Hegel and Colonialism

Original · #1

Abstract

Translation

摘要

Original · #2

This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World History with respect to colonialism. For Hegel, freedom can be recognized and practised only in classical, Christian and modern Europe; therefore, the world’s other peoples can acquire freedom only if Europeans impose their civilization upon them. Although this imposition denies freedom to colonized peoples, this denial is legitimate for Hegel because it is the sole condition on which these peoples can gain freedom in the longer term. The article then considers whether Hegel’s basic account of freedom can be extricated from his Eurocentric and pro-colonialist interpretation of the course of history. The article argues that matters are more complicated because that interpretation has significant connections with Hegel’s conception of freedom as self-determination.

Translation

本文探讨黑格尔的世界历史哲学对于殖民主义的意涵。在黑格尔看来，自由只有在古典、基督教和现代的欧洲才能被承认和实践；因此，世界其他民族只有在欧洲人将其文明强加于他们时，才可能获得自由。尽管这种强加剥夺了被殖民民族的自由，但在黑格尔看来，这种剥夺是正当的，因为这是这些民族在长期能够获得自由的唯一条件。接着，本文考察黑格尔关于自由的基本论述是否可以从他对历史进程所做的欧洲中心主义及亲殖民主义的解释中剥离出来。本文认为，事情要复杂得多，因为这种解释与黑格尔将自由理解为自我规定的观念之间存在着重要的联系。

Original · #3

Recently there has been considerable discussion amongst Hegel scholars of Hegel’s views on race. 1 There has been less direct consideration of what Hegel thought or what his philosophy implies regarding colonialism, 2 even though the discourses of race, colonialism and Eurocentrism are entwined. In this article I reconstruct Hegel’s position on colonialism—taking ‘colonialism’ to mean the system of European political and economic dominance over the rest of the world which began to form when Columbus and others arrived in North and South America, culminated in the ‘scramble for Africa’ in the late nineteenth century, and lasted into the mid-twentieth century.

Translation

近来，黑格尔研究者已就黑格尔的种族观展开了大量讨论。相比之下，尽管种族、殖民主义和欧洲中心主义这几种话语彼此交织，但对于黑格尔本人如何看待殖民主义，或者说他的哲学对殖民主义意味着什么，人们的直接探讨却少得多。在本文中，我将重构黑格尔关于殖民主义的立场——这里所谓“殖民主义”，是指欧洲对世界其他地区实行政治和经济支配的体系。这一体系始于哥伦布等人抵达南北美洲之时，至十九世纪晚期“瓜分非洲”时达到顶峰，并一直延续到二十世纪中叶。

Original · #4

To reconstruct Hegel’s position on colonialism I focus on his Philosophy of World History (PWH), for reasons explained in Section I, in which I re-examine the Eurocentrism of the PWH’s essential claims. In Section II, I explain how the PWH implies that colonialism is justified on the grounds that it spreads the principle and spirit of freedom. For Hegel, it has only been possible for this principle to be grasped and put into practice in Europe. Therefore, the world’s other peoples can acquire freedom only if Europeans first impose their civilization upon them. Although this imposition denies freedom to colonized peoples, this denial is legitimate because it is the sole condition on which these peoples can gain freedom in the longer term. Further, colonialism is necessary to the ongoing expansion of freedom which is world history’s goal.

Translation

为了重构黑格尔关于殖民主义的立场，我将着重考察他的《世界历史哲学》（PWH）；其原因将在第一节中说明，在那里我也会重新审视《世界历史哲学》基本主张中的欧洲中心主义。第二节中，我将说明，《世界历史哲学》实际上意味着：殖民主义之所以具有正当性，是因为它传播了自由的原则与精神。按照黑格尔的看法，这一原则只有在欧洲才可能被理解并付诸实践。因此，世界上其他民族只有在欧洲人先把欧洲文明强加给他们之后，才能获得自由。尽管这种强加剥夺了被殖民民族的自由，但这种剥夺却是正当的，因为这是这些民族从长远来看能够获得自由的唯一条件。此外，殖民主义对于自由的持续扩展——而这正是世界历史的目标——也是必要的。

Original · #5

I argue, then, that Hegel’s PWH generates a case for colonialism. In this I agree with critics of Hegel such as Enrique Dussel and Teshale Tibebu. They regard Hegel as a—indeed the—quintessential Eurocentrist, giving ‘the most sophisticated rendition of the Eurocentric paradigm’ (Tibebu 2010: xxi) and of the ‘myth of modernity’ (Dussel 1993)—the myth that modern Europe is the world’s most advanced civilization which is obliged to educate, develop and civilize the others, using violence where this mission requires it. I also take it that:

Translation

我认为，黑格尔的《世界历史哲学》为殖民主义提供了一套辩护论证。在这一点上，我同意恩里克·杜塞尔（Enrique Dussel）和特沙列·提贝布（Teshale Tibebu）等黑格尔批评者的观点。他们视黑格尔为典型——甚至可以说是最典型的欧洲中心主义者，认为他给出了“欧洲中心主义范式最精致、最复杂的表述”（Tibebu 2010: xxi）以及对“现代性神话”（Dussel 1993）的表述。所谓“现代性神话”，指的是这样一种神话：现代欧洲是世界上最先进的文明，有义务去教育、发展并开化其他民族，而如果这一使命需要，甚至可以动用暴力。我也主张：

Original · #6

Eurocentrism … emerged as a discursive rationale for colonialism … [but a]lthough colonialist discourse and Eurocentric discourse are intimately intertwined, the terms have a distinct emphasis. While the former explicitly justifies colonial practices, the latter embeds, takes for granted and ‘normalizes’ the hierarchical power relations generated by colonialism and imperialism, without necessarily even thematizing these issues directly. (Shohat and Stam [1994] 2014: 2) As we will see, in Hegel’s PWH overt Eurocentrism and more implicit procolonial reasoning are present in just this fashion. One might conclude— assuming that colonialism was morally wrong—that there is little point studying Hegel’s stance on colonialism today. I disagree, and believe such study important because the international order today remains deeply shaped by the power relations established under colonialism, so much so that this order can reasonably be described as ‘neo-colonial’ or as continuing to exhibit a ‘coloniality of power’ (Quijano 2000). In this context it is important to understand the Eurocentric and colonialist discourses that still shape the world, and to reflect critically on how some major European philosophers, including Hegel, have contributed to these discourses.

Translation

欧洲中心主义……是作为殖民主义的一种话语依据而出现的……［不过］，虽然殖民主义话语和欧洲中心主义话语紧密交织，但这两个术语各有侧重。前者明确地为殖民实践辩护；后者则嵌入、视为理所当然并将殖民主义和帝国主义所产生的等级化权力关系“正常化”，甚至未必直接将这些议题主题化。（Shohat and Stam [1994] 2014: 2）下文会看到，在黑格尔的《世界历史哲学》中，公开的欧洲中心主义和更隐晦的支持殖民的推理，正是以这种方式并存的。 如果设定殖民主义在道德上是错误的，人们或许会认为今天研究黑格尔对殖民主义的立场已无甚意义。我并不同意，并相信这种研究很重要，因为当今的国际秩序仍深受殖民主义时期建立的权力关系的形塑，以至于这一秩序完全有理由被称作“新殖民主义”的，或者说，它仍在持续呈现一种“权力的殖民性”（Quijano 2000）。在此背景下，理解至今仍在塑造世界的欧洲中心主义和殖民主义话语，并批判性地反思包括黑格尔在内的一些重要欧洲哲学家如何助长了这些话语，就十分重要。

Original · #7

An alternative view is that it is worth studying Hegel’s stance on colonialism so as to find out what resources he offers us for critiquing it. Perhaps we can filter out his basic account of freedom and its historicity from his Eurocentric narrative of the actual movement of history, and perhaps, so filtered out, his account of freedom tells against colonialism for denying freedom to many peoples. I consider this strategy for rescuing Hegel from himself in Section III, then argue in Section IV that matters are more complicated because Hegel’s conception of freedom as self-determination has significant connections with his Eurocentrism and the pro-colonialism that follows from it. His philosophy nonetheless contains possibilities that can be taken in an anti-colonial direction; but it also contains elements that have real and tenacious links with colonialism, which we should not overlook.

Translation

另一种观点认为，研究黑格尔对殖民主义的立场是值得的，这有助于找出他提供了哪些批判殖民主义的思想资源。或许，我们能够将他关于自由及其历史性的基本论述，从他那欧洲中心的现实历史进程叙事中剥离出来；而一旦剥离出来，他的自由理论或许恰恰会指向对殖民主义的批判，因为殖民主义剥夺了众多民族的自由。我将在第三节中考察这种将黑格尔从他自身理论中“挽救”出来的策略；进而在第四节中论证，情况其实更为复杂，因为黑格尔将自由理解为自我规定，这一概念与其欧洲中心主义以及由此产生的亲殖民主义立场有着深刻的关联。尽管如此，他的哲学中确实包含着可以向反殖民主义方向发展的可能性；但同时也包含着一些与殖民主义有着真实且顽固关联的要求，这些都是我们不应忽视的。

Original · #8

I. World history and Eurocentrism

Translation

一、世界历史与欧洲中心主义

Original · #9

Hegel’s best-known argument regarding colonialism, in his Philosophy of Right, is that migration of the European poor to colonies overseas can alleviate modern civil society’s endemic problems of poverty and over-production (PR §§246–48,

Translation

黑格尔在《法哲学》中关于殖民主义最为人熟知的论证是：欧洲贫困人口向海外殖民地迁徙，能够缓解现代市民社会中固有的贫困与生产过剩问题（PR §§246–48，

Original · #10

267–69). 3 In this article, though, I concentrate on the scattered statements on

Translation

267–69）。3 不过，在本文中，我将聚焦于那些零散见于文中的论述：

Original · #11

colonialism in Hegel’s Philosophy of World History (PWH), along with the PWH’s broader implications.^4 I focus on the PWH because this is where Hegel argues that history runs from East to West, that history proper only unfolds in the West, and that Christian European civilization, especially in its latest phase as modern, liberal Europe, is the most advanced world civilization (so far, at least).

Translation

我将讨论黑格尔《世界历史哲学》中的殖民主义，以及这部著作更广泛的意涵。^4 我之所以聚焦于《世界历史哲学》，是因为黑格尔正是在这里主张：历史从东方走向西方，严格意义上的历史只在西方展开，而基督教的欧洲文明——尤其是在其最新阶段，即现代、奉行自由主义的欧洲——是（至少迄今为止）世界上最先进的文明。

Original · #12

That is, in the PWH Hegel overtly upholds Eurocentrism, or so I will argue in this section.

Translation

也就是说，在《历史哲学》中，黑格尔明确主张欧洲中心主义——至少，我将在本节中论证这一点。

Original · #13

I understand Eurocentrism, informed by Shohat and Stam (2014: esp. 2–3), as the position that (i) history follows a linear path from Greece through Rome to medieval then modern Europe, all change powered internally to this line; (ii) ‘modern Europe’ includes European-derived cultures in the US, Australia and broadly ‘the West’; (iii) inherent progress unfolds along this intra-European line towards freedom, equality and other liberal values; (iv) where unfreedom has existed or still exists in Europe’s past or present, this is only because Europe has not yet fully worked through and applied its own governing principles of freedom and equality; (v) no equivalent progression to freedom and equality has occurred outside the West. This kind of position, focusing on freedom, is expressed in Hegel’s PWH—his distinctive mode of approaching history notwithstanding— and his Eurocentrism brings pro-colonialism in its wake, I’ll argue. Thus it is from the PWH that we can best ascertain how Hegel’s thought tells for colonialism.

Translation

我借鉴 Shohat 和 Stam（2014：特别是第2–3页）的界定，将欧洲中心主义理解为这样一种立场：第一，历史沿着一条线性路径发展，从希腊经由罗马，至中世纪欧洲，再到现代欧洲，一切变化的动力都内在于这条线索之中；第二，“现代欧洲”也包括美国、澳大利亚乃至广义上的“西方”中那些源自欧洲的文化；第三，内在的进步沿着这条欧洲内部的线索展开，趋向自由、平等及其他自由主义价值；第四，若在欧洲的过去或现在存在或仍存在不自由，那也只是因为欧洲尚未完全贯彻和落实其自身关于自由与平等的根本原则；第五，在西方之外，并未出现任何与此相当的、通向自由与平等的进展。黑格尔在《历史哲学讲演录》中表达了这种以自由为核心的立场——尽管他理解历史的方式有其独特性——而我认为，他的欧洲中心主义也连带导致了亲殖民主义的立场。因此，我们最好从《历史哲学讲演录》入手，来判断黑格尔的思想是如何为殖民主义辩护的。

Original · #14

Regarding Hegel’s distinctive approach to history, suffice it here to say that Hegel’s deceptively simple claim is to apply thought to history (H 78) where ‘the sole conception [or thought] that [philosophy] brings … is the simple conception of reason—the conception that reason governs the world, and that therefore world history is a rational process’ (79). That is, we aim to discern the immanent reason why real historical events took place: to see why it made sense for these events to happen, why they had to happen, to advance history’s overarching goal: the ‘consciousness of freedom’ (Bewußtsein der Freiheit). This goes even for dismal episodes of decline, destruction and suffering: we ask how they too played a part in history’s broader advancement. This is not a matter of imposing an external logic or categorial scheme on historical events (81) but rather of discerning their logic, through interpretation of the recorded facts. That said, we the philosophical historians bring forward the idea of reason and with it freedom—the idea that this single goal must regulate all world events—and we find that the historical record confirms this. ‘Whoever looks at the world rationally sees it as rational too; the two exist in a reciprocal relationship’ (81).

Translation

关于黑格尔独特的历史研究进路，这里只需指出：他那个看似简单的主张，就是把思想运用于历史（H 78）；而“（哲学）所带来的唯一概念（或思想）……就是理性的简单概念——即理性统治世界，因而世界历史是一个合乎理性的过程这一概念”（79）。也就是说，我们要辨识真实历史事件之所以发生的内在理性：看清这些事件为何有其道理，为何它们必须发生，以推进历史的总体目标——“自由意识”（Bewußtsein der Freiheit）。即便是那些令人沮丧的衰落、毁灭与苦难的插曲，也不例外：我们要追问它们如何在历史更宏大的进程中发挥了作用。这并不是把某种外在的逻辑或范畴图式强加于历史事件之上（81），而是通过对既有事实记录的解释，辨认出这些事件自身的逻辑。 这就是说，我们这些哲学的历史研究者提出了理性的观念，并随之提出了自由的观念——亦即这个唯一目标必然支配所有世界历史事件的观念——而我们发现，历史记录证实了这一点。“谁理性地看世界，世界对他也显得合乎理性；两者处于一种相互关系之中。”（81）

Original · #15

As is well known, Hegel holds concretely that world history’s progression in the ‘consciousness of freedom’ unfolds over three main stages, ‘one is free’, ‘some are free’, ‘all are free’ (all containing sub-divisions), corresponding to Oriental, Classical and Germanic civilizations. On ‘consciousness of freedom’, Hegel’s views are these. Freedom consists in self-determination: rational decision-making about what ends to follow, which impulses to satisfy, or whether to act purely from universal principle instead (HG 148–49). All human individuals have this capacity for self-determination—‘all human beings are intrinsically free’ (an sich … frei; H 88), but individuals are not always aware of this. If they are not, then they will fail to exercise, develop and actualize their capacity, remaining practically unfree (although ontologically free)—free ‘in themselves’ (an sich) but not for themselves (88). For instance, ‘the Orientals do not know that spirit, or the human being as such, is intrinsically free; because they do not know this, they are not themselves free’ (87; my emphasis). As this implies, if the civilization to which I belong does not treat me as being free—say, if my place in it is to be a slave or serf—then I will be unaware of my capacity for freedom, for what I can know depends on what is known in the social world around me. This is why individual freedom advances in tandem with the shared consciousness of that freedom on the part of members of societies and as this consciousness is embodied in their practices and institutions. As this consciousness advances, the nature of freedom is grasped more adequately; its domain is expanded, e.g., from religious to secular affairs; and, crucially, its scope is expanded: ever more people and categories of people are known to be free.

Translation

众所周知，黑格尔明确主张，世界历史在“自由意识”上的进展经历了三个主要阶段——“一人是自由的”“一些人是自由的”“所有人是自由的”（每个阶段内部都有分支）——分别对应于东方文明、古典文明和日耳曼文明。关于“自由意识”，黑格尔的观点如下。自由在于自我规定：理性地决定追求何种目的、满足哪些冲动，或者是否纯粹根据普遍原则行动（HG 148–49）。所有人类个体都拥有这种自我规定的能力——“所有人本质上都是自由的”（an sich … frei; H 88），但个体并不总是意识到这一点。如果意识不到，他们就无法运用、发展并实现这种能力，因而在实践上依然是不自由的（尽管在本体论上自由）——即“自在”自由而非“自为”自由（88）。例如，“东方人并不知道，精神——亦即人本身——本质上是自由的；正因他们不知道，他们自身也就不自由”（87；引者强调）。这意味着，如果我所属的文明不把我当作自由者对待——例如我在其中的位置是奴隶或农奴——那么我将意识不到我的自由能力，因为我所能认知的，取决于我所处社会世界中已被认知的内容。因此，个体自由的进展，总是与社会成员对这种自由的共同意识及其在实践与制度中的体现同步发展。随着这种意识的进步，自由的本性被更充分地把握；其适用领域不断扩大，例如从宗教扩展到世俗事务；至关重要的是，其适用范围也随之扩大：越来越多人以及更多类别的人，被认知为自由的。

Original · #16

As to Eurocentrism, Hegel famously states that history moves West like the sun, for history’s most advanced stage is the ‘Germanic’ civilization whose spirit is that ‘all are free’. Admittedly, for Hegel, the insight that ‘all are free’ was first won, albeit only in spiritual form (e.g., that we may all be saved), by Jesus Christ—thus in Judaea, not Europe (88). But Christ’s message took hold in ancient Rome, not the Middle East, because the Romans already held that some are free: native male slave-holders (HG 450–51). The soil was therefore ripe for other Romans to claim that they shared in freedom too, Christianity affording them terms to do so. Next, due to Roman imperialism which spread Christianity, the Teutonic tribes encountered and gradually took on Christianity, then, after the Roman Empire fell, spread Christianity through the rest of Europe (S 347–49), becoming the ‘bearers of the Christian principle of freedom’ (HG 460). Through its adoption of Christianity, Europe emerged as a distinct civilization, the ‘Germanic’ or ‘Christian’—Hegel tends to talk indifferently of the ‘Christian’, ‘Germanic’ and ‘European’ states (e.g., 463). ‘Germanic’, then, means not ‘German’ but ‘Christian European’ more broadly (see also Mowad 2013: 168–70). Freedom’s development continued with the Reformation at last restoring the principle of the spiritual freedom of all, against previously dominant Church hierarchies. The next step, the Enlightenment, was to grasp that freedom applies in secular life too, in freedoms to own private property, choose a profession and spouse, participate in public affairs, etc. Against the excessively abstract realization of freedom in the French Revolution, the most advanced European states treat determinate social institutions—nuclear family, market economy, constitutional monarchy—as needed to secure these individual freedoms and reconcile them with social membership. Overall, then, European history has been a centuries-long process of working out and putting into practice one defining principle—the freedom of all (H 88).

Translation

关于欧洲中心主义，黑格尔有句众所周知的话：历史如太阳般自东向西行进，最先进的阶段是“日耳曼”文明，其精神在于“所有人都自由”。诚然，在黑格尔看来，“所有人都自由”这一洞见最初是由耶稣基督获得的——尽管它当时还只是以精神形式呈现（比如，所有人都可能得救）——因而它始于犹地亚，而非欧洲（88）。然而，基督的信息之所以扎根于古罗马而非中东，是因为罗马人早已持有“部分人自由”的观念：即本地的男性奴隶主（HG 450–51）。因此，条件已然成熟，其他罗马人也能主张自己同样享有自由，而基督教则为他们提供了这样说的表述方式。 随后，由于罗马帝国扩张传播了基督教，日耳曼部落接触并逐渐接受了它；罗马帝国灭亡后，它们又将基督教传播至欧洲其余地区（S 347–49），从而成为“基督教自由原则的承载者”（HG 460）。通过对基督教的接受，欧洲形成了一个独特的文明，即“日耳曼”或“基督教”文明——黑格尔谈及“基督教”“日耳曼”和“欧洲”国家时，往往不加区分地使用这些称谓（例如第463页）。所以，“日耳曼”并非指“德国”，而是在更广义上指“基督教欧洲”（亦参见 Mowad 2013: 168–70）。 自由的发展在宗教改革中得以继续，后者最终恢复了“所有人在精神上皆自由”的原则，以挑战先前占主导地位的教会等级制。接下来的一步是启蒙运动，它认识到自由也适用于世俗生活，体现在拥有私有财产、选择职业与配偶、参与公共事务等自由之中。与法国大革命中对自由过于抽象的实现方式不同，欧洲最先进的国家将特定的社会制度——核心家庭、市场经济、君主立宪制——视为保障这些个人自由并将其与社会成员身份相协调的必要条件。 总之，欧洲历史是一个持续数世纪的过程：其核心在于不断展开并将一个标志性的原则——即所有人的自由——付诸实践（H 88）。

Original · #17

Europe, then, comes to bear the Christian principle of freedom because it takes it over from the Roman Empire, where in turn Christianity had taken hold because the Romans were already conscious that ‘some are free’, building on the same consciousness by the ancient Greeks. So that last—the ancient Greek consciousness that ‘some are free’—was ultimately decisive. ‘The consciousness of freedom first awoke among the Greeks, and with that they were free’ (87; my emphases); they made the key transition from unfreedom to freedom. Ultimately, this is why the development from ‘some are free’ to ‘all are free’ has only spontaneously occurred on European soil.

Translation

欧洲之所以承担起基督教的自由原则，是因为它从罗马帝国那里接过了这一原则；而基督教之所以能在罗马站稳脚跟，又因为罗马人原本就已经意识到“有些人是自由的”，而这种意识本身又是建立在古希腊人同样的意识之上的。这样一来，最终起决定作用的，终究还是古希腊人那种“有些人是自由的”的意识。“自由的意识首先在希腊人中觉醒了，而有了这种意识，他们也就是自由的”（87；着重号为引者所加）；正是他们实现了从不自由到自由的关键转变。归根到底，这正是为什么从“有些人是自由的”到“所有人都是自由的”这一发展，只有在欧洲土地上才能自发发生。

Original · #18

The transition that the Greeks made was equally from pre-history to history.

Translation

希腊人所经历的转变，同样也是从前历史迈入历史。

Original · #19

Hegel says of China and India that we ‘cannot speak here of a proper history as such’ (HG 214). The Oriental civilizations are in world history only ambiguously.

Translation

黑格尔在谈到中国和印度时说，我们‘不能在这里谈论一种严格意义上的历史’（HG 214）。东方文明在世界历史中的位置本就是含混不明的。

Original · #20

They are unhistorical insofar as they are not conscious of freedom—or rather are conscious of it only very inadequately, as belonging to one emperor (China), ruling caste (India) or empire (Persia). Consequently, individuals in these cultures are not motivated to pursue or advance their own freedom, for they do not know that they are capable of self-determination in the first place (again, the ‘Orientals do not know that … the human being as such, is intrinsically free; because they do not know this, they are not themselves free’; H 87). Oriental culture contains no inner motor for progressive development to take place, by way of individuals broadening and deepening the scope of an extant yet still incomplete level of freedom. Lacking that motor, the Orient has no history properly speaking. Even so, Hegel includes the Oriental civilizations in world history because they do have a minimal level of consciousness of freedom, i.e., as belonging only to the emperor, highest caste, etc. In contrast, for Hegel, Africans and indigenous Americans lack any awareness of freedom; their worlds are fully, non-ambiguously pre-historical, whereas Oriental pre-history is on the threshold of world history and to that extent lies partly within it.

Translation

它们之所以是非历史性的，是因为它们并未意识到自由——或者更确切地说，只是极不充分地意识到自由，将其仅仅视为皇帝（中国）、统治种姓（印度）或帝国（波斯）的专属之物。因此，这些文化中的个人并不会去追求或推动自身的自由，因为他们首先并不知道自己具有自我决定的能力（再说一遍，“东方人并不知道……人之为人，本身就是自由的；因为他们不知道这一点，所以他们自己并不自由”；H 87）。东方文化内部并不存在推动其渐进发展的内在动力；这种发展本应通过个人拓展和深化某种现存却仍不完整的自由范围而实现。由于缺乏这种动力，严格来说，东方并没有历史。即便如此，黑格尔仍将东方文明纳入世界历史，因为它们毕竟具有某种最低限度的自由意识——即认为自由仅仅属于皇帝、最高种姓等等。相比之下，在黑格尔看来，非洲人和美洲原住民则根本没有任何自由意识；他们的世界完全、明确地处在前历史阶段，而东方的前历史则身处世界历史的门槛之上，并且在这一意义上部分属于世界历史。

Original · #21

Hegel’s denial of full history to the Orientals sheds light on the kind of reason he takes to be immanent in historical events, which in turn illuminates his Eurocentrism. Whereas the Orientals lack a motor for historical development and hence are pre-historical, that motor does arise when, a given level of consciousness of freedom being attained and embodied in social life, that level of consciousness harbours some inner ‘contradiction’ or tension which propels people, qua rational beings, to bring about change and improvement. These conditions are first met by the ancient Greeks. Another instance, mentioned earlier, is that the Romans conferred freedom on slave-owners while denying it to slaves, giving slaves rational grounds to claim freedom as well. In Section IV we will encounter other instances of this type of historical development through the rational response to contradictions.

Translation

黑格尔否认东方民族拥有完整的历史，这有助于我们理解那种在他看来内在于历史事件的理性，而这一点反过来也揭示了他的欧洲中心主义。东方民族缺乏历史发展的动力，因而处于前历史状态。相反，只有当自由意识达到某一既定水平并体现于社会生活之中，且这一意识水平本身又蕴含着某种内在的“矛盾”或张力，从而推动人们作为理性存在者去促成变革和改进时，这种动力才会产生。这些条件首先由古希腊具备。前文提及的另一个例子是：罗马人将自由赋予奴隶主，却否定奴隶的自由；这也就为奴隶提供了基于理性的自由诉求。在第四节中，我们还会看到此类其他例子：历史发展如何通过人们对矛盾的理性回应而展开。

Original · #22

That reason is immanent in historical changes might suggest that in history, logical and temporal development coincide (whereas in, say, Hegel’s Logic, the dialectical development of categories is not temporal). This is so to an extent.

Translation

理性内在于历史变迁之中，这似乎表明：在历史中，逻辑的发展与时间进程是重合的（而例如在黑格尔《逻辑学》中，诸范畴的辩证发展并非在时间中展开）。在某种程度上，情况的确如此。

Original · #23

The pre-historical civilizations of Africa, indigenous America and the Orient have no consciousness of freedom sufficient to harbour self-contradictory limitations that call for change, hence these civilizations actually show no significant social change over time, for Hegel. They are and have ever been the same, embodying time but not history, that is, no instantiation over time of the dialectical-and-rational development of freedom. Conversely, in Europe the limitations placed on a freedom that is nevertheless known power developments that are at once rationally warranted and transpire, through human agency, over time. Yet, for Hegel, all that exists in space and time is subject to contingency and so realizes rational requirements under an innumerable variety of permutations arising from the very nature of a spatio-temporal, indefinitely complex, causally interconnected world (EN §250 and R, 22–24). For example, the Reformation ultimately had to happen; but it is a contingency that Luther posted his theses in But not all that the PWH covers is historical. In Africa, indigenous America and the Orient, time unfolds without history. Consequently, the advancement from Africa to the Orient and from China to India to Persia occurs purely spatially, in that each region in turn grasps freedom to successive—all highly inadequate—degrees. Conversely, historical development (in Europe) takes place in space as well as time, not only in space (HG 156–57). Where advancement occurs only spatially, its motor is not human reason and agency but geographical variation. Because we are natural, spatially embodied as well as rational beings, we are inescapably located in natural surroundings that divide into continents:

Translation

在黑格尔看来，非洲、美洲原住民地区以及东方的前历史文明，并不具备充分的自由意识，因而无法容纳那种要求变革的自相矛盾的限制。正因为如此，这些文明实际上并未随时间推移呈现出显著的社会变化。它们过去如此，现在依然如此；它们体现的是时间，而非历史。也就是说，在时间进程中，并没有自由的辩证理性发展得以具体实现。 相反，在欧洲，自由虽受限制，却已被意识到；而这些限制恰恰推动了既有理性根据、又通过人的能动作用在时间中展开的发展。 然而，对黑格尔而言，一切存在于空间与时间中的事物都受制于偶然性，因此理性的要求总是在无数变式中得到实现；这些变式源于一个时空性、无限复杂、因果交织的世界本性（EN §250 and R, 22–24）。例如，宗教改革终究必然发生；但路德恰好在1517年张贴他的论纲，却是偶然的。 不过，《世界历史哲学》所涵盖的内容并非全是历史性的。在非洲、美洲原住民地区和东方，时间在流逝，却没有历史。因此，从非洲到东方、从中国到印度再到波斯的推进，纯粹是在空间层面发生的，因为每个地区依次以递进的一一却又都极不充分的一一程度把握了自由。相反，（欧洲的）历史发展则同时在空间和时间中展开，而不仅仅发生在空间之中（HG 156–57）。 凡推进仅发生在空间之处，其动力便非人的理性与能动作用，而是地理差异。由于我们既是理性的存在者，又是具有空间性身体的自然存在者，我们不可避免地居于自然环境之中，而自然环境又划分为各个大陆：

Original · #24

America, Asia, Africa and Europe. The continents’ features affect how their inhabitants live and so what level of civilization and consciousness of freedom they can reach by their own efforts. America is weak and powerless, yielding immature, weak and lazy people (193). Africa is dominated by highlands and other non-cultivable areas, so that African peoples form no awareness of their freedom, something people first develop by working on nature (196). Asia is dominated by fertile plains, so that its peoples’ focus on agriculture inclines them towards patriarchal family-based relationships and uncritical obedience to authority (199–200). Only Europe is geographically diverse enough to foster people living in diverse ways and so thinking for themselves (196).

Translation

美洲、亚洲、非洲和欧洲。各大洲的自然特征影响其居民的生存方式，进而决定了他们凭借自身努力所能达到的文明程度与自由意识水平。美洲软弱无力，其人民也因此不成熟、孱弱而懒惰（193）。非洲以高地和其他不可耕地区为主，因此非洲人民未能形成自由意识；这种意识正是人类通过劳动改造自然才首次发展出来的（196）。亚洲则以肥沃平原为主，当地人民对农业的专注，使其倾向于建立以家长制家庭为基础的社会关系，并对权威表现出不加反思的服从（199–200）。唯有欧洲在地理上足够多样，才能促成人们以多种方式生活，从而能够独立思考（196）。

Original · #25

Thus, Europe’s physical environment explains why Greek civilization arose and started the trajectory to modern liberalism. Conversely, for their part, the Orientals advanced beyond the Africans not by thinking rationally about the limitations of the latter’s grasp of freedom—after all, allegedly they had none— but due to the Orientals’ more auspicious environmental circumstances.

Translation

因此，欧洲的自然环境解释了希腊文明为何得以兴起，并开启了通向现代自由主义的历史轨迹。反过来说，东方人之所以超越了非洲人，并非因为他们理性地认识到后者对自由理解的局限——毕竟，据说非洲人根本不存在这样的理解——而是由于东方人所处的环境条件更为优越。

Original · #26

Ultimately, here, what guarantees the progression of stages up to the transition to history proper is the rationality that, for Hegel, is embodied in the world’s geographic divisions. 6 Then the European natural environment made it possible for the Greeks to form a conception of freedom that in turn enabled historical progression, in time and on the continuing basis of (intra-European) geographical space, to begin.^7 (We might still ask, though, why the successive Oriental views that ‘one is free’ were not sufficient to initiate historical progression proper. I will return to this question later. For now let us just note that, for Hegel, they were not.)

Translation

终究，此处保障各个阶段向前推进、直至过渡到真正意义上的历史的，乃是黑格尔所认为的、体现于世界地理划分中的那种理性。^6 随后，欧洲的自然环境使希腊人有可能形成一种自由观念，而这种观念又反过来使得历史进程得以开启——这一进程既在时间中展开，又持续以（欧洲内部的）地理空间为根基。^7（不过，我们仍可追问：东方先后出现的那些‘一个人是自由的’观点，为何不足以真正启动历史的进程？对于这个问题，我将在后文再作探讨。眼下我们仅需留意，在黑格尔看来，它们确实不足以做到这一点。）

Original · #27

In sum, Hegel is a Eurocentrist as defined above (p. 3). As per (i) and (iii), he believes that European civilization develops purely internally towards the fuller comprehension and application of its principle of the freedom of all, where (ii) this development has come to include that of all of the ‘West’, e.g., the USA. 8 (iv) He explains oppressive episodes in European history either from its not yet having consistently worked out and applied its own principle of freedom (as with the hierarchies of the medieval church) or as unavoidable requirements for advancement (e.g., the religious wars of early modern Europe). (v) He denies that any equivalent progression to freedom has occurred or can spontaneously occur outside Europe. Next I argue that it is Hegel’s Eurocentrism, in particular his sharp divide between European freedom and non-European unfreedom, which generates a case for colonialism.

Translation

总之，按照上文的界定（第3页），黑格尔是一个欧洲中心主义者。(i)(iii)认为，欧洲文明纯粹凭借内部发展，逐步走向对其原则——即所有人的自由——更充分的理解和实践；而根据(ii)，这种发展如今也已涵盖了整个“西方”，例如美国。8 (iv)对于欧洲历史上的压迫时期，他的解释要么是：当时欧洲尚未能一以贯之地展开并贯彻其自身的自由原则（如中世纪教会的等级制）；要么是：这些时期乃是进步所不可避免的必要条件（如近代早期欧洲的宗教战争）。(v)他否认在欧洲以外，曾发生过或能够自发地发生任何与此同等的通向自由的进步。接下来我将论证，黑格尔的欧洲中心主义——尤其是他对欧洲的自由与非欧洲的不自由所作的鲜明区分——恰好构成了为殖民主义辩护的论据。

Original · #28

II. Hegel’s case for colonialism

Translation

二、黑格尔为殖民主义所作的论证

Original · #29

In the PWH Hegel explicitly says relatively little about colonialism, but what he does say is approving. Finishing his account of the European middle ages, he praises the revival of learning, the flourishing of fine art, and the arrival of the ‘hero’ Columbus in the new world (S 411; Hei 204). Columbus, he says, was motivated by the ‘outward’ urging of spirit to know its own earth and convert non-European natives to Christianity. The reasons why Hegel regards this positively emerge in the passages on the ‘geographical conditions of history’ that address the ‘new world’.

Translation

在《历史哲学讲演录》中，黑格尔明确谈及殖民主义的地方相对不多，但凡他所论及之处，却都持赞许态度。在结束对欧洲中世纪的叙述时，他赞颂了学术的复兴、精美艺术的繁荣，以及“英雄”哥伦布抵达新大陆（S 411；Hei 204）。黑格尔称，驱使哥伦布的是一种“向外”的精神驱力，既要认识其自身所处的地球，也要让非欧洲的土著居民皈依基督教。黑格尔之所以对此持肯定看法，其理由可以从他论述“历史的地理条件”时涉及“新大陆”的段落中得以明晰。

Original · #30

It does not matter that Mexico and Peru did indeed have significant civilisations, since they were of a feebler stock and are long gone. The new world has shown itself to be much feebler than the old world. … Some of the tribes of North America have disappeared and some have retreated and generally declined … (HG 192–93) In 1830/3^1 Hegel expanded on the new world, adding that African Negroes had to be brought to America to do the physical work of which the weak natives were incapable (Hei 59). For ‘the Negroes are far more receptive to European culture than the Indians … [and] it will still be a long time before the Europeans succeed in producing any genuine feeling of self [Selbstgefühl]’ in indigenous Americans (S 81). Hegel praises the Church in Latin America for beginning to instil discipline in the natives; through these and other colonial efforts, the ‘authentic Americans are … now beginning to educate themselves [sich hineinzubilden] in European culture’ (N 165). Incidentally, Hegel’s points about indigenous Americans apply equally to Aboriginal Australians, since he includes ‘New Holland’—i.e., Australia—in the new world.

Translation

墨西哥和秘鲁确实拥有重要的文明，但这并不重要，因为它们所属的民族较为孱弱，且早已湮灭。新世界已表明自己远比旧世界孱弱。……北美的一些部族已经消失，另一些则退避迁移，总体上趋于衰落……（HG 192–93）在1830/3^1年的讲稿中，黑格尔进一步论及新世界，补充说必须把非洲黑人带到美洲，以承担那些孱弱土著无力胜任的体力劳动（Hei 59）。因为“黑人远比印第安人更能接受欧洲文化……［而且］欧洲人要想在美洲原住民中培养出任何真正的自我感［Selbstgefühl］，仍将需要很长时间”（S 81）。黑格尔赞扬拉丁美洲的教会开始向土著灌输纪律；通过这些殖民努力及其他手段，“真正的美洲人……如今正开始将自己塑造进欧洲文化之中［sich hineinzubilden］”（N 165）。顺带一提，黑格尔关于美洲原住民的这些观点同样适用于澳大利亚原住民，因为他将“新荷兰”——即澳大利亚——也归入了新世界。

Original · #31

As for the old world, Hegel begins with Africa—the ‘authentic’ sub-Saharan Africa of the Negroes. He contends that the Negroes know no morality and practice slavery along with polygamy, cannibalism, and other customs that embody total ignorance about freedom.

Translation

至于旧世界，黑格尔首先论及非洲——即撒哈拉以南黑人所居住的那个“真正的”非洲。他认为黑人毫无道德观念，实行奴隶制，同时奉行一夫多妻、食人等习俗；在他看来，这些都体现出他们对自由的全然无知。

Original · #32

Another characteristic fact in reference to the Negroes is Slavery. Negroes are taken into slavery by Europeans and sold to America. Despite this, their lot is even worse in their own country, where an equally absolute slavery is present; for the overall foundation of slavery is that man has no consciousness of his freedom yet, and so sinks down to a mere thing, a worthless object. …. Slavery is in and for itself wrong [Unrecht], for the essence of humanity is freedom; but for this man must first become mature [reif]. This is why the gradual abolition of slavery is therefore more appropriate and more right [Richtigeres] than its sudden removal. (S 96–99) So: European enslavement of Africans involves a degree of moral wrong insofar as Africans have intrinsic capacities for freedom. Yet before enslavement, Africans did not know themselves to have that capacity; accordingly they enslaved and mistreated one another, and acted merely on their natural desires.

Translation

关于黑人，还有一个显著特征是奴隶制。黑人被欧洲人掳为奴隶，贩卖到美洲。尽管如此，他们在自己故土的处境甚至更为糟糕，因为那里同样存在着一种绝对的奴隶制；奴隶制在总体上的根源在于，人尚未意识到自身的自由，因而降格为单纯的物，沦为无价值的物。……奴隶制本身既是不正当的[Unrecht]，因为人的本质是自由；然而人要抵达这种自由，首先必须臻于成熟[reif]。正因如此，逐步废除奴隶制，比骤然将其取消，是更为恰当且更为正确[Richtigeres]的做法。（S 96–99）也就是说：欧洲人对非洲人的奴役包含着道德上的错误，这是因为非洲人生来具有自由的能力。但在被奴役之前，非洲人并未认识到自己拥有这种能力；因此他们之间相互奴役、虐待，所行之事仅仅是顺从自然欲望。

Original · #33

The latter does not constitute freedom, Hegel insists; if I act from naturally given desires, I am still not determining for myself how to act. So slavery was, relatively, an improvement, because it ‘matured’ the Negroes to become aware of their freedom. ‘One must educate the Negroes in their freedom by taming their naturalness’ (Hei 70).

Translation

黑格尔坚称自然性本身并不构成自由——如果我仅依照自然赋予的欲望行事，我依然不能说是自己决定了如何行动。因此，奴隶制在某种意义上反倒是一种进步，因为它‘催熟’了黑人，使他们开始意识到自身的自由。‘我们必须通过驯服其自然性，来教育黑人在自由中成长’（Hei 70）。

Original · #34

We can infer from Hegel’s comments that slavery educates in several ways.

Translation

从黑格尔的有关论述中，我们可以推断，奴隶制具有多方面的“教化”作用。

Original · #35

(i) Those enslaved are subjected to European culture and ethical standards (from, e.g., N 165). (ii) Slavery imposes the discipline of work (e.g., Hei 59). In working, one learns to hold one’s natural desires in check and thereby see oneself as capable of deliberating about or even rejecting them. (iii) Work also instils an awareness of one’s capacity to mould natural objects—a sense of ‘achieving independence through one’s own activity’ (61). (iv) Ironically, those enslaved thus acquire a sense of private property (61)—partly by learning of European institutions of property and partly by imposing form on objects, thereby forming a sense of ‘possessing’ them which fosters an appreciation of property. 9 In sum: ‘Slavery … is necessary at those stages where the state [and its people] has not yet arrived at rationality. It is an element in the transition to a higher stage’ (HG 197). Because slavery still has elements of wrong, though, the final step must be for slavery to end. However, Hegel cautions, slavery should not be suddenly abolished because it must end after, not before, the Negroes have been educated through it: ‘If slavery was altogether wrong, then the Europeans should give the slaves their freedom immediately; but in that way the most frightening consequences arise, as in the French colonies’ (Hei 70).

Translation

(i) 被奴役者被置于欧洲文化及其伦理标准的支配之下（例如，N 165）。(ii) 奴隶制强加了一种劳动纪律（例如，Hei 59）。在劳动中，人学会克制自身的自然欲望，从而认识到自己有能力对这些欲望加以审度、甚至予以拒绝。(iii) 劳动还会灌输一种意识，即人有能力塑造自然对象——一种“通过自己的活动获得独立”之感（61）。(iv) 具有讽刺意味的是，被奴役者由此还获得了一种私有财产意识（61）：这一方面是通过了解欧洲的财产制度，另一方面则是通过将形式加诸对象，从而形成一种“占有”它们的感觉，这种感觉又促使他们领会到财产的价值。总之：“在国家［及其人民］尚未达到理性的那些阶段，奴隶制……是必要的。它是向更高阶段过渡的一个环节”（HG 197）。不过，由于奴隶制依然包含错误的要素，其最终步骤必然是自身的终结。然而，黑格尔告诫道，不应骤然废除奴隶制，因为它必须在黑人经由奴隶制受到教化之后，而非在此之前，才走向终结：“如果奴隶制完全是错误的，那么欧洲人就应当立刻给予奴隶自由；但那样一来，就会产生最可怕的后果，就像在法国殖民地发生的那样”（Hei 70）。

Original · #36

Hegel’s line of thought, then, takes in slavery and colonization at once (understandably, since enslavement of Africans was fundamental to colonial America). Use of slavery in the colonies might be judged wrong because it violates the rights, equality and freedom of the slaves. But through being enslaved, slaves take steps forward in their consciousness of freedom which they could not otherwise make, for Africa is intrinsically pre-historical and unfree, so that freedom can come to Africans only from without. Analogously, one might think that colonization was altogether wrong because it violated the rights, equality and freedom of indigenous peoples—but no, for before colonization those people had no awareness of their freedom. They ‘ha[d] no sense of private property, of achieving independence through one’s own activity, or of securing one’s property through right’ (61). By being forced to labour and being disciplined spiritually by agencies such as the Christian church, these people will eventually learn about their freedom. Until then, their subjection, while partially wrong insofar as it is subjection, is also partially right: it is, at least, an improvement on the natives remaining in their natural, wholly unfree, pre-colonial condition.

Translation

因此，黑格尔的这一思路同时将奴隶制与殖民纳入考察之中——这并不难理解，因为对非洲人的奴役本就是殖民地美洲的根本性事实之一。殖民地中实行奴隶制，或许会被判定为错误，因为它侵犯了奴隶的权利、平等与自由。然而，奴隶恰恰是在被奴役的过程中，在自由意识上迈出了原本不可能迈出的步伐；因为非洲就其本性而言处于前历史状态、是不自由的，所以非洲人只能从外部获得自由。 与此相似，人们也可能认为，殖民完全是错误的，因为它侵犯了土著人民的权利、平等与自由——但答案是否定的，因为这些人在殖民之前并没有任何关于自由的意识。他们“没有私人财产的观念，不懂得通过自身活动获得独立，也不懂得通过权利来保障自己的财产”(61)。在被强迫劳动、并在基督教会等机构的精神规训之下，这些人最终将学会认识自己的自由。在此之前，他们所受的支配，虽然就其作为支配而言在一定程度上是错误的，但同时也在一定程度上是正确的：至少，这比让土著继续停留在其自然的、完全不自由的前殖民状态中要前进了一步。

Original · #37

Colonialism is justified, on this view, because it spreads freedom to peoples who otherwise both lack it and have no native means of acquiring it.

Translation

按照这种观点，殖民主义之所以被视为正当，是因为它将自由传播给那些原本既没有自由、也缺乏凭借自身获取自由的内在途径的民族。

Original · #38

Moreover, the colonizers are justified in extirpating the indigenous cultures of native peoples—hence Hegel’s endorsement of the Christian clergy and missionaries ‘setting out to accustom the Indians to European culture and ethics [Sitten]’ (N 164)—since those indigenous cultures embody unfreedom. We might wonder whether Hegel regards even the violence and slaughter that occurred during the colonization of America as justified. He does acknowledge European, especially Spanish, violence towards indigenous Americans, but he is only overtly critical of this violence when the colonial project had, he says, degenerated into mere robbery (Hei 204). Moreover, he disguises the extent of European violence by running together indigenous Americans having been ‘destroyed and slaughtered’ (untergegangen, verdrängt), having disappeared (verschwunden), and having voluntarily withdrawn (haben sich zurückgezogen; N 163; see also Parekh 2009). Hegel does not wholly denounce colonial violence because he thinks that Europe’s conquest of America was based on a sound goal— spreading freedom and the culture of freedom to all people—and that the violence that was necessary for achieving that goal was justified. But Hegel does disapprove of violence when it served merely an unworthy goal—robbery.

Translation

不仅如此，殖民者甚至有权根除本土民族的传统文化——黑格尔因此认可基督教神职人员和传教士“着手使印第安人习惯于欧洲文化与伦理［Sitten］”（N 164）——理由在于，这些传统文化所体现的是不自由。我们或可追问：黑格尔是否认为，就连美洲殖民过程中发生的暴力与屠杀也算正当。他的确承认了欧洲人（尤其是西班牙人）针对美洲原住民施加的暴力，但唯有当殖民事业在他看来已“蜕变为单纯的掠夺”时，他才明确批评这类暴力（Hei 204）。不仅如此，黑格尔还将美洲原住民“被毁灭与屠杀”（untergegangen, verdrängt）、“已然消亡”（verschwunden）以及“主动退却”（haben sich zurückgezogen；N 163；另见 Parekh 2009）这几类表述混为一谈，从而淡化了欧洲暴力的实际程度。黑格尔并未全盘否定殖民暴力，因为他认为，欧洲对美洲的征服建立在一个正当目标之上——向所有人传播自由以及自由之文化——而为达成该目标所必需的暴力亦属正当。不过，当暴力仅仅服务于一个不值得的目标——即掠夺时，他确实持反对态度。

Original · #39

This is congruent with Hegel’s overall approach to violence in history, which he memorably calls a ‘slaughterbench’ (Schlachtbank). On his view, the consciousness of freedom advances through each civilization in turn establishing its pre-eminence by prevailing, culturally and militarily, over its predecessor. To the extent that war and violence are necessary for progress, they are justified (although ‘justified’ does not mean ‘to be celebrated’). Even in these terms, though, much of the violence carried out by European colonizers—the decimation of many native American tribes, the Middle Passage—went beyond the minimum necessary to subject non-Europeans to colonial control along the way to their ultimate freedom. But likewise, in history generally, violence has regularly gone beyond the minimum necessary to propel progress. Such excesses are inevitable, an aspect of the inescapable contingency of human affairs. These excesses of violence are not justified; yet we can be reconciled to them as an inevitable, albeit non-ideal, concomitant of progress (H 90–91). Presumably, Hegel thinks the same about the excesses of colonial violence.

Translation

这与黑格尔对历史暴力的整体看法一致，他曾将历史形象地称为一张“屠宰台”（Schlachtbank）。在他看来，自由意识的发展是通过各个文明依次确立其优势地位实现的，而每个文明之所以能占据优势，是因为它在文化和军事上战胜了前一个文明。既然战争和暴力对于进步是必要的，那么它们就是正当的——不过，“正当”并不意味着“值得颂扬”。然而，即便按此标准，欧洲殖民者施加的许多暴力——比如对众多美洲原住民部族的灭绝，以及“中间航道”——也超出了在非欧洲人通往最终自由之路上、使其屈从于殖民统治所必需的最低限度。但在一般历史中，暴力同样经常超出推动进步所需的最低限度。这类过度不可避免，是人类事务中无法消除的偶然性的一面。这些过度的暴力并不正当；但我们仍可与之和解，视其为进步过程中一种虽不理想却不可避免的伴随现象（H 90–91）。想来，黑格尔对殖民暴力的过度也应持同样看法。

Original · #40

Hegel’s overall line of thought is that colonialism is not only justified but also necessary, as part of Europe’s centuries-long process of realizing freedom. A logical step in this process is to extend freedom to non-European peoples: after all, the European principle is that all are free. This extension can only occur, though, by passing through a stage of subjugating non-European peoples, since they have no native means of acquiring freedom: ‘The [Negroes’] condition is incapable of any development or culture [Entwicklung und Bildung], and their condition as we see it today is as it has always been’ (N 190). And ‘the Negroes ... cannot move [bewegen] to any culture’ (Hei 67). Likewise with indigenous Americans: America is new and young because it had no history until the Europeans arrived. These claims do not mean that Negroes and indigenous Americans cannot be educated; they can. But given their native ignorance of freedom, they cannot educate themselves but must be educated by Europeans, which requires that they first be subjected to European control.

Translation

黑格尔的整体思路是：殖民主义不仅是正当的，而且是必要的，因为它是欧洲历经数百年实现自由这一历史进程的一部分。在这一进程中，合乎逻辑的一步是将自由扩展至非欧洲民族：毕竟，欧洲的原则是人人皆自由。然而，这种扩展只能通过一个先使非欧洲民族受支配的阶段来实现，因为他们自身并不具备获得自由的内生条件：“[黑人]的状态不可能有任何发展或教化［Entwicklung und Bildung］，而且他们如今所呈现的状态，始终就是如此”（N 190）。并且，“黑人……不能迈向任何文化”（Hei 67）。美洲原住民亦然：美洲之所以是新的、年轻的，是因为在欧洲人到来之前，它并无历史。这些断言并不意味着黑人和美洲原住民不能受教育；他们是可以受教育的。但鉴于他们在自身原初状态下对自由懵然无知，他们无法自我教育，必须由欧洲人来施教；而这又要求他们首先处于欧洲人的控制之下。

Original · #41

Hegel’s case for colonization could be extended to the Orientals. He admits that unlike Africans and indigenous Americans the Oriental peoples do have an idea of freedom—that ‘one is free’—but this idea remains so inadequate as to count as unfreedom. Hence, lacking belief in their own freedom, Oriental people cannot pursue any extensions or advancements of freedom and, without such pursuits to drive historical change, their societies remain ahistorical. Colonization of these peoples for educative purposes would therefore be justified. As long as a people is at a low enough level to count as unfree and pre-historical, that people can advance only through having the European spirit imposed on it, for being pre-historical it has no native way to attain freedom. And indeed Hegel does say of India that: ‘The English, or rather the East India Company, are the lords [Herren] of the land; for it is the necessary fate of Asiatic empires to be subjected [unterworfen] to Europeans; and China will also, some day, have to submit to this fate’ (S 142–43).

Translation

黑格尔为殖民辩护的理由也可以扩展到东方民族。他承认，与非洲人和美洲原住民不同，东方民族确实有一种自由观念——即“一人是自由”——但这种观念仍然如此不充分，以致应被视为不自由。因此，由于不相信自身的自由，东方人便无法追求自由的任何扩展或进步；而没有这种追求来驱动历史变迁，他们的社会就仍停留在非历史状态。因此，以教化之名对这些民族进行殖民便是正当的。 只要一个民族的发展水平足够低以致被视为不自由且处于前历史阶段，该民族就只能通过强加欧洲精神来取得进步，因为处于前历史阶段，它没有本土的方式来实现自由。事实上，黑格尔在论及印度时确曾说过：“英国人，或更确切地说东印度公司，乃是这片土地的主人[Herren]；因为亚洲帝国注定要臣服于[unterworfen]欧洲人，中国亦终有一天不得不屈从此命运”（S 142–43）。

Original · #42

We should not be misled by an apparently conflicting statement in the Philosophy of Right: ‘The liberation of colonies … [is] of the greatest advantage to the mother state, just as the emancipation of slaves is of the greatest advantage to the master’ (PR §248A, 269). Hegel’s paradigm here is American independence:

Translation

不应被《法哲学》中一段看似矛盾的陈述所误导：“殖民地的解放……对宗主国乃最大利益，正如奴隶的解放对主人乃最大利益一样”（PR §248A, 269）。黑格尔在此援引的范例是美国独立：

Original · #43

i.e., the independence of what, he is explicit and adamant, is colonial European

Translation

也就是说，他明确且坚定地认为，这种独立性正是殖民主义欧洲的独立性。

Original · #44

America, not Native America (N 165–66). That is, America merits independence once its native populace is reduced or placed securely under European tutelage.

Translation

美洲——而非美洲原住民——才配得上独立（N 165–66）。也就是说，当其本土人口被削减，或被稳妥地置于欧洲人的监护之下后，美洲才算配得上独立。

Original · #45

This coheres with Hegel’s approving reference to independent Haiti in the Philosophy of Mind (EM §393A, 40): he says that this is a Christian state that the Negroes could only found after having undergone long spiritual servitude. Once a people has been colonized sufficiently to acquire European culture, as in Haiti, then and only then does that people merit freedom.

Translation

这与黑格尔在《精神哲学》中对独立海地的肯定性提及是一致的（EM §393A, 40）：他声称，海地是一个基督教国家，黑人唯有在经历了长期的精神奴役之后才可能建立此类国家。一个民族只有像海地那样，经受充分殖民、获得欧洲文化之后，才配享有自由；也唯有到那时，它才值得拥有自由。

Original · #46

Hegel’s argument for colonialism is of the ‘civilizing mission’ family.

Translation

黑格尔对殖民主义的辩护，属于“文明使命”论这一类型。

Original · #47

Effectively, his defence is that colonialism benefits most those who fare worst under it—colonized peoples—by civilizing and bringing them freedom that they cannot access without passing through colonial subjection. For Hegel, colonialism and the advancement of freedom go hand-in-hand.

Translation

实际上，他的辩护在于：殖民主义最大的受益者，恰恰是那些在其统治下处境最糟的人——被殖民的民族；因为殖民主义使他们开化，并赋予他们一种若不经由殖民支配便无法获得的自由。对黑格尔而言，殖民主义与自由的提升是携手并进的。

Original · #48

III. Saving Hegel from himself

Translation

III. 拯救黑格尔于其自身

Original · #49

Hegel’s PWH implies that colonialism is required to further the realization of universal freedom. Does this show that Hegel’s conception of freedom is necessarily bound up with his pro-colonialism? If so, then—taking it that colonialism was in fact morally wrong—presumably his conception of freedom and its historical development must be rejected (although not necessarily freedom as such, of course).

Translation

黑格尔的《世界历史哲学》暗示，殖民主义是实现普遍自由所必需的。这是否表明，黑格尔的自由概念必然与他支持殖民主义的立场纠结在一起？如果是这样，那么——考虑到殖民主义事实上在道德上是错误的——很可能他的自由概念及其历史发展就必须被否定（当然，这并不一定意味着自由本身也要被否定）。

Original · #50

But perhaps that would be to dismiss Hegel’s thought too summarily, and thereby to do disservice not only to Hegel but also to anti-colonial and decolonizing thought and activism, which, after all, has regularly drawn on Hegel, both directly—e.g., when Frantz Fanon ([1952] 2008) and Ngugi wa Thiong’o (2012) use Hegel to critique colonialism—and indirectly, through Hegel’s influence on Marxism and critical theory. Moreover, Hegel’s thought may still offer further anti-colonial resources which remain to be mined. We might therefore reasonably seek to separate Hegel’s basic conception of freedom and its historicity from his Eurocentric narrative of history so that, when so separated, that basic conception tells against colonialism. Such a view—one that rescues Hegel from himself—is often adopted, more or less explicitly, by his interpreters.^10 I now want to set out my own version of this type of view, although I will go on to complicate it in Section IV.

Translation

但或许这样对待黑格尔的思想会显得太过草率。如此做法不仅有失公允于黑格尔本人，同样也不利于反殖民与去殖民的思想及行动——毕竟，这些思潮一直不断地从黑格尔那里汲取养分，既有直接的借鉴，例如弗朗茨·法农（Frantz Fanon，[1952] 2008）和恩古吉·瓦·提安哥（Ngugi wa Thiong’o, 2012）都曾借助黑格尔来批判殖民主义；也有间接的途径，即通过黑格尔对马克思主义与批判理论的影响。况且，黑格尔的思想或许仍蕴藏着更多尚未被发掘的反殖民资源。 因此，我们或许有理由尝试将黑格尔关于自由及其历史性的基本构想，与他那种欧洲中心论的历史叙述分离开来。一旦完成这种分离，该基本构想便可能转而反对殖民主义。这种观点——即所谓“将黑格尔从他自身中拯救出来”——常常为黑格尔的阐释者或多或少明确地采纳。^10 在本文中，我也打算提出一种属于该类型的观点，尽管我将在第四节对其加以进一步的复杂化处理。

Original · #51

The view is this. We can separate the essentials of Hegel’s account of freedom from his concrete interpretation of the actual movement of history.

Translation

该观点认为，我们可以将黑格尔关于自由论述的核心内容，与他对于现实历史进程的具体阐释区分开来。

Original · #52

Hegel was wrong and prejudiced when he dismissed Africans, indigenous Americans and Orientals as unfree and incapable of coming to freedom on their own. Nevertheless his basic account of what freedom is, including its necessary historical development, remains insightful. A better informed judgment of non-European peoples would require a very different historical narrative. But that does not undermine Hegel’s basic points that freedom develops historically in tandem with the consciousness of it, as embodied in different cultures and social institutions. When we separate these basic points from his actual narrative, we find that these points serve a progressive purpose, yielding grounds to reject colonialism.

Translation

黑格尔将非洲人、美洲原住民和东方人贬斥为不自由且无法自行走向自由，这一观点是错误且充满偏见的。尽管如此，他关于‘自由是什么’的基本论述——包括其必然的历史发展过程——仍然富有洞见。要对非欧洲民族作出更确切的评判，就需要一种截然不同的历史叙事。但这并不妨碍黑格尔的核心论点，即自由是随着对自由的意识而在历史中共同发展的，并体现于不同的文化与社会制度中。当我们把这些核心论点与他实际讲述的历史叙事区分开时，就会发现这些论点具有进步意义，为反对殖民主义提供了依据。

Original · #53

This view dovetails with Hegel’s claim that the human capacity for selfdetermination is universal, not confined to Europeans (see, e.g., H 88). Admittedly, though, this starting-point is only an abstract universal. Self-determination can be actualized only when one is conscious of one’s capacity for it, and that requires social and cultural institutions, a whole way of life, which foster that consciousness. Such a way of life arose for the first time only in ancient Greece, for Hegel, so that actualized freedom does not obtain universally.

Translation

这一看法与黑格尔的主张相契合：人的自我规定能力具有普遍性，并非仅限于欧洲人（例如见 H 88）。然而，需要承认的是，这一起点毕竟还只是一种抽象的普遍性。只有当人意识到自己具有这种能力时，自我规定才能得以实现；而这种意识又需要社会与文化制度的支撑，需要一整套能够培育这种意识的生活方式。在黑格尔看来，这样的生活方式最初只在古希腊出现，因此，现实化的自由并未普遍地存在。

Original · #54

Arguably, though, given his basic view of freedom and its historicity, Hegel could and should have interpreted all the world’s regions as taking part in the gradual historical unfolding of social institutions that support freedom. Hegel does not do so because he denies that non-European peoples are conscious of freedom at all. Since non-European societies were not conscious of freedom even in the restricted ways that the Greeks and Romans were, the former had no basis for moving forward historically by further advancing an already partly realized freedom.

Translation

不过可以说，考虑到黑格尔关于自由及其历史性的基本观点，他本可以并且也应当把世界各地区都理解为正在参与社会制度的渐进历史展开过程，这些制度支持着自由。但黑格尔并未这样做，因为他否认非欧洲民族具有任何自由意识。既然非欧洲社会甚至不像希腊人和罗马人那样以受限的方式意识到自由，它们就没有基础在历史中向前推进，即通过进一步推进一种已在部分程度上实现自由的状态来继续发展。

Original · #55

Thus, what underpins Hegel’s denial of historicity to non-European peoples is his sharp division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom. That in turn is underpinned by his claim that the ancient Greeks made the decisive break from unfreedom into freedom. The Greeks, Hegel says, became the distinctive people they were out of a mixing within them of heterogeneous Oriental peoples and their cultures, but the Greeks surmounted or overcame (überwinden) this background (HG 214). By doing so, the Greeks created their ‘free, beautiful’ spirit (374). The Greeks overcame their Oriental preconditions to ‘make themselves’ (372; see also 393–94).

Translation

因此，支撑黑格尔否认非欧洲民族具有历史性的，是他将欧洲的自由与非欧洲的不自由截然分开。而这一划分，又建立在他的如下主张之上：古希腊人完成了从不自由迈向自由的决定性断裂。黑格尔说，希腊人之所以成为他们那样一个独特的民族，是因为其内部混合了异质的东方民族及其文化；但希腊人克服了这一背景（überwinden）（HG 214）。正是通过这一点，希腊人创造了他们“自由而美的”精神（374）。希腊人超越了其东方前提，从而“造就了自己”（372；另见393–94）。

Original · #56

However, this view that the Greeks ‘overcame’ the Oriental world of unfreedom seems overstated by Hegel’s own lights. For Hegel himself, the Greeks mark only the latest phase in a growing consciousness of freedom running from China through India to Persia and culminating in Egypt, Persia’s most advanced province. Egypt is the hinge between Orient and Occident, in which the human soul’s intrinsic capacity for freedom was almost grasped. But it was not quite grasped, for the soul was still not distinguished from animal nature, a distinction the Greeks went on to make (HG 334, 368).

Translation

不过，按照黑格尔本人的标准来看，将希腊人描述为‘克服’了东方那个不自由的世界，似乎有些言过其实。因为在黑格尔看来，希腊人仅仅标志着自由意识不断演进过程中的最新阶段；这一过程自中国开始，经过印度和波斯，最终在埃及——这个波斯最先进的行省——达到顶点。埃及是东方与西方之间的枢纽，在那里，人类灵魂内在的自由能力几乎被把握到了。但终究尚未真正把握，因为灵魂仍未与动物的自然本性区分开来；这种区分后来才由希腊人实现（HG 334, 368）。

Original · #57

That lack of distinction is shown by the way the Egyptians modelled their gods and goddesses on animal species, often with animal heads. Yet, for Hegel, the Greeks too stopped short of recognizing that all people have an inherent capacity for freedom. They admitted freedom only to male, native-born slave-owners.

Translation

这种缺乏区分体现在埃及人塑造诸神的方式上：他们常常以动物为原型来塑造神祇，使其长着动物的头。然而，在黑格尔看来，希腊人同样未能充分认识到，所有人天生都有自由的能力。他们所承认的自由，仅仅属于本邦出生的男性奴隶主。

Original · #58

In that way their view of freedom remained intermingled with acceptance of natural contingency, i.e., accidents of birth, sex and geographical location (H 88).

Translation

因此，他们对自由的理解仍然与对自然偶然性的接受交织在一起，也就是说，他们接受了出生、性别和地理位置等偶然因素（H 88）。

Original · #59

So the difference between the Egyptian view—human freedom is incompletely distinguished from (animal) nature—and the Greek view—human freedom is again incompletely distinguished from nature—appears to be a difference of degree, not kind. 1^1 Hegel’s ‘overcoming’ idea therefore sits uncomfortably with his graduated portrayal of history’s stages. That portrayal could be taken to show that belief in freedom is not exclusively European, since the Persians and Egyptians already had versions of that belief. To be sure, they were inadequate versions (for Hegel)—but then so was the Greeks’. And by extension, the Indians and Chinese likewise had versions of the belief in freedom—even more inadequate ones, since they attributed freedom only to ‘one’, not ‘some’—but where that inadequacy still differentiates these peoples from the Greeks only by degree and not kind (more so in the Indian case since the ‘one’ is a whole caste). If the Oriental peoples did have versions, however unsatisfactory, of the belief in freedom, then Hegel should not have denied that these peoples are historical. For if it is believed that someone is free, be it only ‘one’ ruler or caste, then others may claim and demand that same freedom for themselves, powering historical change.

Translation

因此，埃及人的观点——人的自由尚未与（动物性的）自然充分区分开来——与希腊人的观点——人的自由同样尚未与自然充分区分开来——之间的差别，看起来只是程度之别，而非种类之别。1^1 所以，黑格尔的“克服”观念与他所描绘的渐次上升的历史阶段显得并不协调。这一描绘可被解读为：对自由的信念并非欧洲所独有，因为波斯人和埃及人早已持有该信念的某种版本。诚然，这些版本（对黑格尔而言）并不充分——但希腊人的版本同样不充分。由此推之，印度人和中国人亦持有某种关于自由的信念版本——只是更为不充分，因为他们只将自由归于“一个人”，而非“一些人”——但这种不充分，依然只是使这些民族与希腊人之间的差异停留在程度上，而非种类上（在印度的案例中尤为明显，因为那“一个人”实指整个种姓）。然而，倘若东方民族确实拥有某种关于自由的信念，无论其如何不尽人意，黑格尔便不应否认这些民族具有历史性。因为，只要人们相信某个人是自由的，哪怕这个人只是“一个”统治者或一个种姓，其他人就可能为自己主张并要求同样的自由，从而推动历史变迁。

Original · #60

Now, Hegel regards the Africans and indigenous Americans as lacking freedom more radically than the Orientals, yet contrary evidence was available to him. He might, for instance, have noted the Iroquois Confederacy of five (later six) Native American tribes, founded c.1600 and dissolved c.1800: a system of intra- and inter-tribal governance which ‘maximized individual freedom while seeking to minimize excess governmental interference in people’s lives’ (Johansen

Translation

然而，黑格尔认为，非洲人和美洲原住民比较东方人更为彻底地缺乏自由；不过，与之相反的证据其实在他所能接触到的材料中早已存在。举例来说，他本可以注意到易洛魁联盟——这是一个由五个（后来增至六个）美洲原住民部族组成的联盟，大约成立于1600年，在1800年前后解体。该联盟的治理体系在调节部族内外事务时，“既要将政府对民众生活的过度干预降到最低，又要最大限度地保障个人自由”（Johansen

Original · #61

1982: 9), influencing the American Constitution. And Hegel embellished,

Translation

1982：9），并影响了美国宪法。黑格尔还进一步渲染道，

Original · #62

exaggerated and at times outright distorted his sources on Africa so as to portray a people without any respect for human life, freedom, or rights—more so than the sources suggested, and they were already unreliable (see Bernasconi 1998).^12 The way was open to Hegel to recognize Africans and indigenous Americans as having views of freedom, even if he classed them as even less adequate than Oriental ones. With that those peoples would, like the Orientals, have had an entry to history.

Translation

他夸大了、甚至有时公然歪曲了自己关于非洲的资料来源，旨在将非洲人描绘成一个对生命、自由与权利毫无尊重的民族——而且这种描绘比那些本身就不可靠的资料所显示的还要过分（参见 Bernasconi 1998）。^12 黑格尔完全有可能承认，非洲人与美洲原住民也拥有自己的自由观，即使他认为这些观点甚至比东方民族的还要不成熟。这样，这些民族就会像东方民族那样，获得进入历史的门径。

Original · #63

Nonetheless, Hegel preserves his division of European freedom from non- European unfreedom by counting all the European stages as stages of freedom, down to its lowest level, and all the non-European stages as stages of unfreedom, right up to where unfreedom is almost freedom, but not quite. But the placement of this dividing line appears arbitrary. Consider, for example, Hegel’s view that Hindus are not conscious of their own freedom because they fail to distinguish themselves, as human agents from nature (HG 256, 273–81). On Hegel’s account, as we’ve just seen, there are ways that the ancient Greeks did not fully extricate human agency from nature either, so—on his own terms—it is not clear that the difference here is one of kind (history versus non-history, freedom versus unfreedom) rather than degree (more or less freedom, more or less far along the historical path towards full freedom).

Translation

尽管如此，黑格尔仍然维持了欧洲自由与非欧洲不自由之间的划分：他把欧洲的各个阶段都算作自由的阶段，即便只是最低程度的自由；而把非欧洲的各个阶段都算作不自由的阶段，即便那种不自由已几乎接近自由，却终究还不是自由。但这条分界线的划定看起来是武断的。比如，黑格尔认为，印度人并未意识到自身的自由，因为他们未能将自己作为人类的行动者与自然区分开来（HG 256, 273–81）。然而，根据黑格尔自己的叙述，正如我们刚才所见，古希腊人在某些方面也并未充分将人的行动能力从自然中抽离出来。因此，按照他自己的逻辑，这里的差别究竟是性质上的差别（历史与非历史、自由与不自由），还是程度上的差别（自由更多还是更少、在通往完全自由的历史道路上走得更远还是更近），并不清楚。

Original · #64

Hegel could and, it seems, should have interpreted much of his material as evidencing how non-European peoples have grasped and practised freedom, albeit imperfectly. We might still find this revised Hegelian narrative objectionable, assuming that it ranks non-European conceptions of freedom as less advanced than European ones. Yet once it is admitted that non-European peoples are historical in principle, Hegel would also have to trace how historical advances unfolded in those societies, so reinterpreting his material once again. Each continent would have its own history of progression in consciousness of freedom, rather than non-European continents merely paving the way for Europe. The several continents would have histories of freedom that run in parallel, rather than corresponding to more or less advanced phases of a single historical line that culminates in modern Europe. Neither of these revised Hegelian narratives—the single line or parallel lines versions—supports colonialism, not even the single line model on which non-European peoples’ native levels of freedom are, although real, yet deficient compared to European ones. By recognizing freedom, however unsatisfactorily, non-European cultures would still have the internal potential and motor to advance to greater freedom. In that case colonization would not be necessary for non-European peoples’ achieving freedom, and would not be justified as a necessary step in the realization of universal freedom. Another plank in Hegel’s justification of colonization is that colonized peoples enjoyed no freedom pre-colonization—so that, despite its abrogation of their freedom, colonization did not worsen their position (and ultimately would improve it). But if these peoples did have a grasp of freedom, however imperfect, then colonization stood to worsen their position. That risk is especially pronounced given Hegel’s own perspective that some violence is necessary for colonization and, given the role of contingency in human affairs, that that violence may well mushroom beyond the necessary minimum. Further, for Hegel colonization requires the extirpation of native cultures; but if these are not cultures of unfreedom, then that extirpation is not justified. Apparently, then, Hegel should by his own lights have opposed colonialism, for his own philosophy generates a case against it.

Translation

黑格尔本来可以——而且看来也应当——将他掌握的许多材料解释为：非欧洲民族如何把握并践行了自由，尽管这种把握和践行并不完善。即便如此，如果这种经过修正的黑格尔式叙事仍将非欧洲的自由观念排在欧洲之下，视为较不发达，我们或许依然会认为它难以接受。然而，一旦承认非欧洲民族在原则上也具有历史性，黑格尔就还必须追溯历史进步如何在这些社会中展开，从而再次重新诠释他的材料。这样一来，每个大陆都将有其自身的自由意识进步史，而非欧洲各大陆不再只是为欧洲铺路。各个大陆都将拥有各自的自由史，这些历史彼此平行展开，而不再对应于同一条最终在现代欧洲达到顶点的单一历史线上或先进或落后的不同阶段。 这两种经过修正的黑格尔式叙事——单线式版本和并行线式版本——都不能为殖民主义提供支持。即便是在单线模式中，非欧洲民族本有的自由水平虽然真实存在，却仍被视为低于欧洲，也依然如此。只要非欧洲文化承认自由，哪怕这种承认并不充分，它们内部就仍然具有迈向更大自由的潜能和动力。既然如此，非欧洲民族要实现自由，就并不需要殖民；殖民也不能被证明为实现普遍自由所必需的一个步骤。 黑格尔为殖民辩护的另一条依据是：被殖民民族在殖民之前并不享有任何自由——因此，尽管殖民剥夺了他们的自由，它也并没有使他们的处境变得更糟（而且最终还会改善这种处境）。但是，如果这些民族确实把握到了自由，尽管并不完善，那么殖民就可能使他们的处境恶化。考虑到黑格尔本人认为，殖民需要某种程度的暴力；再考虑到在人类事务中偶然性所起的作用，这种暴力很可能会膨胀到远远超出必要最低限度的程度，这种风险就尤其明显。 并且，在黑格尔看来，殖民还要求根除本土文化；但如果这些文化并非不自由的文化，那么这种根除就是没有正当性的。因此看来，按照黑格尔自己的标准，他本应反对殖民主义，因为他自己的哲学就足以形成一套反对殖民主义的论证。

Original · #65

IV. The Greeks, history and self-liberation from nature

Translation

四、希腊人：历史与从自然的自我解放

Original · #66

The view just canvassed is that, despite the Eurocentrism and pro-colonialism of Hegel’s substantial narrative in the PWH, his distinctive account of freedom, as developing historically through successive civilizations, does not in itself necessitate his substantive Eurocentrism and, when extricated from the latter, yields a case against colonialism. However, we can distinguish weaker and stronger versions of this view. More weakly: Hegel’s basic account of freedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism, and so does not necessarily imply pro-colonialism, but contains anti-colonial possibilities as well as the pro-colonial possibilities that Hegel developed from it. More strongly: Hegel’s basic account of freedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism and, when so separated, this account implies anti-colonialism and has an inherently anti-colonial direction. I endorse the weaker but not the stronger claim, and the weaker one only subject to a significant qualification: Hegel’s basic account of freedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism, but not as easily as

Translation

刚才概述的看法是：尽管黑格尔在《历史哲学讲演录》中展开的实质性叙述带有欧洲中心主义和亲殖民主义色彩，但他关于自由的独特说明——即自由如何在历史中通过相继出现的诸文明而发展——本身并不必然要求那种实质性的欧洲中心主义；而且，一旦把这种自由观从后者中剥离出来，它就能够构成反对殖民主义的理由。 不过，这一看法还可以区分为较弱和较强两种版本。较弱的版本是：黑格尔关于自由的基本说明可以同他实际持有的亲殖民主义立场分离开来，因此它并不必然导向亲殖民主义；其中既包含反殖民的可能性，也包含黑格尔本人据此发展出来的那些亲殖民可能性。较强的版本则是：黑格尔关于自由的基本说明可以同他实际持有的亲殖民主义立场分离开来；而一旦作此分离，这一说明就会导向反殖民主义，并且本身具有一种内在的反殖民指向。 我赞同较弱的主张，而不赞同较强的主张；并且，即便是较弱的主张，也还需要加上一个重要的限定：黑格尔关于自由的基本说明确实可以同他实际持有的亲殖民主义立场分离开来，但并不像人们或许以为的那样容易。

Original · #67

Section III suggested. This is because Hegel’s conception of freedom as

Translation

正如第三节所提示的，这是因为黑格尔将自由理解为

Original · #68

self-determination has significant connections with his Eurocentrism. In Section III I suggested that Hegel’s divisions Greeks/non-Greeks, free/ unfree look arbitrary. But actually they are not. For Hegel:

Translation

自决的概念与他的欧洲中心主义密切相关。我在第三节中曾提出，黑格尔对希腊人/非希腊人、自由/不自由的划分看似颇为随意。但其实并非如此。对黑格尔而言：

Original · #69

Its [Greece’s] principle is that self-conscious freedom steps forth. … [Regarding t]he unity of spirit with nature … the specificity of this unity [in the Greek case] is to be grasped.

Translation

它〔希腊〕的原则是：自我意识的自由显现出来。……〔至于〕精神与自然的统一……则必须把握这种统一〔在希腊这里〕所具有的特殊性。

Original · #70

One unity is the Oriental, … consciousness immersed in nature; a [new kind of] harmony is now to be brought forth [by the Greeks] in which … spirit dominates. Spirit now determines nature, and this is a spiritual unity … (Hei 117; my emphases) [The] fundamental characteristic [of the Greek spirit is] that the freedom of spirit is conditioned by and in essential relation to some natural stimulus. Greek freedom is stimulated by something other and is free because it changes and produces the stimulus from out of itself (aus sich). (S 238; my emphasis) Thus, the Greeks were free in that they were at home with themselves in the other, i.e., nature. But this does not mean that the content of their practices and way of life was determined by natural givens such as the Greeks’ given impulses.

Translation

一种统一性是东方的统一性，……其意识沉浸于自然之中；而如今，【希腊人将要建立的】，是一种【新的】和谐，在其中……精神起主导作用。精神现在规定自然，这是一种精神上的统一……（Hei 117；着重号为本文作者所加）【希腊精神的】根本特征【在于】：精神的自由以某种自然刺激为条件，并在本质上与之相关联。希腊的自由由某种他者所激发；其自由之处，恰恰在于它能从自身内部出发（aus sich），转化并再生这种刺激。（S 238；着重号为本文作者所加）因此，希腊人的自由在于：他们在他者——也就是自然——之中仍能安于自身。但这并不等于说，他们的实践内容和生活方式是由自然给予的既定因素，比如希腊人固有的冲动所决定的。

Original · #71

Rather, they reshaped these givens and so became at-home-with-themselves in them. In the Greek case, then, spirit ‘determined’ nature, whereas previously spirit had been immersed or absorbed (versenkt) in nature. This Greek determination of nature by spirit—spirit’s investment of nature with meaning of its own—was made possible by a prior moment, first carried out by the Greeks, through which ‘spirit is no longer immersed [versenkt] in nature, … [but] releas[es] itself from nature [sich losmachend von der Natur]’ (HG 395–96). This moment in which the human spirit first releases or sets itself free from nature corresponds to the overcoming (überwinden) by the Greeks of their mixed ethnic heritage, a moment of overcoming through which they became able to remake that heritage for themselves, to make themselves. Hegel is explicit that none of the world’s other peoples to that point had achieved this.

Translation

相反，他们重塑了这些既有条件，并因此在其中获得了自我安顿、自我契合的状态。就希腊人的情形而言，精神于是“规定（bestimmte）”了自然；而在此之前，精神一直沉浸在自然之中，或被自然所吸纳（versenkt）。希腊人以精神规定自然——也就是精神将其自身的意义赋予自然——之所以可能，是因为此前已有一个先行的环节，而这一环节首先由希腊人完成了：通过它，“精神不再沉浸[versenkt]于自然之中，……[而是]‘使自身从自然中摆脱出来’[sich losmachend von der Natur]”（HG 395–96）。人类精神最初从自然中摆脱出来、获得自由的这一时刻，对应着希腊人对其混合族裔渊源的克服（überwinden）；正是通过这一克服的时刻，他们才得以重新塑造这一渊源，从而塑造自身。黑格尔明确指出，到那时为止，世界上其他任何民族都还没有实现这一点。

Original · #72

Even so, for Hegel, the Greeks exercised freedom always with respect to nature and existing givens in the world—re-shaping what they found already there, rather than creating a totally new world out of themselves. Hence the Greeks did not regard free individuals as being capable of adjudicating independently on the given natural and social world through their own reason, or of generating norms and principles purely through the exercise of their spiritual freedom. Or, as Hegel also puts it elsewhere, individual subjectivity was not differentiated from social substance, but the individual identified fully and unquestioningly with his or her social role, and there was no ground for independent social criticism (see Hardimon 1993). Connected with all this, the Greeks restricted freedom to some people only, effectively stipulating that only those with certain kinds of nature—male, free-born—or natural location—native Greek—had the power of self-determination. In these ways spirit’s freedom remained ‘conditioned’, or limited (bedingt), by—although not immersed in— nature (and see HG 390).

Translation

即便如此，在黑格尔看来，希腊人行使自由时，始终是针对自然以及世界中既有的条件而进行的——他们只是对已然存在之物进行再造，而非完全从自身之中创造出一个全新的世界。因此，希腊人并不认为自由的个体能够仅凭自身理性，对给定的自然与社会世界作出独立的裁断；亦不认为个体能够纯粹通过运用其精神自由来创生规范和原则。或者，如黑格尔在别处所言，个体主体性与社会实体尚未分化，个体全然并毫无质疑地认同其社会角色，独立的社会批判并无基础（见 Hardimon 1993）。与此相应，希腊人将自由仅赋予某些人，实际上规定，只有具备某些特定自然属性——男性、生而自由者——或处于某种自然位置——希腊本土人——的人，才拥有自我决定的能力。正因如此，精神的自由仍然是“受条件制约的”或受限的（bedingt）——虽然它并未没入自然之中（另见 HG 390）。

Original · #73

However, these limitations contradicted the essence of self-determination as the Greeks understood it, as including a moment of overcoming or settingoneself-free from nature, such that the power to overcome nature cannot possibly be limited by nature (or it would not be a power to overcome nature at all). Thus, ‘in the principle of Greek freedom, inasmuch as it is freedom, it is implied that thought must be free for itself ’ (HG 268)—although the Greeks for a long time did not explicitly grasp or follow through on that implication.

Translation

然而，这些限制与希腊人所理解的自我规定之本质相矛盾，因为自我规定的本质包含一个克服自然、或使自己摆脱自然的环节。既然要超越自然，这种超越自然的能力不应再受自然限制；否则，它根本不配称为超越自然的能力。由此看来，“在希腊自由的原则中，就其为自由而言，已经暗示着思想必须是自为地自由的”（HG 268）——虽然希腊人在很长时期内并未明确把握这一暗示，也未将其充分展开。

Original · #74

Nonetheless, in the end that contradiction was what made it possible for the Greeks’ exclusion of some people from freedom, and their other ways of restricting freedom’s scope, to come in for criticism. The criticism came with Socrates and the Sophists claiming that thought can adjudicate rationally on what is and generate norms by itself (417). In that freedom of thought was thereby grasped as fully independent of nature, it was also grasped as universal, at least in principle. In these two ways, ‘Thought … introduces an opposition [Gegensatz] [to the Greek mixture of freedom and nature] and asserts the validity of essentially rational principles’ (S 267).

Translation

尽管如此，最终正是这一矛盾使得希腊人将某些人排除在自由之外、并以其他方式限制自由范围的做法，成为了可能遭受批评的对象。苏格拉底与智者提出了这种批评，他们声称思想能够对“何为存在”进行理性裁断，并能自行产生规范（417）。由此，思想的自由既然被视为完全独立于自然，它至少在原则上也被视为普遍的。正是在这两方面，“思想……引入了一种对立［Gegensatz］［针对希腊式自由与自然的混合］，并确立了本质上合乎理性的原则之有效性”（S 267）。

Original · #75

For Hegel, then, Greek culture enabled rational criticism of what is, including of limited freedom, as no pre-Greek cultures did, just because the Greeks had established a root opposition between freedom and nature, whereas ‘in the Oriental states, in which a lack of opposition is present, no moral freedom can come about’ (267). Although the advent of rational critique brought on the demise of Greek culture, Europe was thereby also set on the path of transformative historical change. We see, then, why in his own terms Hegel says that non-European peoples could not advance critical claims for freedom’s extension but uncritically accepted the authority of their rulers—patriarchal authority in China, caste hierarchy and caste-based restrictions and rituals in India, and state power in Persia. Non-Europeans could not question such authorities because their cultures did not grasp freedom as including the moment of overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature and the given. Because freedom was not grasped as including that moment of human separation from nature and the given, no contradiction was perceived in freedom being limited by nature, e.g., confined to people of certain castes, or by given states of affairs, e.g., customary authority and ritual. Non-Europeans lacked a critical motor to drive social change, hence lacked history proper—or indeed freedom as properly distinguished from unfreedom. So, for Hegel, there is a genuine difference in kind, not merely degree, between the Greek and post-Greek European world on the one hand and the non-European world on the other; the Europe/non-Europe divide is not arbitrary but has a philosophical rationale. For while the Greek view of freedom was, like non-European views, limited and inadequate, the former was more advanced in one key respect—the inclusion in freedom of a primary moment of ‘overcoming’ nature—which enabled the Greek and post-Greek European world to become self-critical, self-revising, and so historical. This is what motivates Hegel to identify Greek and post-Greek European views as views of freedom, however limited, whereas non-European views that might prima facie look like views of freedom are still actually modes of unfreedom.

Translation

因此，在黑格尔看来，希腊文化之所以能够做到前希腊文化所做不到的事——即对现存之物（包括那受限制的自由）进行理性批判——恰恰在于希腊人确立了自由与自然之间的根本对立；而“在东方国家，由于缺乏这种对立，道德自由便不可能产生”（267）。尽管理性批判的出现导致了希腊文化的式微，但欧洲也因此走上了变革性的历史道路。 如此一来，我们便不难理解，为何黑格尔会依据其自身概念断言：非欧洲民族无法提出要求扩展自由的批判性主张，而只是无批判地接受其统治者的权威——在中国是父权制权威，在印度是种姓等级及基于种姓的限制与仪式，在波斯则是国家权力。非欧洲人之所以未能质疑这些权威，是因为他们的文化并未将自由把握为包含这样一个环节：克服自然与既成之物，或者说，从其中解放出自身。由于自由未被把握为包含人与自然及既成之物相分离的这一环节，人们便看不到其中的矛盾：自由竟会受到自然的限制（例如限于特定种姓之人），或受到既成事态的限制（例如习俗权威与仪式）。 非欧洲人缺乏驱动社会变革的批判性动力，因而也缺乏本真意义上的历史——乃至缺乏那种真正与不自由区分开来的自由。故此，对黑格尔而言，希腊世界与后希腊的欧洲世界，同非欧洲世界之间，存在的是真实的类属差异，而不仅是程度差异；欧洲/非欧洲的分野并非随意，而是有其哲学理据。因为，尽管希腊的自由观与非欧洲的自由观同样受限、不充分，但前者在一个关键方面更为先进：它将“克服”自然的原初环节纳入了自由之中；正是这一点，使希腊及后希腊的欧洲世界得以成为自我批判、自我修正的、从而也是历史性的世界。这就促使黑格尔将希腊与后希腊欧洲的观点视为关于自由的观点（无论多么有限），而那些乍看之下似属自由观点的非欧洲观点，实则仍是不自由的形态。

Original · #76

Once again, we might object that non-Europeans have at times construed freedom as including this moment of overcoming nature. Even on Hegel’s account, Hindus appreciate the human power to abstract from the world in thought. He maintains, though, that this is merely an intellectual withdrawal and that when it comes to practical agency Hindus see human agency as immersed in, not including any moment of self-freeing-from, nature (see, e.g., S 157–58).

Translation

我们仍可提出疑议：非欧洲人有时也会将自由理解为包含克服自然这一环节。即便依黑格尔自己的说法，印度人也承认人可以在思想中从世界中抽离。但他坚称，这仅仅是一种智识上的退缩；而在实践行动方面，印度人所理解的人类能动性是沉浸于自然之中的，并不包含任何令自身摆脱自然的环节（例如参阅 S 157–58）。

Original · #77

In response we could, with Jaspal Peter Sahota (2016), agree that in classical Indian thought there has been a tendency to locate human agency within nature but argue, against Hegel, that this does not constitute a real absence of freedom but rather a different conception of freedom. We might then say that because these—and other—non-European views were still views of freedom, those views were still sufficient to motivate social criticism, and hence place non- European peoples in history, even without the element of overcoming nature.

Translation

作为回应，我们可以同意 Jaspal Peter Sahota（2016）的观点，即古典印度思想中确实存在一种将人的能动性置于自然之中的倾向。但我们也可以反驳黑格尔，指出这并非自由的真正缺失，而是代表了一种不同的自由观念。由此，我们或许可以说，既然这些——以及其他——非欧洲观点仍然是关于自由的观点，它们就仍然足以推动社会批判，从而将非欧洲人民置于历史之中，即使不包含“克服自然”这一要素。

Original · #78

However, such a position would take us further away from Hegel’s own account of the historicity of freedom, according which, as we have seen, that moment of overcoming nature, uniquely new in ancient Greece, is crucial in powering historical progression.

Translation

然而，这样一种立场会使我们进一步偏离黑格尔本人关于自由之历史性的说明。按照这种说明，正如我们已经看到的，在古希腊以独特而崭新的方式出现的克服自然的时刻，对于推动历史的发展至关重要。

Original · #79

Hegel’s basic account of freedom and its historicity thus has more extensive and significant connections with his Eurocentrism than I suggested in

Translation

因此，黑格尔关于自由及其历史性的基本论述，与其欧洲中心主义之间的联系，比我之前所指出的更为广泛和重要。

Original · #80

Section III. In particular, that account connects with Hegel’s denial that non-

Translation

第三部分。具体而言，这一论述与黑格尔的如下否认相联系：非欧洲民族不具备历史性——即无法自行达致自由——因而也与其关于殖民主义的论证相联系，因为对黑格尔而言，殖民是这些民族能够达到自由的惟一途径。

Original · #81

European peoples are historical—i.e., can come to freedom on their own—and hence with his case for colonialism, as the only route along which those peoples can reach freedom. These connections suggest that, after all, we cannot straightforwardly take up Hegel’s account of freedom and its historicity while sloughing off his pro-colonialism. This is not to say that we cannot separate out these parts of his thought at all. But rescuing Hegel from himself is set to be a complicated process, not quick or straightforward. To the extent that such a rescue is possible, Hegel’s pro-colonialism cannot rightly be counted as necessary to his thought or system. Yet his pro-colonialism does have extensive and deep-seated connections with his other views—enough to show that it is not the case that Hegel should not have endorsed colonialism by his own standards.

Translation

欧洲诸民族是具有历史性的——也就是说，它们能够凭借自身走向自由——而此点正与其对殖民主义的证成挂钩；在他看来，殖民主义是那些民族抵达自由的唯一道路。这些关联表明，归根结底，我们不可能采纳黑格尔关于自由及其历史性的论述，却轻易抛开其支持殖民主义的观点。这并不是说，我们完全无法将其思想中的这些部分分离开来。但若要“拯救”黑格尔，使之免于自身观点的局限，必将是一个复杂而非迅速或直接的过程。就此拯救之可能性而言，黑格尔支持殖民主义的立场确实不能被恰当地视为其思想或体系的必然构成部分。然而，其支持殖民主义的立场与其他观点之间确实存在广泛而深刻的联系——其程度足以表明，认为黑格尔按照其自身的标准本不应支持殖民主义，这种看法是站不住脚的。

Original · #82

Rather, he did and could endorse it coherently in his own terms, although other, anti-colonialist possibilities were also available within his own terms which he could have developed.

Translation

毋宁说，他确实赞同殖民主义，而且完全可以依据自己的理论逻辑，前后一贯地为殖民主义辩护；不过，在这一理论逻辑本身之内，同样蕴藏着其他反殖民主义的可能性，这些可能性本是他可以进一步展开的。

Original · #83

So the claim that Hegel’s account of freedom is inherently anti-colonial is unduly strong. Through his understanding of freedom as involving spirit extricating itself from nature, that account has sustained links with his Eurocentrism and so his pro-colonialism. We can nonetheless envisage various manoeuvres by which to maintain that freedom develops historically for all the world’s peoples, for example by saying that they have several conceptions of freedom where freedom can, but does not have to, include self-liberation from nature. Then ancient Greece would initiate one historical pathway to freedom, but not the only one. Even so, Hegel’s own account of freedom and its historicity does not inherently drive us to make these intellectual manoeuvres, but only permits them. In sum, if Hegel’s view of freedom does not necessarily imply pro-colonialism, neither is it inherently anti-colonial. We can make distinctions and qualifications within his thought so as to yield anti-colonial conclusions, but this is only one of several possible lines of development of which his thought admits, another being its elaboration into the Eurocentric and pro-colonial system that Hegel in fact forged.

Translation

因此，声称黑格尔关于自由的论述具有内在的反殖民性质，这一说法未免过强。根据他的理解，自由意味着精神将自身从自然中挣脱出来；而这种理解与他的欧洲中心主义及其亲殖民立场之间，存在着深刻的联系。 尽管如此，我们仍然可以设想各种理论上的处理方式，以坚持自由在历史中会为世界上所有民族发展出来。例如，我们可以说这些民族拥有多种自由观，而自由可以包含但并不必然包含从自然中的自我解放。这样一来，古希腊将开启一条通向自由的历史道路，而非唯一的一条。 即便如此，黑格尔本人关于自由及其历史性的论述本身，并不会驱使我们进行这些理论处理；它仅仅允许我们这样做。总而言之，如果说黑格尔的自由观并不必然意味着亲殖民主义，那么它同样也并非天生就是反殖民的。我们可以从他的思想内部作出区分与限定，从而推导出反殖民的结论；但这只是其思想所容许的若干可能发展方向之一，另一种则是对其加以推演，形成黑格尔事实上所构建的那个欧洲中心主义的、亲殖民的体系。

Original · #84

There is a broader moral. We—i.e., the heirs of the European heritage that runs through philosophy into modern political thought—should not let this heritage off the hook too easily. This heritage, including Hegel’s thought, has been implicated in colonialism in various ways. To be sure, because it extols and articulates the values of freedom and equality, this heritage also furnishes conceptual resources for critiquing colonialism and giving support to anticolonial struggles, and anti-colonial thinkers and activists have drawn on modern European ideas for this purpose. For example, the Haitian revolutionaries declared that they were acting in allegiance to the emancipatory goals of the French Revolution. This might lead us to suppose that the European political legacy is intrinsically liberatory, and that theorists in the European tradition— Hegel included—have only ever justified colonialism due to unfortunate prejudices that led them to go back on their own principles.

Translation

这里还有一个更广泛的道德寓意。我们——即继承了欧洲思想遗产的人，这一遗产贯穿哲学并延伸至现代政治思想——不应太轻易地放过它。这一遗产，包括黑格尔的思想在内，以各种方式与殖民主义纠缠在一起。诚然，正因为它颂扬并阐明了自由和平等的价值，这一遗产也为批判殖民主义、支持反殖民斗争提供了概念资源；反殖民思想家和活动家也确实曾为此目的而借鉴现代欧洲思想。例如，海地革命者宣称，他们的行动是忠于法国大革命的解放目标。这或许会让我们以为，欧洲政治遗产本质上是解放性的，而欧洲传统中的理论家——包括黑格尔——之所以为殖民主义辩护，只是由于某些不幸的偏见，使他们背弃了自己的原则。

Original · #85

I believe that taking that view exculpates our predecessors too quickly, and leaves us at risk of inadvertently embracing ideas inherited from these predecessors which actually have deep-rooted internal connections with Eurocentric and pro-colonial attitudes. This is not to say that we should or could repudiate these ideas outright. Rather, in view of their connections with colonialism, we need to think carefully and critically about how far to take these inherited ideas forward and how we might do so differently. My aim has been to help us cultivate this caution in Hegel’s case by acknowledging that, while his thought harbours anti-colonial possibilities, it also has real and tenacious links with colonialism of which we should remind mindful.13 [email protected]

Translation

我认为，采取那种看法未免过于轻易地为前辈开脱，也会使我们面临风险：不知不觉地接受那些从他们那里继承的观念，而这些观念实际上与欧洲中心主义和亲殖民态度有着根深蒂固的内在关联。这并不是说，我们应当或能够将这些观念全盘否弃。相反，鉴于它们与殖民主义的关联，我们需要认真而批判地思考：这些继承而来的观念，究竟应当在多大程度上继续推进，又应如何以不同的方式加以发扬。我的目的，是通过黑格尔这一案例，帮助我们养成审慎态度：承认他的思想虽包含反殖民的可能性，但同时也与殖民主义存在真实而顽固的联系，这一点我们应当始终谨记。13 [email protected]

Original · #86

Notes

Translation

注释

Original · #87

1 Contributions include those by Bernasconi 1998, 2007, 2016, Bonetto 2006, de Laurentiis

Translation

1 相关研究包括 Bernasconi（1998、2007、2016）、Bonetto（2006）以及 de Laurentiis。

Original · #88

2014, McCarney and Bernasconi 2003, Mowad 2013, Parekh 2009, Purtschert 2010 and

Translation

1 相关研究贡献包括 Bernasconi (1998, 2007, 2016)，Bonetto (2006)，de Laurentiis (2013)，McCarney 和 Bernasconi (2003)，Mowad (2013)，Parekh (2009)，Purtschert (2010) 以及 Tibebu (2010)。

Original · #89

Tibebu 2010.

Translation

Tibebu，2010年。

Original · #90

2 However, see Buck-Morss 2000, and—for highly critical accounts—Dussel [1992] 1995 and

Translation

2 不过，可参考 Buck-Morss 2000；至于高度批判性的论述，则可参见 Dussel [1992] 1995 和

Original · #91

1993, Guha 2002, Tibebu 2010. Also relevant are Bird-Pollan 20^14 (on Hegel and Fanon),

Translation

1993；Guha 2002；Tibebu 2010。另可参见 Bird-Pollan 2014（论黑格尔与法农）。

Original · #92

Brennan 20^13 (on Hegel’s influence on post-colonialism), Buchwalter 20^09 (defending Hegel against charges of Eurocentrism), Monahan 20^17 (Creolizing Hegel) and Serequeberhan 19^89 (on colonialism in the Philosophy of Right).

Translation

Brennan 2013（论黑格尔对后殖民主义的影响）、Buchwalter 2009（为黑格尔辩护，回应其欧洲中心主义之指控）、Monahan 2017（《使黑格尔克里奥尔化》），以及 Serequeberhan 1989（论《法哲学》中的殖民主义）。

Original · #93

3 Ranajit Guha identifies another argument for colonialism in the Philosophy of Right,

Translation

3 拉纳吉特·古哈在《法哲学》中指出了另一种为殖民主义辩护的论点，

Original · #94

from the ‘rights’ that Hegel claims civilized nations have with respect to less advanced ones (PR §351, 376). These rights, Guha argues, are ‘rights of conquest’, noting Hegel’s praise for British military victories over India led by Robert Clive (1725–74), whose conquests established the East India Company’s rule over Bengal and other Indian states. See Guha 2002: 43–44; PR §372A, 364 and 474 note 1).

Translation

黑格尔声称，文明国家对于较不发达的民族享有某些“权利”（PR §351, 376）。古哈认为，这些权利实际上就是“征服的权利”。他指出，黑格尔曾赞扬罗伯特·克莱武（1725–74）领导英国在印度取得的军事胜利；正是凭这些征服，东印度公司确立了对孟加拉及印度其他邦国的统治。见 Guha 2002: 43–44；PR §372A, 364 oraz 474 note 1）。

Original · #95

Abbreviations used:

Translation

所用缩略语：

Original · #96

EN = Hegel, G. W. F. (1970), Philosophy of Nature, trans. A. V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Translation

黑格尔，G. W. F.（1970），《自然哲学》，A. V. Miller 译，牛津：克拉伦登出版社。

Original · #97

EM = Hegel, G. W. F. (1971), Philosophy of Mind. Trans. W. Wallace and A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cited by paragraph and page number.

Translation

EM = 黑格尔，G. W. F.（1971），《精神哲学》，W. Wallace 与 A. V. Miller 译，牛津：牛津大学出版社。引文按段落号和页码标注。

Original · #98

N = Hegel, G. W. F. (1975), Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction: Reason in History, S = Hegel, G. W. F. (1991), The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books.

Translation

N = 黑格尔，G. W. F.（1975），《世界历史哲学讲演录：导论：历史中的理性》；S = 黑格尔，G. W. F.（1991），《历史哲学》，J. Sibree 译，纽约州布法罗：普罗米修斯出版社。

Original · #99

PR = Hegel, G. W. F. (1992), Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge, UK:

Translation

PR = Hegel, G. W. F. (1992), 《法哲学原理》，trans. H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge, UK:

Original · #100

Hei = Hegel, G. W. F. (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte: Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann (Winter 1830/1831), ed. K. Vieweg. Berlin: Wilhelm Fink. converge, as do—extensively—several transcripts of the PWH, we may take them to be reliable. Accordingly, I refer to: Hegel’s manuscripts (abbreviated H) as in Hegel 2011, which is the English translation of the corresponding volume of the Gesammelte Werke (Hegel 1995); and the integrated text of the 1822/23 course composed primarily from Hotho’s and Griesheim’s transcripts (abb. HG), included in Hegel 20^11 (the German is Hegel 1996). Since the German critical edition of the transcripts remains incomplete, for materials on Hegel’s later courses I have used Heimann’s transcript of 1830/31 whenever possible (Hegel 2005; abb. Hei), otherwise the composite texts produced by Karl Hegel (Hegel 1986) and translated by Sibree (Hegel 1991; abb. S) and by Georg Lasson/Johannes Hoffmeister (Hegel 1988), translated by Nisbet (Hegel 1975; abb. N). I quote English translations whenever available, sometimes adjusted in view of the German.

Translation

Hei = 黑格尔（G. W. F.）（2005）《历史哲学：海曼笔记（1830/1831年冬）》（Die Philosophie der Geschichte: Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann (Winter 1830/1831)），K. Vieweg 编，柏林：Wilhelm Fink。 由于这些笔记内容彼此吻合，而且《世界历史哲学讲演录》的多种听讲笔记也在很大程度上相互一致，我们可以将它们视为可靠的资料。因此，我所引用的材料如下：黑格尔的手稿（简写为H），收录于Hegel 2011——这是《著作集》（Gesammelte Werke）相应卷册的英译本（德文原版为Hegel 1995）；以及依据霍托和格里舍姆的笔记为主要基础构成的1822/23年课程的整合文本（简写为HG），收录于Hegel 2011（德文原版为Hegel 1996）。由于这些听讲笔记的德文校勘本尚未出齐，对于黑格尔后期课程的文献，我尽可能使用海曼的1830/31年笔记稿（Hegel 2005；简写为Hei）；否则，则采用卡尔·黑格尔编订的合成文本（Hegel 1986），以及西布里（Hegel 1991；简写为S）和乔治·拉松/约翰内斯·霍夫迈斯特（Hegel 1988）的版本，后者由尼斯贝特翻译（Hegel 1975；简写为N）。凡有现成英译本，我都会加以引用，但有时会参照德文进行适当调整。

Original · #101

5 For more on contingency in Hegel, see, inter alia, Burbidge 2007: esp. ch. 1. Burbidge stresses

Translation

5 关于黑格尔思想中的偶然性，除其他文献外，另可参见 Burbidge 2007 年著作，尤其是第一章。Burbidge 强调黑格尔“在多大程度上认真对待历史的偶然性”（2007: 9）。

Original · #102

the extent to which Hegel ‘takes the contingencies of history seriously’ (2007: 9).

Translation

黑格尔在多大程度上‘严肃对待历史的偶然性’（2007: 9）。

Original · #103

6 For Hegel, ‘nature … is indeed a rational system, operating in its own distinct element’ (N 44).

Translation

6 对黑格尔而言，“自然……确实是一个理性系统，在它自身独特的元素中运作”（N 44）。

Original · #104

The division into continents is rational in that different natural features and their varieties— mountains and plains, lands and seas, and their fusion and differentiation—each find full embodiment in different continents (EM §393 and R, 40–41). In a sense, then, non-Europeans are subject to reason and rational progression insofar as nature imposes it on them from the outside rather than by exercising rational thought for themselves. This coheres with Hegel’s view that these peoples are immersed in nature, out of which only Europeans can lift them; see below.

Translation

大陆的划分是合乎理性的，因为不同的自然特征及其各种形态——山地与平原、陆地与海洋，以及二者的融合与分化——都在不同的大陆上得到了充分体现（EM §393 and R, 40–41）。因此从某种意义上说，非欧洲人也服从于理性及其进步过程；只是这种理性并非源于他们自身对理性思维的主动运用，而是作为自然力量从外部施加于他们的。这与黑格尔的看法相一致：这些民族沉浸于自然之中，只有欧洲人才能将他们从中提升出来；见下文。

Original · #105

7 This recalls Hegel’s derivation of time from space in the Philosophy of Nature, a derivation that

Translation

7 这让人想起黑格尔在《自然哲学》中从空间推导时间的做法，而此推导又

Original · #106

positions time as more advanced than space (EN §§256–57, 31–36).

Translation

将时间置于比空间更高级的位置（EN §§256–57, 31–36）。

Original · #107

8 This is evident from, e.g., Hegel’s discussion of the colonization of America; see Section II.

Translation

这一点从黑格尔对美洲殖民问题的讨论中即可看出；参见第二节。

Original · #108

9 Hegel connects formation with possession (PR §56, 85–86), albeit in the very different

Translation

9 黑格尔将塑造与占有联系起来（PR §56, 85–86），尽管此处的关联与前文所论者截然不同。

Original · #109

context of modern European societies in which private property is institutionalized. I leave unexplored here how far his ideas about slavery’s educative power may be informed by his lord/bondsman dialectic.

Translation

这里我所指涉的是私有财产已然制度化的现代欧洲社会背景。至于他关于奴隶制具有教化作用的观点在多大程度上可能受到其主奴辩证法的影响，我在此暂不进一步探讨。

Original · #110

1^0 For instance, some interpreters defend Hegel against charges of Eurocentrism and racism

Translation

例如，一些阐释者为黑格尔辩护，反驳针对他欧洲中心主义和种族主义的指责。

Original · #111

(e.g., Buchwalter 2009, Houlgate [1991] 2015: 35–37, McCarney in McCarney and Bernasconi

Translation

（例如 Buchwalter 2009；Houlgate [1991] 2015: 35–37；McCarney，载于 McCarney and Bernasconi）

Original · #112

2003, Mowad 2013); others stress Hegel’s founding importance for anti-colonial thought

Translation

（2003；Mowad，2013）；另一些人则强调黑格尔对反殖民思想的奠基性意义。

Original · #113

(Brennan 2013); and numerous readers of Hegel as a thinker of freedom (e.g., Patten 1999) see no need to discuss his position on colonialism, presumably on the grounds that the latter is a merely accidental, avoidable part of his thought from which his essential views on freedom can be extracted. the supposed originators of Europe’s distinctive culture, were actually the Egyptians’ heirs, then, given that Egypt is within Africa, the Europe/Africa divide would crumble. A further complicating factor is whether the Egyptians were seen as black Africans. Bernasconi (2007) argues that Hegel thought so, as did most other Europeans of his time. Later the Egyptians’ racial status was changed—to Mediterranean (i.e., Caucasian)—to hold up the divide between Europe-as-white and Africa-as-black. Bernasconi suggests that Hegel himself dealt with the potential anomaly—of highly cultured black Africans giving much to the Greeks—by making the Egypt/Greece transition the site of the key conceptual transition from unfreedom to freedom, nature to spirit (2007: 212–13). This ties in with my argument in Section IV that Hegel actually did have grounds, on his own terms, to construe the apparently gradual Egypt/ Greece transition as actually being a sharp divide.

Translation

（Brennan 2013）；此外，许多将黑格尔视为自由思想家的读者（如 Patten 1999）也认为无需讨论他在殖民主义问题上的立场，这恐怕是因为他们觉得殖民主义在其思想中只是偶然的、可避免的一部分，从中仍可剥离出他关于自由的核心观点。如果所谓欧洲独特文化的开创者，其实是埃及人的继承者，而埃及又位于非洲，那么欧洲／非洲的区分便会瓦解。另一个使情形复杂化的因素在于，当时人们如何看待埃及人：他们是否属于黑人非洲人？Bernasconi（2007）指出，黑格尔以及当时大多数欧洲人确实是这样认为的。然而此后，为了维系“欧洲即白人、非洲即黑人”的区隔，埃及人的种族地位被更改为地中海人（即高加索人）。Bernasconi 指出，黑格尔本人处理这一潜在悖论——即高度开化的黑人非洲人曾对希腊人有诸多贡献——的方式，是将埃及与希腊之间的过渡塑造成一个关键的概念转折点：从不自由转向自由，从自然转向精神（2007: 212–13）。这正呼应了我在第四节中的论点：依据黑格尔自身的逻辑，他实际上确有理由将表面上渐进的埃及／希腊过渡，解释为一种剧烈的断裂。

Original · #114

1^2 Bernasconi (2016) has recently shown how Hegel likewise distorted his sources on China, to

Translation

1^2 伯纳斯科尼（Bernasconi，2016）近来表明，黑格尔也歪曲了他关于中国的资料，以便

Original · #115

the detriment of the Chinese.

Translation

损害了中国人民的利益。

Original · #116

1^3 I thank Bob Stern and the referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions.

Translation

感谢鲍勃·斯特恩和各位匿名审稿人对本文早期版本提出的宝贵意见。

Original · #117

Bibliography

Translation

参考文献

Original · #118

Bernal, M. [1987] (1991), Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilisation, Vol. 1. London: Vintage.

Translation

伯纳尔，M. [1987]（1991），《黑色雅典娜：古典文明的亚非根源》，第1卷。伦敦：Vintage。

Original · #119

Bernasconi, R. (1998), ‘Hegel at the Court of the Ashanti’, in S. Barnett (ed.), Hegel After Derrida. Albany NY: SUNY.

Translation

Bernasconi, R.（1998），〈阿散蒂宫廷中的黑格尔〉，载 S. Barnett 编《德里达之后的黑格尔》。纽约州奥尔巴尼：纽约州立大学出版社。

Original · #120

Bernasconi, R. (2007), ‘The Return of Africa: Hegel and the Question of the Racial Identity of the Egyptians’, in P. T. Grier (ed.), Identity and Difference. Albany

Translation

伯纳斯科尼，R.（2007），〈非洲的回归：黑格尔与埃及人种族身份问题〉，载 P. T. 格里尔（编），《同一与差异》，奥尔巴尼。

Original · #121

NY: SUNY.

Translation

纽约市：纽约州立大学出版社。

Original · #122

Bernasconi, R. (2016), ‘China on Parade: Hegel’s Manipulation of his Sources and his Change of Mind’, in B. Brandt and D. L. Purdy (eds.), China in the German Enlightenment. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Translation

Bernasconi, R.（2016），〈被展示的中国：黑格尔对其资料来源的操弄及其思想转变〉，载 B. Brandt、D. L. Purdy 编，《德国启蒙运动中的中国》。多伦多：多伦多大学出版社。

Original · #123

Bird-Pollan, S. (2014), Hegel, Freud and Fanon: The Dialectic of Emancipation. London:

Translation

Bird-Pollan, S.（2014），《黑格尔、弗洛伊德与法农：解放的辩证法》。伦敦：

Original · #124

Rowman and Littlefield International.

Translation

Rowman & Littlefield International。

Original · #125

Bonetto, S. (2006), ‘Race and Racism in Hegel—An Analysis’, Minerva: An Internet Brennan, T. (2013), ‘Hegel, Empire, and Anti-Colonial Thought’, in G. Huggan (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Translation

Bonetto, S. (2006), ‘Race and Racism in Hegel—An Analysis’, Minerva: An Internet Journal of Philosophy 10. Brennan, T. (2013), ‘Hegel, Empire, and Anti-Colonial Thought’, in G. Huggan (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Original · #126

Buchwalter, A. (2009), ‘Is Hegel’s Philosophy of History Eurocentric?’, in W. Dudley (ed.), Hegel and History. Albany NY: SUNY.

Translation

Buchwalter, A. (2009), 〈黑格尔的历史哲学是欧洲中心主义的吗？〉，载 W. Dudley 编，《黑格尔与历史》。奥尔巴尼，纽约州：纽约州立大学出版社。

Original · #127

Buck-Morss, S. (2000), ‘Hegel and Haiti’, Critical Inquiry 26:4: 821–65.

Translation

Buck-Morss, S. (2000), 'Hegel and Haiti', Critical Inquiry 26:4: 821–65.

Original · #128

Burbidge, J. (2007), Hegel’s Systematic Contingency. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Translation

伯布里奇，J.（2007）《黑格尔体系中的偶然性》。贝辛斯托克：帕尔格雷夫·麦克米兰。

Original · #129

De Laurentiis, A. (2014), ‘Race in Hegel: Text and Context’, in M. Egger (ed.), Philosophie Nach Kant: Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Berlin: De Gruyter. Dussel, E. [1992] (1995), The Invention of the Americas, trans. M. D. Barber. New York: Continuum.

Translation

De Laurentiis, A.（2014），〈黑格尔论种族：文本与语境〉，载于 M. Egger 编，《康德之后的哲学：理解康德先验哲学与道德哲学的新路径》。柏林：De Gruyter。Dussel, E.［1992］（1995），《美洲的发明》，M. D. Barber 译。纽约：Continuum。

Original · #130

Dussel, E. (1993), ‘Eurocentrism and Modernity’, Boundary 2 20:3: 65–76.

Translation

杜塞尔，E.（1993），《欧洲中心主义与现代性》，载《Boundary 2》第20卷第3期，第65—76页。

Original · #131

Fanon, F. [1952] (2008), Black Skin, White Masks, trans. R. Philcox. New York:

Translation

法农，F.，[1952]（2008），《黑皮肤，白面具》，R. Philcox 译。纽约：

Original · #132

Grove.

Translation

格罗夫。

Original · #133

Guha, R. (2002), History at the Limit of World-History. New York: Columbia University Press.

Translation

Guha, R.（2002），《世界历史之界的历史》。纽约：哥伦比亚大学出版社。

Original · #134

Hardimon, M. (1993), Hegel’s Social Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Translation

哈迪蒙，M.（1993），《黑格尔的社会哲学》。剑桥：剑桥大学出版社。

Original · #135

Hegel, G. W. F. (1970), Philosophy of Nature, trans. A. V. Miller. Oxford:

Translation

黑格尔（1970）《自然哲学》，A. V. 米勒译。牛津：

Original · #136

Clarendon.

Translation

克拉伦登。

Original · #137

Hegel, G. W. F. (1971), Philosophy of Mind, trans. W. Wallace and A. V. Miller.

Translation

黑格尔，G. W. F.（1971），《精神哲学》，W. 华莱士、A. V. 米勒译。

Original · #138

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Translation

牛津：牛津大学出版社。

Original · #139

Hegel, G. W. F. (1975), Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction: Reason Hegel, G. W. F. (1986), Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte. Werke Vol. 12, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. [English translation: Sibree.]

Translation

黑格尔，G. W. F.（1975），《世界历史哲学讲演录：导论：理性》；黑格尔，G. W. F.（1986），《历史哲学讲演录》，收入《著作集》第12卷，E. Moldenhauer 与 K. M. Michel 编。法兰克福：苏尔坎普出版社。[英译本：Sibree。]

Original · #140

Hegel, G. W. F. (1988), Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols. 1-3, ed.

Translation

黑格尔（1988），《世界历史哲学讲演录》（第1–3卷），G. 拉松 编，第1–4卷。汉堡：迈纳出版社。[第一卷英译本译者：尼士贝特。]

Original · #141

G. Lasson. Vols. 1-4. Hamburg: Meiner. [English translation of volume 1: Nisbet.]

Translation

G. 拉松编，第1—4卷，汉堡：迈纳出版社。[第1卷英译本：尼斯贝特译。]

Original · #142

Hegel, G. W. F. (1991), The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree. Buffalo NY:

Translation

黑格尔（1991），《历史哲学》，J. Sibree 译。纽约州布法罗：

Original · #143

Prometheus Books.

Translation

普罗米修斯出版社。

Original · #144

Hegel, G. W. F. (1992), Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. H. B. Nisbet.

Translation

黑格尔，G. W. F.（1992），《法哲学原理》，H. B. Nisbet 译。

Original · #145

Hegel, G. W. F. (1995), ‘Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte:

Translation

黑格尔，G. W. F.（1995），《世界历史哲学讲演录》：

Original · #146

Einleitung’, in W. Jaeschke (ed.), Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916–1831).

Translation

《导言》，载 W. Jaeschke 编：《讲稿手稿 II》（1916—1831）。

Original · #147

Gesammelte Werke Vol. 18. Hamburg: Meiner. [English translation: Brown and Hodgson.]

Translation

《文集》第18卷。汉堡：迈纳出版社。[英译本：布朗和霍奇森译。]

Original · #148

Hegel, G. W. F. (1996), Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, Berlin 1822/

Translation

黑格尔，G. W. F. (1996), 《世界历史哲学讲演录》，柏林 1822/23年。格里塞姆、霍托与凯勒的笔记，卡尔·布雷默、K.-H. 伊尔廷与许楠·泽尔曼编。《黑格尔讲演录：选编笔记与手稿》第12卷。汉堡：迈纳出版社。[英文译本：布朗与霍奇森译。]

Original · #149

23. Nachschriften von Griesheim, Hotho und Kehler, ed. Karl Brehmer, K.-H. Ilting

Translation

23. 格里斯海姆、霍托与凯勒的听课笔记，卡尔·布雷默、K.-H. 伊尔廷编。

Original · #150

und Hoo Nam Seelmann. Hegel: Vorlesungen: Ausgew. Nachschriften und Manuskripte Vol. 12. Hamburg: Meiner. [English translation: Brown and Hodgson.]

Translation

以及 Hoo Nam Seelmann 编：《黑格尔：讲演录：精选听课笔记与手稿》，第12卷。汉堡：迈纳出版社。[英译本：Brown 和 Hodgson。]

Original · #151

Hegel, G. W. F. (2005), Die Philosophie der Geschichte: Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann (Winter 1830/1831), ed. K. Vieweg. Berlin: Wilhelm Fink. Abb. Hei.

Translation

黑格尔（2005），《历史哲学：海曼课堂笔记（1830／1831年冬季学期）》，K. Vieweg编，柏林：Wilhelm Fink。Abb. Hei。

Original · #152

Hegel, G. W. F. (2011), Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Volume 1:

Translation

黑格尔（G. W. F.）（2011）：《世界历史哲学讲演录》第一卷：

Original · #153

Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822–3, ed. and trans. R. F. Brown and P. C. Hodgson, with assistance of W. G. Geuss. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Translation

《导论》手稿与1822—1823年《讲演录》，R. F. Brown与P. C. Hodgson编译，W. G. Geuss协助。牛津：克拉伦登出版社。

Original · #154

Houlgate, S. [1991] 2015, An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History.

Translation

霍尔盖特，S.，[1991] 2015，《黑格尔导论：自由、真理与历史》。

Original · #155

Oxford: Blackwell.

Translation

牛津：布莱克威尔。

Original · #156

Johansen, B. E. (1982), Forgotten Founders: How the American Indians Helped Shape Democracy. Boston: Harvard Common Press. McCarney, J. and Bernasconi, R. (2003), ‘Exchange: Hegel’s Racism?’, Radical Philosophy 119(May/June): 32–37.

Translation

Johansen, B. E. (1982), 《被遗忘的奠基者：美洲印第安人如何帮助塑造民主》。波士顿：哈佛共同出版社。McCarney, J. 与 Bernasconi, R. (2003), 《交流：黑格尔的种族主义？》，载《激进哲学》第119期（5/6月）：第32–37页。

Original · #157

Monahan, M. (ed.) (2017), Creolizing Hegel. London: Rowman and Littlefield International.

Translation

Monahan, M.（编），《Creolizing Hegel》，伦敦：Rowman and Littlefield International，2017年。

Original · #158

Mowad, N. (2013), ‘The Place of Nationality in Hegel’s Philosophy of Politics and Religion: A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism and Racism’, in A. Nuzzo (ed.), Hegel on Religion and Politics. Albany NY: SUNY.

Translation

Mowad, N.（2013）：《国家性在黑格尔政治哲学与宗教哲学中的地位：为黑格尔关于民族沙文主义与种族主义的指控辩护》，载 A. Nuzzo（编），《黑格尔论宗教与政治》。纽约州奥尔巴尼：纽约州立大学出版社。

Original · #159

Parekh, S. (2009), ‘Hegel’s New World: History, Freedom, and Race’, in W. Dudley (ed.), Hegel and History. Albany NY: SUNY.

Translation

帕雷克，S.（2009），〈黑格尔的新世界：历史、自由与种族〉，载 W. 达德利编：《黑格尔与历史》。纽约州奥尔巴尼：纽约州立大学出版社。

Original · #160

Patten, A. (1999), Hegel’s Idea of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Translation

Patten, A.（1999），《黑格尔的自由观念》。牛津：牛津大学出版社。

Original · #161

Purtschert, P. (2010), ‘On the Limit of Spirit: Hegel’s Racism Revisited’, Philosophy and Social Criticism 36:9: 1039–51.

Translation

Purtschert, P.（2010），〈论精神的界限：重访黑格尔的种族主义〉，《哲学与社会批判》第36卷第9期，第1039–1051页。

Original · #162

Quijano, A. (2000), ‘Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America’, Nepantla: Views from South 1:3: 533–80.

Translation

基哈诺，A.（2000），《权力的殖民性、欧洲中心主义与拉丁美洲》，《Nepantla：南方观点》，第1卷第3期，第533–580页。

Original · #163

Sahota, J. P. (2016), ‘Hegel’s Critique of Hinduism: A Response’, Hegel Bulletin

Translation

萨霍塔，J. P.（2016），《黑格尔对印度教的批判：回应》，《黑格尔公报》。

Original · #164

37:2: 305–17.

Translation

37:2：305–17。

Original · #165

Serequeberhan, T. (1989), ‘The Idea of Colonialism in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’, International Philosophical Quarterly 29:3: 301–18.

Translation

Serequeberhan, T.（1989），〈黑格尔《法哲学》中的殖民主义观念〉，《国际哲学季刊》第29卷第3期：301—318。

Original · #166

Shohat, E. and Stam, R. [1994] (2014), Unthinking Eurocentrism. New York:

Translation

Shohat, E. and Stam, R. [1994]（2014），《Unthinking Eurocentrism》。纽约：

Original · #167

Routledge.

Translation

劳特利奇。

Original · #168

Tibebu, T. (2010), Hegel and the Third World: The Making of Eurocentrism in World History. Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press.

Translation

Tibebu, T.（2010），《黑格尔与第三世界：世界历史中欧洲中心主义的形成》。纽约州雪城：雪城大学出版社。

Original · #169

Wa Thiong’o, N. (2012), Globalectics: Theory and the Politics of Knowing. New York:

Translation

瓦·提昂戈，N.（2012），《全球互动论：理论与知识的政治》。纽约：

Original · #170

Columbia University Press.

Translation

哥伦比亚大学出版社。

Original · #171

4 Hegel lectured on the PWH in 1822/23, 1824/25, 1826/27, 1828/29 and 1830/31. His manuscripts of the Introduction from 18^22 (rev. 1828) and 1830/31 survive, as do many transcripts, between them covering every course. Some, such as de Laurentiis (2014), are wary of directly attributing to Hegel views, notably on race, expressed only in the transcripts. I agree that we should disambiguate sources, but where multiple independently written transcripts

Translation

4 黑格尔曾于1822/23、1824/25、1826/27、1828/29和1830/31年讲授《世界历史哲学》。1822年的《导论》手稿（1828年修订）以及1830/31年的手稿均保存至今，此外还有许多听课记录存世，合在一起涵盖了每一次授课过程。有些学者——例如 de Laurentiis（2014）——对于仅见于听课记录中的观点，特别是涉及种族的论述，是否该直接归于黑格尔本人，态度十分谨慎。我同意应当区分不同的来源，但如果多份彼此独立的听课记录都

Original · #172

1^1 For Hegel, the Greeks were greatly influenced by the Egyptians, whose influence they nonetheless overcame. Here he is close to accepting what Martin Bernal calls the ‘ancient model’ of the Greeks’ origins, a model to which the Greeks themselves adhered; laternineteenth-century Europeans instead espoused an ‘Aryan model’, on which Greek culture proper arose from northern invaders driving out earlier Egyptian and Phoenician influences ([1987] 1991). Bernal argues that the Aryan model had Eurocentric motivations: if the Greeks,

Translation

对黑格尔来说，希腊人深受埃及影响，但他们终究克服了这一影响。就此而言，他几乎接受了马丁·伯纳尔所称的关于希腊起源的“古代模型”——这也是希腊人自身曾认同的模型。相比之下，十九世纪后期的欧洲人反倒拥护一种“雅利安模型”：按照这个模型，真正的希腊文化源自北方入侵者，是他们驱逐了更早的埃及和腓尼基影响（[1987] 1991）。伯纳尔认为，雅利安模型背后有欧洲中心主义的动机：如果希腊人，