失，“injustice”眼下可以暂且被当作一个统称，用来涵盖若干不同的类型。例如：“bilking”、“theft”（其含义取决于现存的财产制度）、“slander”、“adultery”、“punishment of the innocent”。

Original · #17

In present-day philosophy an explanation is required how an unjust man is a bad man, or an unjust action a bad one; to give such an explanation belongs to ethics; but it cannot even be begun until we are equipped with a sound philosophy of psychology. For the proof that an unjust man is a bad man would require a positive account of justice as a "virtue." This part of the subject-matter of ethics is, however, completely closed to us until we have an account of what type of characteristic a virtue is—a problem, not of ethics, but of conceptual analysis—and how it relates to the actions in which it is instanced: a matter which I think Aristotle did not succed in really making clear. For this we certainly need an account at least of what a human action is at all, and how its description as "doing such-andsuch" is affected by its motive and by the intention or intentions in it; and for this an account of such concepts is required.

Translation

在当代哲学中，我们需要说明：一个不正义的人何以是一个坏人，一项不正义的行为何以是一个坏行为。给出这样的说明属于伦理学；但在我们具备一种健全的哲学心理学之前，这项工作甚至无从开始。因为，要证明一个不正义的人是一个坏人，就需要对作为一种“德性”的正义作出一种积极的说明。然而，只有在我们说明德性究竟是一类什么样的特征——这不是伦理学的问题，而是概念分析的问题——以及它与体现它的行动之间究竟是什么关系之后，伦理学这一部分的论题才会向我们敞开；而我认为，亚里士多德实际上并没有真正把这一点讲清楚。 为此，我们当然至少需要说明，人的行动究竟首先是什么，以及当我们把它描述为“做这样那样的事”时，这种描述如何受到其动机和其中所包含的意图或诸意图的影响；而要做到这一点，就需要对这类概念作出说明。

Original · #18

The terms "should" or "ought" or "needs" relate to good and bad: e.g. machinery needs oil, or should or ought to be oiled, in that running without oil is bad for it, or it runs badly without oil. According to this conception, of course, "should" and "ought" are not used in a special "moral" sense when one says that a man should not bilk. (In Aristotle's sense of the term "moral" (ijfo/cds), they are being used in connection with a moral subject-matter: namely that of human passions and (non-technical) actions.) But they have now acquired a special so-called "moral" sense—i.e. a sense in which they imply some absolute verdict (like one of guilty / not guilty on a man) on what is described in the "ought" sentences used in certain types of context: not merely the contexts that Aristotle would call "moral"—passions and actions—but also some of the contexts that he would call "intellectual."

Translation

“应该”“应当”或“需要”这些词都与善和坏有关。例如，机器需要润滑油，或者说应该、应当上油，因为无油运转对它不好，或者说，它在无油时运转不良。按照这种理解，当然，当人们说一个人不应当欺诈时，“应该”和“应当”并不是在一种特殊的“道德”意义上使用的。（按亚里士多德对“道德”〔ijfo/cds〕一词的理解，这里确实是在与一种道德的主题相关的意义上使用它们：也就是关于人的激情与行为——非技术性的行为——的主题。）但是如今，这些词已经获得了一种特殊的、所谓“道德”的意义——也就是说，在这种意义上，当“应当”句用于某些类型的语境时，它们会对这些“应当”句所描述的事情含有某种绝对裁决的意味（就像对一个人作出“有罪／无罪”的裁决一样）。这种语境不仅包括亚里士多德会称为“道德”的那些语境——激情和行为——也包括某些他会称为“理智”的语境。

Original · #19

The ordinary (and quite indispensable) terms "should," "needs," "ought," "must"—acquired this special sense by being equated in the relevant contexts with "is obliged," or "is bound," or "is required to," in the sense in which one can be obliged or bound by law, or something can be required by law.

Translation

“should”“needs”“ought”“must”这些日常的（而且相当不可或缺的）词语，之所以获得这种特殊含义，是因为在相关语境中，它们被等同于“is obliged”“is bound”或“is required to”；这里所说的是这样一种意义：人可以受法则约束，或负有义务，而某事也可以是法则所要求的。

Original · #20

How did this come about? The answer is in history: between Aristotle and us came Christianity, with its law conception of ethics.

Translation

这是如何发生的？答案在于历史：在亚里士多德与我们之间，出现了基督教，以及它那种将伦理学理解为法则的概念。

Original · #21

For Christianity derived its ethical notions from the Torah. (One might be inclined to think that a law conception of ethics could arise only among people who accepted an allegedly divine positive law; that this is not so is shown by the example of the Stoics, who also thought that whatever was involved in conformity to human virtues was required by divine law.)

Translation

因为基督教的伦理概念源自《托拉》。（人们或许会倾向于认为，只有在那些接受某种据称由神所颁布的实在法的人们中间，伦理的法则概念才可能产生；但事实并非如此，斯多亚派的例子就表明了这一点：他们同样认为，凡属符合人的德性的东西，都是神圣法则所要求的。）

Original · #22

In consequence of the dominance of Christianity for many centuries, the concepts of being bound, permitted, or excused became deeply embedded in our language and thought. The Greek word "apaprdvew," the aptest to be turned to that use, acquired the sense "sin," from having meant "mistake," "missing the mark," "going wrong." The Latin peccatum which roughly corresponded to d/*a/3Tjjfia was even apter for the sense "sin," because it was already associated with "culpa"—"guilt"—a juridical notion. The blanket term "illicit," "unlawful," meaning much the same as our blanket term "wrong," explains itself. It is interesting that Aristotle did not have such a blanket term. He has blanket terms for wickedness— "villain," "scoundrel"; but of course a man is not a villain or a scoundrel by the performance of one bad action, or a few bad actions.

Translation

由于基督教在许多个世纪中的支配地位，受约束、被允许或被免责这类概念，已经深深嵌入我们的语言和思想之中。希腊词“apaprdvew”最适合被转用于这一意义；它原本意为“犯错”“失的”“走上歧途”，后来获得了“罪”的含义。与 d/*a/3Tjjfia 大致对应的拉丁词 peccatum 则更适合表达“罪”的意义，因为它本来就与“culpa”——“罪责”——这一司法概念联系在一起。至于“illicit”“unlawful”这类涵盖性术语，其意义与我们同样具有涵盖性的词“wrong”大致相同，这一点本身就说明了问题。有意思的是，亚里士多德并没有这样一个涵盖性术语。他倒是有用来统称邪恶之人的词——如“villain”“scoundrel”；但当然，一个人并不会因为做出一次坏行为，或几次坏行为，就成了恶棍或无赖。

Original · #23

And he has terms like "disgraceful," "impious"; and specific terms signifying defect of the relevant virtue, like "unjust"; but no term corresponding to "illicit." The extension of this term (i.e. the range of its application) could be indicated in his terminology only by a quite lengthy sentence: that is "illicit" which, whether it is a thought or a consented-to passion or an action or an omission in thought or action, is something contrary to one of the virtues the lack of which shows a man to be bad qua man. That formulation would yield a concept co-extensive with the concept "illicit."

Translation

而且，他有“可耻的”“不虔敬的”之类的词，也有一些专门表示相关德性缺失的词，例如“不公正的”；但却没有一个与“illicit”相对应的词。这个词的外延（即其适用范围）在他的术语体系中只能借助一个相当冗长的句子来表明：凡是“illicit”的东西，无论是一种思想、一种经同意的激情、一个行动，还是思想或行动中的某种不作为，都是与某种德性相违背的东西；而对这种德性的缺乏，恰恰表明一个人作为人是坏的。这样的表述将会给出一个与“illicit”这一概念外延相同的概念。

Original · #24

To have a law conception of ethics is to hold that what is needed for conformity with the virtues failure in which is the mark of being bad qua man (and not merely, say, qua craftsman or logician)—that what is needed for this, is required by divine law. Naturally it is not possible to have such a conception unless you believe in God as a lawgiver; like Jews, Stoics, and Christians. But if such a conception is dominant for many centuries, and then is given up, it is a natural result that the concepts of "obligation," of being bound or required as by a law, should remain though they had lost their root; and if the word "ought" has become invested in certain contexts with the sense of "obligation," it too will remain to be spoken with a special emphasis and a special feeling in these contexts.

Translation

把伦理学理解为一种法则观，就是认为：一个人若要符合那些德性——而在这些德性上的失败，正标志着他作为人之为坏，而不只是例如作为工匠或逻辑学家之为坏——他所需要做到的，乃是神法所要求的。自然，除非你相信上帝是一位立法者，否则你不可能持有这样一种观念；犹太人、斯多亚派和基督徒便是如此。 但是，如果这样一种观念在许多个世纪中一直居于支配地位，后来又被放弃，那么一个自然的结果就是：“义务”、受约束，或者如同受法则要求那样被要求，这些概念虽然已经失去了根基，却仍会保留下来；而如果“ought”一词在某些语境中已经获得了“义务”的含义，那么它也会继续在这些语境中被说出，并带着一种特殊的强调和特殊的感受。

Original · #25

It is as if the notion "criminal" were to remain when criminal law and criminal courts had been abolished and forgotten. A Hume discovering this situation might conclude that there was a special sentiment, expressed by "criminal," which alone gave the word its sense. So Hume discovered the situation in which the notion "obligation" survived, and the notion "ought" was invested with that peculiar force having which it is said to be used in a "moral" sense, but in which the belief in divine law had long since been abandoned: for it was substantially given up among Protestants at the time of the Reformation.^1 The situation, if I am right, was the interesting one of the survival of a concept outside the framework of thought that made it a really intelligible one.

Translation

这就好比“罪犯”这一概念在刑法和刑事法庭都已废除并被人遗忘之后，却依然保留下来。若有一个发现了这种情形的休谟，他也许会断定：存在着一种由“罪犯”一词表达出来的特殊情感，而正是这种情感本身赋予了这个词以意义。休谟所发现的，正是这样一种情形：一方面，“义务”这一概念依然存续；另一方面，“应当”这一概念又被赋予了那种特殊的力量，正因为具有这种力量，它才据说是在一种“道德”意义上被使用的；然而，对神法的信念却早已被抛弃了，因为在宗教改革时期，这种信念在新教徒中实际上就已经基本放弃了。^1 如果我说得对，那么这里耐人寻味之处就在于：一个概念脱离了原先使它真正可理解的思想框架之后，竟仍然存活了下来。

Original · #26

When Hume produced his famous remarks about the transition from "is" to "ought," he was, then, bringing together several quite different points. One I have tried to bring out by my remarks on the transition from "is" to "owes" and on the relative "bruteness" of facts. It would be possible to bring out a different point by enquiring about the transition from "is" to "needs"; from the characteristics of an organism to the environment that it needs, for example. To say that it needs that environment is not to say, e.g., that you want it to have that environment, but that it won't nourish unless it has it.

Translation

因此，休谟在提出那段关于从“是”到“应当”的著名论述时，实际上是把几个颇不相同的要点合并在了一起。其中一点，我曾试图通过自己关于从“是”到“欠”的转变以及事实相对“粗粝性”的评论把它揭示出来。另一点则可以通过考察从“是”到“需要”的转变而凸显出来——例如，从一个有机体的特征谈到它所需要的环境。说它需要那种环境，并不是说，比如，你希望它拥有那种环境，而是说，除非有那种环境，否则它就无法得到滋养。

Original · #27

Certainly, it all depends whether you want it to nourish! as Hume would say. But what "all depends" on whether you want it to flourish is whether the fact that it needs that environment, or won't flourish without it, has the slightest influence on your actions, Now that suchand-such "ought" to be or "is needed" is supposed to have an influence on your actions: from which it seemed natural to infer that to judge that it "ought to be" was in fact to grant what you judged "ought to be" influence on your actions. And no amount of truth as to what is the case could possibly have a logical claim to have influence on your actions. (It is not judgment as such that sets us in motion; but our judgment on how to get or do something we want.) Hence it must be impossible to infer "needs" or "ought to be" from "is." But in the case of a plant, let us say, the inference from "is" to "needs" is certainly not in the least dubious. It is interesting and worth examining; but not at allfishy. Its interest is similar to the interest of the relation between brute and less brute facts: these relations have been very little considered. And while you can contrast "what it needs" with "what it's got"—like contrasting de facto and de iure—that does not make its needing this environment less of a "truth."

Translation

当然，正如休谟会说的，一切都取决于你是否希望它茁壮生长。不过，所谓“一切都取决于”你是否希望它生长良好，意思是：它需要那种环境，或者说，没有那种环境它就不会长好；而这一事实是否会对你的行动产生哪怕最细微的影响，则取决于你是否希望它生长良好。现在，人们原本就认为，某物“应当如此”或“是被需要的”，会对你的行动产生影响。由此，自然似乎可以推断：判断某物“应当如此”，实际上就是承认你所判断为“应当如此”的东西会对你的行动产生影响。而无论关于事实情形的真理有多少，都不可能在逻辑上要求对你的行动产生影响。（推动我们行动的，并不是判断本身，而是我们关于如何得到或做到某种自己想要的东西的判断。）因此，从“是”必定不可能推出“需要”或“应当如此”。 但是，以植物为例，从“是”推出“需要”，显然丝毫也没有可疑之处。这一点很有意思，也值得考察；但一点也不蹊跷。它之所以值得注意，类似于赤裸事实与较不赤裸的事实之间关系之所以值得注意：这类关系几乎从未得到认真考察。而且，虽然你可以把“它所需要的”与“它所拥有的”对照起来——就像区分事实上的与法理上的一样——这并不会使“它需要这种环境”这件事少一些作为一种“真理”的性质。

Original · #28

Certainly in the case of what the plant needs, the thought of a need will only affect action if you want the plant to flourish. Here, then, there is no necessary connection between what you can judge the plant "needs" and what you want. But there is some sort of necessary connection between what you think you need, and what you want.

Translation

当然，就植物所需要的东西而言，只有当你希望这株植物长得茂盛时，关于这种需要的想法才会影响行动。因此，在这里，你所判断的这株植物“需要”什么，与你想要什么之间并没有必然联系。但你认为自己需要什么，与你想要什么之间，却存在某种必然联系。

Original · #29

The connection is a complicated one; it is possible not to want something that you judge you need. But, e.g., it is not possible never to want anything that you judge you need. This, however, is not a fact about the meaning of the word "to need," but about the phenomenon of wanting. Hume's reasoning, we might say, in effect, leads one to think it must be about the word "to need," or "to be good for."

Translation

这种联系是复杂的：你可能并不想要某种你判断自己需要的东西。不过，举例来说，你不可能从来不想要任何一种你判断自己需要的东西。然而，这并不是一个关于“需要”一词意义的事实，而是一个关于欲求这一现象的事实。我们不妨说，休谟的论证实际上会使人以为，这必定是一个关于“需要”一词，或“对……有益”这种说法的事实。

Original · #30

Thus wefindtwo problems already wrapped up in the remark about a transition from "is" to "ought"; now supposing that we had clarified the "relative bruteness" of facts on the one hand, and the notions involved in "needing," and "flourishing" on the other—there would still remain a third point. For, following Hume, someone might say:

Translation

因此，关于从“是”到“应当”的过渡这一说法，我们已经看到，其中其实包含着两个问题。现在，假定我们一方面已经澄清了事实的“相对粗粝性”，另一方面也澄清了“需要”与“兴盛”所涉及的概念——那么，仍然还会剩下第三点。因为，追随休谟的人可能会说：

Original · #31

Perhaps you have made out your point about a transition from "is" to "owes" and from "is" to "needs": but only at the cost of showing "owes" and "needs" sentences to express a kind of truths, a kind of facts. And it remains impossible to infer "morally ought" from "is" sentences.

Translation

也许你已经把那种从“is”到“owes”、从“is”到“needs”的过渡论证清楚了；但代价只是表明，包含“owes”和“needs”的句子所表达的，是某一种真理、某一种事实。而从“is”句子中推导出“morally ought”，仍然是不可能的。

Original · #32

This comment, it seems to me, would be correct. Thisword "ought," having become a word of mere mesmeric force, could not, in the character of having that force, be inferred from anything whatever.

Translation

在我看来，这一评论是正确的。既然“ought”这个词已经沦为一个仅仅具有催眠性力量的词，那么恰恰就其具有这种力量而言，它便不可能由任何东西推导出来。

Original · #33

It may be objected that it could be inferred from other "morally ought" sentences: but that cannot be true. The appearance that this is so is produced by the fact that we say "All men are <f>" and "Socrates is a man" implies "Socrates is $." But here "<f>" is a dummy predicate. We mean that if you substitute a real predicate for "<f>" the implication is valid. A real predicate is required; not just a word containing no intelligible thought: a word retaining the suggestion of force, and apt to have a strong psychological effect, but which no longer signifies a real concept at all.

Translation

也许有人会反对说，这个句子可以由其他“在道德上应当”的句子推导出来；但这不可能成立。之所以会有这种显象，是因为我们会说：“所有人都是<f>”与“苏格拉底是人”蕴涵“苏格拉底是$”。但这里的“<f>”只是一个虚位谓词。我们的意思是：如果你用一个真正的谓词来替换“<f>”，那么这个蕴涵就是有效的。这里所需要的是一个真正的谓词，而不只是一个不包含任何可理解思想的词——那样的词仍保留着某种力量的暗示，并且很容易产生强烈的心理效应，但它实际上已根本不再表示任何真实的概念。

Original · #34

For its suggestion is one of a verdict on my action, according as it agrees or disagrees with the description in the "ought" sentence. And where one does not think there is a judge or a law, the notion of a verdict may retain its psychological effect, but not its meaning. Now imagine that just this word "verdict" were so used—with a characteristically solemn emphasis—as to retain its atmosphere but not its meaning, and someone were to say: "For a verdict, after all, you need a law and a judge." The reply might be made: "Not at all, for if there were a law and a judge who gave a verdict, the question for us would be whether accepting that verdict is something that there is a Verdict on." This is an analogue of an argument which is so frequently referred to as decisive: If someone does have a divine law conception of ethics, all the same, he has to agree that he has to have a judgment that he ought (morally ought) to obey the divine law; so his ethic is in exactly the same position as any other: he merely has a "practical major premise"1 : "Divine law ought to be obeyed" where someone else has, e.g., "The greatest happiness principle ought to be employed in all decisions."

Translation

因为它所暗示的是一种对我行动的裁决，这取决于该行动是否符合“应当”句中的描述。然而，如果一个人并不认为存在法官或法则，那么“裁决”这一概念或许还能保留其心理效应，却保留不了其意义。现在设想，“裁决”这个词恰恰就是这样被使用的——带着一种特有的庄严强调——从而保留了它的氛围，却失去了它的意义；这时如果有人说：“说到底，要有裁决，就需要法则和法官。” 那么就可以回答说：“完全不是这样；因为即便有一条法则和一位作出裁决的法官，对我们来说，问题仍然会是：接受那个裁决这件事本身，是否也是某种有一个‘裁决’加于其上的事情。” 这类似于一种常被援引为决定性论证的论证：即使某人确实在伦理学上持一种神法观，他也仍然必须承认，自己还得有一个判断，即认为自己应当（在道德上应当）服从神法；因此，他的伦理学与任何其他伦理学处境完全相同：他不过是有一个“实践大前提”1——“神法应当被服从”——而别人则可能有，例如，“最大幸福原则应当在一切决定中被采用”。

Original · #35

I should judge that Hume and our present-day ethicists had done a considerable service by showing that no content could be found in the notion "morally ought"; if it were not that the latter philosophers try to find an alternative (very fishy) content and to retain the psychological force of the term. It would be most reasonable to drop it. It has no reasonable sense outside a law conception of ethics; they are not going to maintain such a conception; and you can do ethics without it, as is shown by the example of Aristotle. It would be a great improvment if, instead of "morally wrong," one always named a genus such as "untruthful," "unchaste," "unjust." We should no longer ask whether doing something was "wrong," passing directly from some description of an action to this notion; we should ask whether, e.g., it was unjust; and the answer would sometimes be clear at once.

Translation

我认为，休谟以及我们当代的伦理学家指出，“在道德上应当”这一概念中找不到任何内容，这原本是一项相当大的贡献；若不是因为后面这些哲学家还试图为这个术语寻找某种替代性的（十分可疑的）内容，并保留它在心理上的力量。最合理的做法本来是干脆把它弃置不用。离开一种以法则概念为基础的伦理学，它就没有任何合理的意义；而他们又并不打算坚持这样一种伦理学概念；并且，没有它你同样可以做伦理学，亚里士多德的例子已经表明了这一点。 如果人们不再说“在道德上错误”，而总是指出一个属，比如“不诚实”“不贞洁”“不正义”，那将是一个极大的改进。这样一来，我们就不再会问，做某件事是否是“错误的”，仿佛可以从对某个行为的某种描述直接过渡到这一概念；我们会问，例如，它是否是不正义的；而答案有时会立刻变得清楚。

Original · #36

I now come to the epoch in modern English moral philosophy marked by Sidgwick. There is a startling change that seems to have taken place betweeen Mill and Moore. Mill assumes, as we saw, that there is no question of calculating the particular consequences of an action such as murder or theft; and we saw too that his position was stupid, because it is not at all clear how an action can fall under just one principle of utility. In Moore and in subsequent academic moralists of England we find it taken to be pretty obvious that "the right action" is the action which produces the best possible consequences (reckoning among consequences the intrinsic values ascribed to certain kinds of act by some "Objectivists" 1 ). Now it follows from this that a man does well, subjectively speaking, if he acts for the best in the particular circumstances according to his judgment of the total consequences of this particular action. I say that this follows, not that any philosopher has said precisely that. For discussion of these questions can of course get extremely complicated: e.g. it can be doubted whether "such-and-such is the right action" is a satisfactory formulation, on the grounds that things have to exist to have predicates—so perhaps the best formulation is "I am obliged"; or again, a philosopher may deny that "right" is a "descriptive" term, and then take a roundabout route through linguistic analysis to reach a view which comes to the same thing as "the right action is the one productive of the best consequences" (e.g. the view that you frame your "principles" to effect the end you choose to pursue, the connexion between "choice" and "best" being supposedly such that choosing reflectively means that you choose how to act so as to produce the best consequences); further, the roles of what are called "moral principles" and of the "motive of duty" have to be described; the differences between "good" and "morally good" and "right" need to be explored, the special characteristics of "ought" sentences investigated. Such discussions generate an appearance of significant diversity of views where what is really significant is an overall similarity. The overall similarity is made clear if you consider that every one of the best known English academic moral philosophers has put out a philosophy according to which, e.g., it is not possible to hold that it cannot be right to kill the innocent as a means to any end whatsoever and that someone who thinks otherwise is in error. (I have to mention both points; because Mr. Hare, for example, while teaching a philosophy which would encourage a person to judge that killing the innocent would be what he "ought" to choose for over-riding purposes, would also teach, I think, that if a man chooses to make avoiding killing the innocent for any purpose his "supreme practical principle," he cannot be impugned for error: that just is his "principle." But with that qualification, I think it can be seen that the point I have mentioned holds good of every single English academic moral philosopher since Sidgwick.) Now this is a significant thing: for it means that all these philosophies are quite incompatible with the Hebrew-Christian ethic.

Translation

现在我转而谈论现代英国道德哲学中以西季威克为标志的那个时期。看起来，在密尔与摩尔之间，发生了一种惊人的变化。正如我们所见，密尔设想，对于谋杀或偷窃这类行为，并不存在计算其具体后果的问题；我们也看到，他的立场是愚蠢的，因为一个行为究竟如何能够只归属于单一的效用原则，这一点根本不清楚。在摩尔以及其后的英国学院派道德哲学家那里，人们几乎理所当然地认为，“正确的行动”就是产生尽可能最好后果的行动（某些“客观主义者”1 赋予某些行为类型的内在价值，也被算作后果的一部分）。 由此可推出：从主观方面说，一个人如果依据自己对这一特定行动全部后果的判断，在特定情境中为求最佳而行动，那么他就做得好。我说这是可以推出来的，并不是说哪位哲学家曾经明明白白地这样说过。因为，对这些问题的讨论当然会变得极其复杂。比如，人们可以怀疑“如此这般是正确的行动”是否是一个令人满意的表述，理由是事物必须存在，才能具有谓词——因此，也许最好的表述是“我有义务”；又或者，有哲学家会否认“正确”是一个“描述性”术语，然后通过一条迂回的语言分析路径，得出一种实际上与“正确的行动就是产生最好后果的行动”是一回事的观点（例如，认为你构造自己的“原则”，是为了实现你所选择追求的目的，而“选择”与“最好”之间据说有这样一种联系：所谓经过反思的选择，意味着你选择如何行动，以便产生最好的后果）。此外，还必须说明所谓“道德原则”和“义务动机”所起的作用；还需要探究“善”、“道德上善”和“正确”之间的差异，并考察“应当”句子的特殊特征。这类讨论制造出一种显象，仿佛这里存在着重大的观点分歧，而真正重要的却是一种总体上的相似性。 只要你想到这一点，这种总体上的相似性就很清楚了：每一位最著名的英国学院派道德哲学家都提出过这样一种哲学；按照这种哲学，例如，你不可能坚持说，把无辜者作为达成某种目的的手段来杀害，无论为了什么目的，都不可能是正当的；并且，凡持相反看法的人就是错了。（我不得不把这两点都提出来；因为例如哈雷先生，虽然他所讲授的哲学会鼓励一个人判断说，为了压倒一切的目的，杀害无辜者会是他“应当”选择的做法；但同时，我想他也会教导说，如果一个人选择把“无论为了任何目的都避免杀害无辜者”当作自己的“最高实践原则”，那也不能指责他犯了错误：那恰恰就是他的“原则”。不过，加上这一限定之后，我想仍然可以看出，我所指出的这一点适用于西季威克以来每一位英国学院派道德哲学家。）而这是一件意义重大的事情：因为它意味着，所有这些哲学都与希伯来—基督教伦理完全不相容。

Original · #37

For it has been characteristic of that ethic to teach that there are certain things forbidden whatever consequences threaten, such as: choosing to kill the innocent for any purpose, however good; vicarious punishment; treachery (by which I mean obtaining a man's confidence in a grave matter by promises of trustworthy friendship and then betraying him to his enemies); idolatry; sodomy; adultery; making a false profession of faith. The prohibition of certain things simply in virtue of their description as such-and-such identifiable kinds of action, regardless of any further consequences, is certainly not the whole of the Hebrew-Christian ethic; but it is a noteworthy feature of it; and if every academic philosopher since Sidgwick has written in such a way as to exclude this ethic, it would argue a certain provinciality of mind not to see this incompatibility as the most important fact about these philosophers, and the differences between them as somewhat trifling by comparison.

Translation

因为，这种伦理学的一个显著特征就在于：它教导说，有些事情无论会带来怎样的后果，都是被禁止的，例如：无论目的多么善，都选择杀害无辜者；替罪式的惩罚；背信弃义（我的意思是：在重大事务上，以关于可靠友谊的许诺获取某人的信任，然后再把他出卖给敌人）；偶像崇拜；鸡奸；通奸；作出虚假的信仰宣认。仅仅因为某些事情可被描述为这样或那样一类可识别的行动，就禁止这些事情，而不顾任何进一步的后果，这当然并不是希伯来—基督教伦理的全部；但这无疑是它一个值得注意的特征。倘若自西季威克以来的每一位学院哲学家都以这样的方式写作，以致将这种伦理排除在外，那么，若还看不出这种不相容性乃是关于这些哲学家最重要的事实，反而把他们彼此之间的差异看得更重要，就未免显出一种心灵上的偏狭；相比之下，他们之间的差异实在有些无足轻重。

Original · #38

It is noticeable that none of these philosophers displays any consciousness that there is such an ethic, which he is contradicting: it is pretty well taken for obvious among them all that a prohibition such as that on murder does not operate in face of some consequences.

Translation

值得注意的是，这些哲学家中没有一人意识到，存在着这样一种他们自己正在加以违背的伦理：在他们所有人看来，像禁止谋杀这样的禁令，在某些后果面前并不起作用，这几乎是不言而喻的。

Original · #39

But of course the strictness of the prohibition has as its point that you are not to be tempted by fear or hope of consequences.

Translation

但当然，这一禁令之所以如此严格，正是要使你不因对后果的恐惧或希望而受到诱惑。

Original · #40

If you notice the transition from Mill to Moore, you will suspect that it was made somewhere by someone; Sidgwick will come to mind as a likely name; and you will in fact find it going on, almost casually, in him. He is rather a dull author; and the important things in him occur in asides and footnotes and small bits of argument which are not concerned with his grand classification of the "methods of ethics."

Translation

如果你注意到从密尔到摩尔的转变，就会猜想：这一转变必定是在某处由某个人促成的；西季威克会立刻作为一个颇有可能的人选浮现在你心头；而事实上你会发现，在他那里，这一转变几乎是不经意地展开着。他是一位相当乏味的作者；而他那里真正重要的东西，恰恰出现在一些插话、脚注和零碎的论证片段中，这些内容都与他对“伦理学方法”的宏大分类无关。

Original · #41

A divine law theory of ethics is reduced to an insignificant variety by a footnote telling us that "the best theologians" (God knows whom he meant) tell us that God is to be obeyed in his capacity of a moral being, TJ fopriKos 6 en-awo?; one seems to hear Aristotle saying: zo "Isn't the praise vulgar?"1 —But Sidgwick is vulgar in that kind of way: he thinks, for example, that humility consists in underestimating your own merits—i.e. in a species of untruthfulness; and that the ground for having laws against blasphemy was that it was offensive to believers; and that to go accurately into the virtue of purity is to offend against its canons, a thing he reproves "medieval theologians" for not realizing.

Translation

一种神圣法则伦理学理论，被一条脚注贬成了一个无足轻重的变种；这条脚注告诉我们，“最好的神学家”（天知道他指的是谁）说，我们之所以应当服从上帝，是因为上帝作为一个道德存在应受服从，TJ fopriKos 6 en-awo?；人们仿佛听见亚里士多德在说：zo“这种赞美难道不粗俗吗？”1——不过，西季威克确实就是以这种方式显得粗俗：例如，他认为谦卑在于低估自己的功劳——也就是说，在于某种不诚实；又认为，设立反亵渎法则的根据，在于亵渎会冒犯信徒；还认为，对纯洁这一德性作准确探究，就是违犯它自身的规范——而他却责备“中世纪神学家”没有意识到这一点。

Original · #42

From the point of view of the present enquiry, the most important thing about Sidgwick was his definition of intention. He defines intention in such a way that one must be said to intend any foreseen consequences of one's voluntary action. This definition is obviously incorrect, and I dare say that no one would be found to defend it now.

Translation

从当前这项探究的角度来看，西季威克最重要之处在于他对“意图”的界定。他将“意图”界定得如此之宽，以至于一个人自愿行为的任何可预见后果，都必须被说成是他所意图的。这个定义显然是错误的；我敢说，如今已经不会再有人为它辩护了。

Original · #43

He uses it to put forward an ethical thesis which would now be accepted by many people: the thesis that it does not make any difference to a man's responsibility for something that he foresaw, that he felt no desire for it, either as an end or as a means to an end.

Translation

他借此提出了一个伦理学命题，而如今许多人都会接受这一命题：就一个人对某事所负的责任而言，即便他预见到这件事，却并不想要它——无论是把它当作目的，还是把它当作为达到某个目的的手段——这也丝毫不会造成差异。

Original · #44

Using the language of intention more correctly, and avoiding Sidgwick's faulty conception, we may state the thesis thus: it does not make any difference to a man's responsibility for an effect of his action which he can foresee, that he does not intend it. Nowthis sounds rather edifying; it is I think quite characteristic of very bad degenerations Of thought on such questions that they sound edifying. We can see what it amounts to by considering an example. Let us suppose that a man has a responsibility for the maintenance of some child.

Translation

如果更恰当地使用“意图”这一语言，并避免西季威克的错误概念，我们可以把这一论题表述如下：对于一个人行为所造成的、且他能够预见的某种结果而言，他并不意图这一结果，这一点并不会对他为之承担的责任造成任何差异。这样说听起来颇有一种道德教化的意味；在我看来，关于这类问题的思考一旦出现极其糟糕的败坏，一个相当典型的特征就是：它们听起来总是如此冠冕堂皇。要看这究竟意味着什么，我们可以考虑一个例子。设想某人负有抚养某个孩子的责任。

Original · #45

Therefore deliberately to withdraw support from it is a bad sort of thing for him to do. It would be bad for him to withdraw its maintenance because he didn't want to maintain it any longer; and also bad for him to withdraw it because by doing so he would, let us say, compel someone else to do something. (We may suppose for the sake of argument that compelling that person to do that thing is in itself quite admirable.) But now he has to choose between doing something disgraceful and going to prison; if he goes to prison, it will follow that he withdraws support from the child. By Sidgwick's doctrine, there is no difference in his responsibility for ceasing to maintain the child, between the case where he does it for its own sake or as a means to some other purpose, and when it happens as a foreseen and unavoidable consequence of his going to prison rather than do something disgraceful. It follows that he must weigh up the relative badness of withdrawing support from the child and of doing the disgraceful thing; and it may easily be that the disgraceful thing is in fact a less vicious action than intentionally withdrawing support from the child would be; if then the fact that withdrawing support from the child is a side effect of his going to prison does not make any difference to his responsibility, this consideration will incline him to do the disgraceful thing; which can still be pretty bad. And of course, once he has started to look at the matter in this light, the only reasonable thing for him to consider will be the consequences and not the intrinsic badness of this or that action. So that, given that he judges reasonably that no great harm will come of it, he can do a much more disgraceful thing than deliberately withdrawing support from the child. And if his calculations turn out in fact wrong, it will appear that he was not responsible for the consequences, because he did not foresee them. For in fact Sidgwick's thesis leads to its being quite impossible to estimate the badness of an action except in the light of expected consequences. But if so, then you must estimate the badness in the light of the consequences you expect; and so it will follow that you can exculpate yourself from the actual consequences of the most disgraceful actions, so long as you can make out a case for not having foreseen them. Whereas I should contend that a man is responsible for the bad consequences of his bad actions, but gets no credit for the good ones; and contrariwise is not responsible for the bad consequences of good actions.

Translation

因此，蓄意撤回对那孩子的供养，对他来说就是一种恶劣的行为。如果他撤回供养只是因为自己不想再供养下去了，那对他而言是恶的；如果他撤回供养是因为借此——比方说——可以迫使别人去做某件事，那也同样是恶的。（我们不妨为论证之便设定：迫使那个人去做那件事，本身是相当值得称许的。）但现在，他必须在做一件可耻的事和进监狱之间作出选择；如果他进了监狱，结果就会是他停止供养那个孩子。按照西季威克的学说，在停止供养孩子这件事上，无论他是为这件事本身而这样做，还是把它当作达到其他目的的手段，抑或这是他宁可入狱也不愿去做可耻之事时一个可预见且无法避免的后果，他所负的责任都没有差异。由此可见，他就必须权衡停止供养孩子之恶与做那件可耻之事之恶，看看孰轻孰重；而实际上，那件可耻之事很可能还不如蓄意停止供养孩子那样恶劣。那么，如果停止供养孩子只是他入狱的一个副作用这一点，并不对他的责任造成任何差别，这一考虑就会促使他去做那件可耻的事；而那件事本身仍然可能相当恶劣。 当然，一旦他开始从这个角度来看问题，对他来说唯一合理的考量就只会是后果，而不再是这样或那样的行为本身内在的恶。这样一来，只要他作出合乎理性的判断，认为那样做不会造成什么严重伤害，他就可以去做一件比蓄意停止供养孩子可耻得多的事。而且，如果事实证明他的算计错了，看起来他对那些后果也不负责任，因为他并没有预见到它们。实际上，西季威克的论题会导致这样一种结果：除非根据预期的后果，否则根本不可能估量一个行为有多恶。如果是这样，那么你就必须根据自己所预期的后果来估量这种恶；于是便会得出这样的结论：对于最可耻的行为所造成的实际后果，只要你能提出一套理由说明自己并未预见到它们，你就可以为自己开脱。可是我要主张，一个人应当对其恶行为造成的恶后果负责，却不因其带来的善后果而获得任何褒奖；反过来说，他也不应对善行为所造成的恶后果负责。

Original · #46

The denial of any distinction between foreseen and intended consequences, as far as responsibility is concerned, was not made by Sidgwick in developing any one "method of ethics"; he made this important move on behalf of everybody and just on its own account; and I think it plausible to suggest that this move on the part of Sidgwick explains the difference between old-fashioned Utilitarianism and that consequentialism, as I name it, which marks him and every English academic moral philosopher since him. By it, the kind of consideration which would formerly have been regarded as a temptation, the kind of consideration urged upon men by wives and nattering friends, was given a status by moral philosophers in their theories.

Translation

就责任而言，不承认可预见的后果与意图中的后果之间有任何区别，这并不是西季威克在发展某一种“伦理学方法”时提出的；他作出这一重要转变，是替所有人作出的，而且只是就其本身而论。并且，我认为，有相当理由可以说，西季威克的这一步解释了旧式功利主义与我所谓“结果主义”之间的差异；正是这种结果主义构成了他的特征，也构成了自他以来每一位英国学院派道德哲学家的特征。借由这一步，那种从前本会被视为诱惑的考量——那种由妻子和喋喋不休的朋友们拿来劝说人的考量——便在道德哲学家的理论中获得了一种地位。

Original · #47

It is a necessary feature of consequentialism that it is a shallow philosophy. For there are always borderline cases in ethics. Now if you are either an Aristotelian, or a believer in divine law, you will deal with a borderline case by considering whether doing such-and-such in such-and-such circumstances is, say, murder, or is an act of injustice; and according as you decide it is or it isn't, you judge it to be a thing to do or not. This would be the method of casuistry; and while it may lead you to stretch a point on the circumference, it will not permit you to destroy the centre. But if you are a consequentialist, the question "What is it right to do in such-and-such circumstances?" is a stupid one to raise. The casuist raises such a question only to ask "Would it be permissible to do so-and-so?" or "Would it be permissible not to do so-and-so?" Only if it would not be permissible not to do so-and-so could he say "This would be the thing to do." 1 Otherwise, though he may speak against some action, he cannot prescribe any— for in an actual case, the circumstances (beyond the ones imagined) might suggest all sorts of possibilities, and you can't know in advance what the possibilities are going to be. Now the consequentialist has no footing on which to say "This would be permissible, this not"; because by his own hypothesis, it is the consequences that are to decide, and he has no business to pretend that he can lay it down what possible twists a man could give doing this or that; the most he can say is: a man must not bring about this or that; he has no right to say he will, in an actual case, bring about such-and-such unless he does so-and-so.

Translation

结果主义有一个必然特征：它是一种肤浅的哲学。因为伦理学中总会有一些边界案例。若你是亚里士多德主义者，或信奉神法，你处理边界案例时，就会考察：在某种情境下做某件事，譬如说，是否构成谋杀，或是否属于一种不正义的行为；然后根据你判定它是或不是，来判断这件事该做还是不该做。这就是决疑术的方法。它固然可能使你在边缘处有所放宽，却不会允许你摧毁中心。 但如果你是结果主义者，那么提出“在某种情境下，做什么才是正当的？”这样的问题，就是愚蠢的。决疑术家提出这样的问题，只是为了追问：“这样做是否被允许？”或者“这样不做是否被允许？”只有在“不这样做”不被允许的情况下，他才能说：“这才是该做的事。”1 否则，尽管他可能反对某种行动，却不能规定任何一种行动——因为在实际情形中，现实的处境（超出设想出来的那些情况）可能会呈现出各种各样的可能性，而你无法预先知道这些可能性究竟会是什么。 而结果主义者并没有任何立足点来说“这是被允许的，那不是”；因为按照他自己的假定，应由结果来作出裁断，而他无权假装自己能够事先规定：一个人在做这件事或那件事时，可能会通过何种变通来加以实施。他至多只能说：一个人不得造成这样或那样的结果；但他无权说，在实际情形中，除非一个人这样做或那样做，否则就会造成某种结果。

Original · #48

Further, the consequentialist, in order to be imagining borderline cases at all, has of course to assume some sort of law or standard according to which this is a borderline case, Where then does he get the standard from? In practice the answer invariably is: from the standards current in his society or his circle. And it has in fact been the mark of all these philosophers that they have been extremely conventional; they have nothing in them by which to revolt against the conventional standards of their sort of people; it is impossible that they should be profound. But the chance that a whole range of conventional standards will be decent is small.—Finally, the point of considering hypothetical situations, perhaps very improbable ones, seems to be to elicit from yourself or someone else a hypothetical decision to do something of a bad kind. I don't doubt this has the effect of predisposing people—who will never get into the situations for which they have made hypothetical choices—to consent to similar bad actions, or to praise and flatter those who do them, so long as their crowd does so too, when the desperate circumstances imagined don't hold at all.

Translation

此外，结果论者若要设想所谓边界情形，当然就必须预设某种法则或标准，依此这才算是一个边界情形。那么，这个标准他又是从哪里来的呢？在实践中，答案始终如一：来自他的社会或他所属圈子里通行的标准。事实上，这些哲学家的共同特征恰恰在于，他们极其墨守成规；在他们身上，并没有任何东西能使他们反抗他们那类人所奉行的成规；他们不可能是深刻的。然而，一整套成规恰好都还算正派的可能性，其实很小。——最后，考察各种假设情形——也许是极不可能发生的情形——其目的似乎在于，从你自己或别人那里诱导出一种假设性的决定：去做某种坏事。我并不怀疑，这样做的效果，是使人们——这些人永远不会陷入他们曾为之作出假设性选择的那种处境——更倾向于赞同类似的恶行，或者称赞并阿谀那些做出这种事的人，只要他们所属的群体也这样做；而此时，所设想的那种绝境其实根本并不存在。

Original · #49

Those who recognize the origins of the notions of "obligation" and of the emphatic, "moral," ought, in the divine law conception of ethics, but who reject the notion of a divine legislator, sometimes look about for the possibility of retaining a law conception without a divine legislator. This search, I think, has some interest in it. Perhaps the first thing that suggests itself is the "norms" of a society. But just as one cannot be impressed by Butler when one reflects what conscience can tell people to do, so, I think, one cannot be impressed by this idea if one reflects what the "norms" of a society can be like. That legislation can be "for oneself" I reject as absurd; whatever you do "for yourself" may be admirable; but is not legislating. Once one sees this, one may say: I have to frame my own rules, and these are the best I can frame, and I shall go by them until I know something better: as a man might say "I shall go by the customs of my ancestors."

Translation

那些承认“义务”以及带有强调意味的“道德”这些概念的起源在于神圣法则伦理观、却又拒绝神圣立法者这一概念的人，有时会试图寻找这样一种可能性：在没有神圣立法者的情况下，仍然保留一种法则观念。我认为，这种探寻自有其意味。最先浮现出来的，或许是某个社会的“规范”。但是，正如一个人一旦想想良心实际上可能会告诉人们去做些什么，就不会再觉得巴特勒有说服力一样；我认为，一个人一旦想想一个社会的“规范”可能会是何种样子，也同样不会觉得这种想法有说服力。至于说立法可以是“为自己而立”，我认为这是荒谬的；无论你“为自己”做什么，那都可能是值得赞许的，但并不是立法。一旦看清这一点，人们或许会说：我必须为自己设定规则，而这些是我现在所能设定的最好的规则；在我知道有更好的规则之前，我将依照它们行事——就像一个人可能会说：“我将遵循祖先的习俗。”

Original · #50

Whether this leads to good or evU will depend on the content of the rules or of the customs of one's ancestors. If one is lucky it will lead to'good. Such an attitude would be hopeful in this at any rate: it seems to have in it some Socratic doubt where, from having to fall back on such expedients, it should be clear that Socratic doubt is good; in fact rather generally it must be good for anyone to think "Perhaps in some way I can't see, I may be on a bad path, perhaps I am hopelessly wrong in some essential way".—The search for "norms" might lead someone to look for laws of nature, as if the universe were a legislator; but in the present day this is not likely to lead to good results: it might lead one to eat the weaker according to the laws of nature, but would hardly lead anyone nowadays to notions of justice; the pre-Socratic feeling about justice as comparable to the balance or harmony which kept things going is very remote to us.

Translation

这会导向善还是恶，取决于那些规则或祖先习俗的内容。若运气好，它就会导向善。无论如何，这样一种态度至少在这一点上仍是可取的：其中似乎包含着某种苏格拉底式的怀疑；既然人不得不诉诸这类权宜之计，那么就应当明白，苏格拉底式的怀疑是善的。事实上，更一般地说，任何人若能想到：“也许在某种我看不见的意义上，我正走在一条错误的道路上；也许我在某个根本之点上错得无可救药。”这总归多半是好的。——对“规范”的探寻，可能会使人转而寻求自然法则，仿佛宇宙是一位立法者；但在今天，这不大可能产生好的结果：它也许会使人依据自然法则去吃掉弱者，却几乎不会在今天把任何人引向正义观念；前苏格拉底派那种关于正义的感受——即把正义看作一种维系万物运行的平衡或和谐——离我们已经非常遥远了。

Original · #51

There is another possibility here: "obligation" may be contractual.

Translation

这里还有另一种可能性：“义务”可能是契约性的。

Original · #52

Just as we look at the law to find out what a man subject to it is required by it to do, so we look at a contract tofind out what the man who has made it is required by it to do. Thinkers, admittedly remote from us, might have the idea of a.foedus rerum, of the universe not as a legislator but as the embodiment of a contract. Then if you could find out what the contract was, you would learn your obligations under it. Now, you cannot be under a law unless it has been promulgated to you; and the thinkers who believed in "natural divine law" held that it was promulgated to every grown man in his knowledge of good and evil. Similarly you cannot be in a contract without having contracted, i.e. given signs of entering upon the contract. Just possibly, it might be argued that the use of language which one makes in the ordinary conduct of life amounts in some sense to giving the signs of entering into various contracts. If anyone had this theory, we should want to see it worked out. I suspect that it would be largely formal; it might be possible to construct a system embodying the law (whose status might be compared to that of "laws" of logic):

Translation

正如我们考察法则，是为了弄清受其支配的人被它要求做什么；同样，我们考察契约，是为了弄清立约者被它要求做什么。诚然，某些与我们相距甚远的思想家或许会提出一种 a.foedus rerum 的观念，把宇宙理解为并非立法者，而是一项契约的体现。这样一来，如果你能够弄清这契约是什么，你就会知道自己在其中负有什么义务。 然而，除非一项法则已经向你颁布，否则你就不可能受其约束；而那些相信“自然的神圣法则”的思想家则认为，这种法则是通过每个成年人的善恶知识向其颁布的。与此类似，如果你没有订约，你就不可能处于一项契约之中；也就是说，你必须已经发出某些表示自己加入该契约的信号。也许有人会论证说，我们在日常生活中对语言的运用，在某种意义上就等于发出了加入各种契约的信号。如果真有人持这种理论，我们会希望看到它被充分展开。我怀疑它大体上会是形式性的；也许有可能构造出一个体现该法则的体系（其地位可与逻辑“法则”的地位相比）：

Original · #53

"what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander," but hardly one descending to such particularities as the prohibition on murder or sodomy. Also, while it is clear that you can be subject to a law that you do not acknowledge and have not thought of as law, it does not seem reasonable to say that you can enter upon a contract without knowing that you are doing so; such ignorance is usually held to be destructive of the nature of a contract.

Translation

“适用于鹅的，也适用于公雁”，但显然不会具体到诸如禁止谋杀或鸡奸之类的禁令。此外，尽管很明显，一个人可以受制于某项自己并不承认、也从未视为法则的法则，但若说一个人在不知道自己正在订立契约的情况下也能进入契约关系，似乎就说不通了；这种无知通常被认为会破坏契约的本性。

Original · #54

It might remain to look for "norms" in human virtues: just as man has so many teeth, which is certainly not the average number of teeth men have, but is the number of teeth for the species, so perhaps the species man, regarded not just biologically, but from the point of view of the activity of thought and choice in regard to the various departments of life—powers and faculties and use of things needed— "has" such-and-such virtues: and this "man" with the complete set of virtues is the "norm," as "man" with, e.g., a complete set of teeth is a norm. But in this sense "norm" has ceased to be roughly equivalent to "law." In this sense the notion of a "norm" brings us nearer to an Aristotelian than a law conception of ethics. There is, I think, no harm in that; but if someone looked in this direction to give "norm" a sense, then he ought to recognize what has happened to the notion "norm," which he wanted to mean "law—without bringing God in"— it has ceased to mean "law" at all; and so the notions of "moral obligation," "the moral ought," and "duty" are best put on the Index, if he can manage it.

Translation

或许还可以在人类的德性中去寻找“规范”：正如人有这么多颗牙齿，这当然不是人们牙齿数目的平均值，而是这一物种所应有的牙齿数；那么也许，“人”这个物种，如果不是仅仅从生物学上来看，而是从思想与选择的活动、就生活各个领域——能力、官能以及对所需之物的运用——来考察，也“具有”这样那样的德性；而这个具备完整德性总体的“人”，就是“规范”，正如例如具备完整牙齿的“人”是一个规范一样。 但是，在这个意义上，“规范”已经不再大致等同于“法则”了。在这个意义上，“规范”这一概念使我们更接近一种亚里士多德式的伦理学概念，而不是一种法则式的伦理学概念。我认为，这并没有什么不好；但如果有人朝这个方向探索，以便赋予“规范”一个意义，那么他就应当承认，“规范”这一概念已经发生了怎样的变化——他原本想让它意味着“法则——而又不把上帝牵扯进来”——可它已经根本不再意味着“法则”了。因此，“道德义务”、“道德上的应当”和“责任”这些概念，最好都列入禁书目录，如果他办得到的话。

Original · #55

But meanwhile—is it not clear that there are several concepts that need investigating simply as part of the philosophy of psychology and,—as I should recommend—banishing ethics totally from our minds? Namely—to begin with: "action," "intention," "pleasure," "wanting." More will probably turn up if we start with these.

Translation

不过与此同时，难道不很清楚吗：有若干概念需要加以探究，而这纯粹属于心理学哲学的范围；并且——正如我愿意建议的——应当把伦理学彻底排除出我们的心灵。首先包括：“行动”、“意图”、“愉快”、“想要”。如果我们从这些概念着手，很可能还会发现更多。

Original · #56

Eventually it might be possible to advance to considering the concept "virtue"; with which, I suppose, we should be beginning some sort of a study of ethics.

Translation

最后，也许我们才有可能进一步考察“德性”这一概念；我想，那时我们就应当开始某种伦理学研究了。

Original · #57

I will end by describing the advantages of using the word "ought" in a non-emphatic fashion, and not in a special "moral" sense; of discarding the term "wrong" in a "moral" sense, and using such notions as "unjust."

Translation

最后，我将说明这样做的好处：以一种非强调的方式使用“ought”一词，而不是赋予它一种特殊的“道德”意义；舍弃“wrong”一词在“道德”意义上的用法，转而使用诸如“不正义”之类的概念。

Original · #58

It is possible, if one is allowed to proceed just by giving examples, to distinguish between the intrinsically unjust, and what is unjust given the circumstances. To arrange to get a man judicially punished for something which it can be clearly seen he has not done is intrinsically unjust. This might be done, of course, and often has been done, in all sorts of ways; by suborning false witnesses, by a rule of law by which something is "deemed" to be the case which is admittedly not the case as a matter of fact, and by open insolence on the part of the judges and powerful people when they more or less openly say: "A fig for the fact that you did not do it; we mean to sentence you for it all the same." What is unjust given, e.g., normal circumstances is to deprive people of their ostensible property without legal procedure, not to pay debts, not to keep contracts, and a host of other things of the kind. Now, the circumstances can clearly make a great deal of difference in estimating the justice or injustice of such procedures as these; and these circumstances may sometimes include expected consequences; for example, a man's claim to a bit of property can become a nullity when its seizure and use can avert some obvious disaster: as, e.g., if you could use a machine of his to produce an explosion in which it would be destroyed, but by means of which you could divert afloodor make a gap which a fire could not jump. Now this certainly does not mean that what would ordinarily be an act of injustice, but is not intrinsically unjust, can always be rendered just by a reasonable calculation of better consequences; far from it; but the problems that would be raised in an attempt to draw a boundary line (or boundary area) here are obviously complicated.

Translation

如果仅仅通过举例来说明，那么就可以区分两类情形：一类是内在地不正义的，另一类则是不正义与否取决于具体情势。设法让一个人因某件明明可以看出并非其所为的事而在司法上受到惩罚，这本身就是不正义的。当然，这种事可以通过各种方式做到，而且事实上也常常如此：可以收买伪证人；可以凭借某种法则规定，把某件明明在事实上并非如此的事情“视为”如此；也可以是法官和有权势者公然蛮横无理，他们或多或少公开地说：“你事实上没做过这件事，那又怎样？我们照样要为此判你的罪。”至于在例如通常情形下构成不正义的，则包括：未经法律程序剥夺人们表面上属于他们的财产，不偿还债务，不履行契约，以及大量其他类似的事情。 显然，在评价这类做法是正义还是不正义时，情势会造成极大的差异；而这些情势有时也可能包括可预期的后果。例如，一个人对一小块财产的权利主张，在扣押并使用该财产能够避免某种显而易见的灾难时，就可能失去效力：譬如，你可以使用他的某台机器制造一次爆炸，使机器本身毁坏，但借此却能够使洪水改道，或者炸开一道火势无法越过的缺口。 当然，这绝不意味着：一种通常会是不正义的行为，只要它并非内在地不正义，就总可以通过对较好后果的某种合理计算而成为正义之举；绝非如此。不过，如果试图在这里划出一条界线（或一个边界区域），显然会引出一些复杂的问题。

Original · #59

And while there are certainly some general remarks which ought to be made here, and some boundaries that can be drawn, the decision on particular cases would for the most part be determined Kara I rov 6pB6v Xoyov "according to what's reasonable."—E.g. that such- \ and-such a delay of payment of a such-and-such debt to a person so i circumstanced, on the part of a person so circumstanced, would or , would not be unjust, is really only to be decided "according to what's i reasonable"; and for this there can in principle be no canon other f than giving a few examples. That is to say, while it is because of a I big gap in philosophy that we can give no general account of the f concept of virtue and of the concept of justice, but have to proceed, : using the concepts, only by giving examples; still there is an area ' where it is not because of any gap, but is in principle the case, that there is no account except by way of examples: and that is where the \ canon is "what's reasonable": which of course is not a canon. \ That is all I wish to say about what is just in some circumstances, \ unjust in others; and about the way in which expected consequences ' can play a part in determining what is just. Returning to my example f of the intrinsically unjust: if a procedure is one of judicially punishing j a man for what he is clearly understood not to have done, there can ! be absolutely no argument about the description of this as unjust, i No circumstances, and no expected consequences, which do not modify the description of the procedure as one of judicially punishing | a man for what he is known not to have done can modify the descrip- [ tion of it as unjust. Someone who attempted to dispute this would j only be pretending not to know what "unjust" means: for this is a ' paradigm case of injustice. j And here we see the superiority or the term "unjust" over the ! terms "morally right" and "morally wrong." For in the context of | English moral philosophy since Sidgwick it appears legitimate to i discuss whether it might be "morally right" in some circumstances to I adopt that procedure; but it cannot be argued that the procedure would in any circumstances be just.

Translation

虽然在这里确实有一些一般性的意见应当提出，也有一些界限可以划定，但对具体个案的判断，在大多数情况下都只能由 κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον——“依照合乎理性的判断”——来决定。例如，处于某种境况的人，对另一位处于某种境况的人，延迟偿还某一笔债务；这样的拖延是否构成不正义，实际上只能“依照合乎理性的判断”来裁定。就此而言，原则上除了举出若干例子之外，不可能有别的准则。换言之，我们之所以无法对德性的概念和正义的概念作出一般性的说明，而只能在运用这些概念时借助例子来推进，固然是因为哲学上存在一个巨大的缺口；但还有一类情形，并不是因为这里有什么缺口，而是原则上如此：除了通过例子之外，根本不可能有任何说明。这类情形就是以“合乎理性的判断”为准则的地方；而这当然并不是一种真正的准则。 关于某些情境下何为正义、另一些情境下何为不正义，以及预期后果能够以何种方式在决定何为正义时发挥作用，我想说的也就这些。现在回到我关于“内在地不正义之事”的例子：如果某一程序是在司法上惩罚一个人，而人们清楚知道他并没有做他因此受罚的那件事，那么把这一程序描述为不正义，就绝对没有任何争论余地。只要各种情境和各种预期后果并不改变对这一程序的描述——即：在司法上惩罚一个明知并未做此事的人——它们就不可能改变它作为不正义之事的描述。谁若试图争辩这一点，就只是在假装不知道“不正义”是什么意思；因为这正是不正义的一个范例。 在这里，我们也可以看出，“不正义”这个词优于“道德上正当”和“道德上错误”这些说法。因为在西季威克以来的英国道德哲学语境中，讨论在某些情境下采取这种程序是否可能是“道德上正当的”，似乎是允许的；但却不能论证说，这种程序在任何情境下会是正义的。

Original · #60

Now I am not able to do the philosophy involved—and I think that no one in the present situation of English philosophy can do the philosophy involved—but it is clear that a good man is a just man; and a just man is a man who habitually refuses to commit or participate in any unjust actions for fear of any consequences, or to obtain any advantage, for himself or anyone else. Perhaps no one will disagree. But, it will be said, what is unjust is sometimes determined by expected consequences; and certainly that is true. But there are cases where it is not: now if someone says, "I agree, but all this wants a lot of explaining," then he is right, and, what is more, the situation at present is that we can't do the explaining; we lack the philosophic equipment. But if someone really thinks, in advance,1 that it is open to question whether such an action as procuring the judicial execution of the innocent should be quite excluded from consideration—I do not want to argue with him; he shows a corrupt mind.

Translation

现在我无力处理其中所涉及的哲学问题——而且我认为，就英国哲学目前的状况而言，也没有人能够处理这些问题——但有一点是清楚的：善人就是正义的人；而正义的人，就是那种惯常拒绝实施任何不正义行为、也拒绝参与其中的人；他不会因为畏惧任何后果，也不会为了给自己或任何他人谋求任何利益，而去这样做。也许不会有人不同意这一点。 但是，人们会说，什么是不正义的，有时是由预期后果决定的；这当然不错。但也有一些情形并非如此。现在，如果有人说：“我同意，不过这一切还需要大量说明。”那么他说得对；而且更进一步说，目前的情形是，我们无法作出这种说明；我们缺乏哲学上的工具。 但如果真有人预先就认为，像促成对无辜者的司法处决这样的行为，是否应当被完全排除在考虑之外，这仍然是个有待商榷的问题，1那么我不想同他争论；这表明他的心灵已经腐坏了。

Original · #61

In such cases our moral philosophers seek to impose a dilemma upon us. "If we have a case where the term 'unjust' applies purely in virtue of a factual description, can't one raise the question whether one sometimes conceivably ought to do injustice? If 'what is unjust' is determined by consideration of whether it is right to do so-and-so in such-and-such circumstances, then the question whether it is 'right' to commit injustice can't arise, just because 'wrong' has been built into the definition of injustice. But if we have a case where the description 'unjust' applies purely in virtue of the facts, without bringing 'wrong' in, then the question can arise whether one 'ought' perhaps to commit an injustice, whether it might not be 'right' to?

Translation

在这类情形中，我们的道德哲学家试图把一个两难强加给我们：“如果有这样一种情形：‘不正义’这一说法之所以适用，纯粹是由于某种事实描述，难道不就可以进一步追问：人在某些情况下是否也可能应当去做不正义之事吗？如果‘什么是不正义的’是由这样的考虑所决定的——即在如此这般的情形中做如此这般的事是否正当——那么，‘做不正义之事是否正当’这个问题就不可能出现；因为‘错误’已经被纳入了不正义的定义之中。但如果有这样一种情形：‘不正义’这一描述之所以适用，纯粹是由于事实本身，而并未把‘错误’带进来，那么，就可以提出这样的问题：一个人是否也许‘应当’去做某种不正义之事，是否这样做也可能是‘正当的’？”

Original · #62

And of course 'ought' and 'right' are being used in their moral senses here. Now either you must decide what is 'morally right' in the light of certain other 'principles,' or you make a 'principle' about this and decide that an injustice is never 'right'; but even if you do the latter you are going beyond the facts; you are making a decision that you will not, or that it is wrong to, commit injustice.

Translation

当然，这里的“ought”和“right”都是在道德意义上使用的。现在，要么你必须根据某些其他“原则”来判定什么在道德上是正当的；要么你就此确立一条“原则”，认定不正义之举绝不可能是“正当”的；但即便采取后一种做法，你也仍然超出了事实本身：你是在作出一个决定——你不会去实施不正义，或者说，实施不正义是错误的。

Original · #63

But in either case, if the term 'unjust' is determined simply by the facts, it is not the term 'unjust' that determines that the term 'wrong' applies, but a decision that injustice is wrong, together with the diagnosis of the 'factual' description as entailing injustice.

Translation

但无论在哪一种情况下，如果“unjust”这一术语仅仅由事实所决定，那么决定“wrong”这一术语是否适用的，并不是“unjust”这一术语本身，而是这样一种判断：不正义是错误的；再加上这样一种认定：对“事实性”描述的判断蕴含着不正义。

Original · #64

But the man who makes an absolute decision that injustice is 'wrong' has no footing on which to criticize someone who does not make that decision as judging falsely."

Translation

但是，那种断然认定不正义是“错误”的人，并没有任何立足点可以据此批评未作出这种认定的人，指责其判断有误。

Original · #65

In this argument "wrong" of course is explained as meaning "morally wrong," and all the atmosphere of the term is retained while its substance is guaranteed quite null. Now let us remember that "morally wrong" is the term which is the heir of the notion "illicit," or "what there is an obligation not to do"; which belongs in a divine law theory or ethics. Here it really does add something to the description "unjust" to say there is an obligation not to do it; for what obliges

Translation

在这一论证中，“wrong”当然被解释为意指“在道德上错误”；这样一来，这个词的全部意味固然都被保留下来了，但其实体内容却被保证完全空无。现在请记住：“在道德上错误”这个术语，乃是“illicit”这一观念——亦即“有义务不去做的事”——的继承者；它属于神圣法则理论或伦理学的范围。在那里，说某事“有义务不去做”，相对于仅仅把它描述为“不正义”，确实增添了某种内容；因为，究竟是什么使人负有义务呢？

Original · #66

1 If he thinks it in the concrete situation, he is of course merely a normally

Translation

1 如果他是在具体情境中这样想的，那么他当然不过是一个通常的

Original · #67

tempted human being. In discussion when this paper was read, as was perhaps to be expected, this case was produced: a government is required to have an innocent man tried, sentenced and executed under threat of a "hydrogen bomb war." It would seem strange to me to have much hope of so averting a war threatened by such men as made this demand. But the most important thing about the way in which cases like this are invented in discussions, is the assumption that only two courses are open: here, compliance and open defiance. No one can say in advance of such a situation what the possibilities arc going to be—e.g. that there is none of stalling by a feigned willingness to comply, accompanied by a skilfully arranged "escape" of the victim.

Translation

受诱惑的存在。在宣读本文后的讨论中，正如或许可以预料的那样，有人提出了这样一个案例：某政府被要求将一名无辜者交付审判、判刑并处决，否则就会面临“一场氢弹战争”的威胁。在我看来，若把希望寄托于用这种方式来避免一场由提出这种要求的人所威胁发动的战争，未免有些奇怪。 但讨论中构造这类案例时，最重要的一点在于其背后的预设：仿佛只有两条路可走，即服从和公开反抗。没有人能够预先断言，在那样的情境中究竟会有哪些可能性——例如，是否根本并非无法通过假意愿意服从来拖延时间，同时又巧妙安排使受害者得以“逃脱”。

Original · #68

B 17 is the divine law—as rules oblige in a game. So if the divine law obliges not to commit injustice by forbidding injustice, it really does add something to the description "unjust" to say there is an obligation not to do it, And it is because "morally wrong" is the heir of this concept, but an heir that is cut off from the family of concepts from which it sprang, that "morally wrong" both goes beyond the mere factual description "unjust" and seems to have no discernible content except a certain compelling force, which I should call purely psychological. And such is the force of the term that philosophers actually suppose that the divine law notion can be dismissed as making no essential difference even if it is held—because they think that a "practical principle" running "I ought (i.e. am morally obliged) to obey divine laws" is required for the man who believes in divine laws.

Translation

B17 就是神圣法则——正如游戏中的规则会施加约束一样。因此，如果神圣法则通过禁止不正义而要求人不得行不正义之事，那么，说人有义务不去做这种事，确实是在“不正义”这一描述之上增添了某种内容。 而“道德上错误”之所以会如此，是因为它乃是这一概念的继承者；但这个继承者又与它所由产生的那一概念家族断绝了联系。正因如此，“道德上错误”一方面超出了单纯事实性的“不正义”这一描述，另一方面，除了某种我愿称之为纯粹心理学性的强制力之外，似乎又没有任何可辨识的内容。这个术语的力量竟如此之大，以至于哲学家们实际上竟会认为，即便承认神圣法则观念，也可以把它撇开，视为并未造成任何本质性的差异；因为他们认为，对于相信神圣法则的人来说，还需要一条“实践原则”：“我应当（即在道德上有义务）服从神圣法则。”

Original · #69

But actually this notion of obligation is a notion which only operates in the context of law. And I should be inclined to congratulate the present-day moral philosophers on depriving "morally ought" of its now delusive appearance of content, if only they did not manifest a detestable desire to retain the atmosphere of the term.

Translation

但实际上，这种义务概念只有在法则的语境中才起作用。倘若当代道德哲学家没有显露出一种可憎的企图，想要保留这一术语的那种氛围，那么对于他们剥去了“道德上应当”如今那种虚妄的内容显象，我几乎是要表示赞许的。

Original · #70

It may be possible, if we are resolute, to discard the notion "morally ought," and simply return to the ordinary "ought", which, we ought to notice, is such an extremely frequent term of human language that it is difficult to imagine getting on without it. Now if we do return to it, can't it reasonably be asked whether one might ever need to commit injustice, or whether it won't be the best thing to do? Of course it can. And the answers will be various. One man—a philosopher—may say that since justice is a virtue, and injustice a vice, and virtues and vices are built up by the performances of the action in which they are instanced, an act of injustice will tend to make a man bad; and essentially the flourishing of a man qua man consists in his being good (e.g. in virtues); but for any X to which such terms apply, X needs what makes it flourish, so a man needs, or ought to perform, only virtuous actions; and even if, as it must be admitted may happen, he flourishes less, or not at all, in inessentials, by avoiding injustice, his life is spoiled in essentials by not avoiding injustice—so he still needs to perform only just actions. That is roughly how Plato and Aristotle talk; but it can be seen that philosophically there is a huge gap, at present unfillable as far as we are concerned, which needs to be filled by an account of human nature, human action, the type of characteristic a virtue is, and above all of human "flourishing." And it is the last concept that appears the most doubtful. For it is a bit much to swallow that a man in pain and hunger and poor and friendless is "flourishing," as Aristotle himself admitted. Further, someone might say that one at least needed to stay alive to "flourish." Another man unimpressed by all that will say in a hard case "What we need is such-and-such, which we won't get without doing this (which is unjust)—so this is what we ought to do." Another man, who does not follow the rather elaborate reasoning of the philosophers, simply says "I know it is in any case a disgraceful thing to say that one had better commit this unjust action." The man who believes in divine laws will say perhaps "It is forbidden, and however it looks, it cannot be to anyone's profit to commit injustice"; he like the Greek philosophers can think in terms of "flourishing." If he is a Stoic, he is apt to have a decidedly strained notion of what "flourishing consists" in; if he is a Jew or Christian, he need not have any very distinct notion: the way it will profit him to abstain from injustice is something that he leaves it to God to determine, himself only saying "It can't do me any good to go against his law." (But he also hopes for a great reward in a new life later on, e.g. at the coming of Messiah; but in this he is relying on special promises.)

Translation

如果我们拿定主意，也许就能够抛开“在道德上应当”这一观念，而干脆回到普通的“应当”。我们应当注意，“应当”是人类语言中一个极其常见的词，以至于很难想象没有它我们还能如何过活。现在，如果我们确实回到这个词上来，难道不可以合理地问：人是否有时会需要去做不义之事，或者说，那是否反而会是最好的做法？当然可以这样问。而且，对此的回答会各不相同。 有一种人——哲学家——可能会说：既然正义是一种德性，不义是一种恶习，而德性和恶习都是通过实施那些体现它们的行为逐渐形成的，那么，一次不义的行为就会倾向于使人变坏；而作为人之为人的兴盛，实质上就在于他是善的（例如，具有德性）。但是，凡适用这类词语的任何X，都需要那使其兴盛的东西；因此，一个人所需要的，或者说所应当做的，就只能是德性的行为。即使——这一点必须承认确有可能——由于避免不义，他在非根本的方面兴盛得较少，甚至完全谈不上兴盛；如果他不避免不义，他的生活在根本的方面就会败坏掉——所以，他仍然只需要做正义的行为。柏拉图和亚里士多德大致就是这样说的；但我们可以看出，从哲学上说，这里有一道巨大的鸿沟。就我们目前而言，这道鸿沟还无法填补；而要填补它，就需要说明人的本性、人的行动、德性这种特征究竟属于何种类型，尤其还需要说明人的“兴盛”究竟是什么。而最后这个概念看起来最成问题。因为，要让人吞下这样一种说法，未免太过了：一个身处痛苦、饥饿、贫穷而又无友之境的人，居然是在“兴盛”——这一点亚里士多德自己也承认。再进一步说，有人还可能会说，一个人至少得活着，才能“兴盛”。 另一种人对上述一切都不以为意，在棘手情形中就会说：“我们需要的是这样那样的东西；不做这件事——而这件事是不义的——我们就得不到它，所以这就是我们应当做的。”还有一种人，并不追随哲学家那套颇为繁复的论证，只是简单地说：“我知道，无论如何，说人最好还是去做这件不义之事，都是可耻的。”相信神圣法则的人也许会说：“这是被禁止的；而且无论表面上看起来怎样，对任何人来说，做不义之事都不可能有利。”他和希腊哲学家一样，也可以从“兴盛”的角度来思考。如果他是斯多亚派，他往往会对“兴盛在于什么”抱持一种明显过于勉强的看法；如果他是犹太人或基督徒，他则未必需要有什么十分明确的看法：不做不义之事究竟会以何种方式使他受益，这一点他交由上帝来决定；他自己只说：“违背他的法则，对我不可能有任何好处。”（不过，他也期待着此后在一种新的生命中获得巨大的奖赏，例如在弥赛亚来临之时；但在这一点上，他依赖的是某些特殊的许诺。）

Original · #71

It is left to modern moral philosophy—the moral philosophy of all the well-known English ethicists since Sidgwick—to construct systems according to which the man who says "We need such-and-such, and will only get it this way" may be a virtuous character: that is to say, it is left open to debate whether such a procedure as the judicial punishment of the innocent may not in some circumstances be the "right" one to adopt; and though the present Oxford moral philosophers would accord a man permission to "make it his principle" not to do such a thing, they teach a philosophy according to which the particular consequences of such an action could "morally" be taken into account by a man who was debating what to do; and if they were such as to conflict with his "ends," it might be a step in his moral education to frame a moral principle under which he "managed" (to use Mr. Nowell-Smith's phrase1 ) to bring the action; or it might be a new "decision of principle," making which was an advance in the formation of his moral thinking (to adopt Mr. Hare's conception), to decide: in such-and-such circumstances one ought to procure the judicial condemnation of the innocent. And that is my complaint.

Translation

现代道德哲学——也就是自西季威克以来一切著名英国伦理学家的道德哲学——竟然建构出这样一些体系：按照这些体系，那种说“我们需要这样那样的东西，而且只有通过这种办法才能得到它”的人，也可能是一个有德性的人。也就是说，像以司法手段惩罚无辜者这样的做法，在某些情形下是否可能是应当采取的“正当”做法，竟被当作一个悬而未决、可以争论的问题；而且，尽管当今牛津的道德哲学家会允许一个人“把不做这种事当作自己的原则”，他们所教授的哲学却认为：一个人在斟酌自己该做什么时，可以“从道德上”把这种行为的具体后果纳入考虑；如果这些后果与他的“目的”相冲突，那么，在其道德教育过程中，形成一条道德原则，把该行为“设法归入”其下（用诺埃尔-史密斯先生的话说^1），也可能是其中的一步；或者，按照黑尔先生的看法，作出一个新的“原则决定”也可能是其道德思维形成过程中的一种进展——这个决定就是：在这样那样的情形下，人应当促成对无辜者的司法定罪。而这就是我的指控。

Original · #72

Somerville College, Oxford.

Translation

牛津大学萨默维尔学院。

Original · #73

1 This paper was originally read to the Voltaire Society in Oxford.

Translation

1 本文最初是在牛津伏尔泰学会宣读的。

Original · #74

1 The above two paragraphs are an abstract of a paper "On Brute Facts" forthcoming in Analysis.

Translation

上述两段摘自即将在《Analysis》发表的论文“On Brute Facts”的摘要。

Original · #75

1 They did not deny the existence of divine law; but their most characteristic doctrine was that it was given, not to be obeyed, but to show man's incapacity to obey it, even by grace; and this applied not merely to the ramified prescriptions of the Torah, but to the requirements of "natural divine law." Cf. in this connection the decree of Trent against the teaching that Christ was only to be trusted in as mediator, not obeyed as legislator,

Translation

他们并不否认神圣法则的存在；但他们最具代表性的教义是：这一法则被赐下，并不是为了让人遵行，而是为了表明人即便蒙受恩典，也无力遵行它。这一点不仅适用于《托拉》中繁复分歧的各项诫命，也适用于“自然的神圣法则”的要求。关于这一点，可参见特伦托会议针对如下教义所作的谴责令：基督只应被信赖为中保，而不应作为立法者而被服从。

Original · #76

1 As it is absurdly called. Since major premise =premise containing the term which is predicate in the conclusion, it is a solecism to speak of it in the connection with practical reasoning.

Translation

1 这种说法本来就荒谬。既然所谓“大前提”，是指包含这样一个项的前提，而该项在结论中充当谓项，那么在实践推理的语境中谈论“大前提”，就是一种语病。

Original · #77

1 Oxford Objectivists of course distinguish between "consequences" and "intrinsic values" and so produce a misleading appearance of not being "consequentialists." But they do not hold—and Ross explicitly denies—that the gravity of, e.g., procuring the condemnation of the innocent is such that it cannot be outweighed by, e.g., national interest. Hence their distinction is of no importance.

Translation

当然，牛津客观主义者确实区分“后果”与“内在价值”，因而制造出一种误导性的显象，仿佛他们并非“后果主义者”。但他们并不主张——而且罗斯还明确否认——例如，使无辜者遭到定罪这类行为的严重性高到连国家利益之类的考虑都无法将其压倒。因此，他们的这种区分并无重要性。

Original · #78

* E.N. ii78bi6. II

Translation

* E.N. ii78bi6。II

Original · #79

1 Necessarily a rare case: for the positive precepts, e.g. "Honour your parents," hardly ever prescribe, and seldom even necessitate, any particular action.

Translation

1 这必定是一种罕见的情形：因为肯定性诫命——例如“孝敬父母”——几乎从不规定任何特定的行动，甚至很少使任何特定行动成为必要。

Original · #80

1 Ethics, p. 308.

Translation

1 《伦理学》，第308页。