Kant on Descartes and the Brutes

Original · #1

by Steve Naragon, Fayetteville/Arkansas

Translation

史蒂夫·纳拉贡，费耶特维尔／阿肯色州

Original · #2

I. Introduction

Translation

一、引言

Original · #3

A well-known feature of Descartes' mind/body dualism is his animal-machine hypothesis, which claims that non-human animals ("brutes") are nothing more than divinely-crafted machines. Indeed all animate bodies (brute as well as human) are such machines in Descartes' system but, while each human is a machine united with a rational soul, brutes are nothing but machines. Descartes' argument for these Emphases in the quoted passages are in the original. Citations of Kant's works refer to the Academy edition (abbreviated as 'Ak'): Kants gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1910-), with the following exceptions: Kr. d. r. V.

Translation

笛卡尔心灵／身体二元论一个众所周知的特征，是他的动物—机器假说。该假说主张，非人动物（“禽兽”）不过是由上帝造就的机器。事实上，在笛卡尔的体系中，一切有生命的身体（禽兽也好，人也好）都是这类机器；区别在于，每个人都是与理性灵魂结合的机器，而禽兽则纯粹是机器。笛卡尔对这些观点的论证如下。引文中的着重号均为原文所有。康德著作的引文参考学院版（简称“Ak”）：《康德全集》（Kants gesammelte Schriften），由普鲁士皇家科学院编辑（1910年起出版），但以下情况除外：Kr. d. r. V.

Original · #4

(which is cited using the standard A/B pagination), Anweisung, Menschenkunde, and Summering (see below). I provide reference to an English translation when available. The following abbreviations are used in citing individual writings and lecture notes (with their presumed dates of origin): Anth. (Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, 1798; translated by Mary Gregor as Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), Anweisung (Anweisung zur Menschen- und Weltkenntnis, lecture notes from WS 1790/1, edited by F.C. Starke, 1831, reprinted as an appendix to Menschenkunde, Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1976), Aufklä- rung (Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?, 1784; translated by Ted Humphrey as An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, in Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, translated by Humphrey, Hackett Publ., 1983), Beweisgrund (Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, 1763), Colleg. Anth. 70s ("Entwürfe zu dem Colleg über Anthropologie aus den 70er Jahren"), Colleg. Anth. 80s ("Entwürfe zu dem Colleg über Anthropologie aus den 80er Jahren"), Deutlichkeit (Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral, 1764; translated by D.E. Watford äs Enquiry concerning the clarity of the principles of natural theology and ethics, in Kant, Selected Pre-Cntical Writings, edited by Kerferd and Watford, Manchester U.P. 1968), Frieden (Zum Ewigen Frieden, 1795; translated by Ted Humphrey as To Perpetual Peace, in Humphrey, op.cit.), Geschichte (Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, 1784; translated by Ted Humphrey as Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent, in Humphrey, op. dt.), Theorie des Himmels (Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels, 1755), Kr.d.p.V. (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 1788; translated by L.W. Beck as Critique of Practical Reason, Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), Kr. d. r. V. (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1781 [1st ed]/1787 [2nd ed]; translated by Norman Kemp Smith as Cntique of Pure Reason, MacmiUan, 1933), Kr. d. U. (Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1790; translated by J. H. Bernard as Cntique of Judgment, New York: Hafner Press, 1951), Logik (edited by Jäsche, 1800; translated by R.S.

Translation

（按标准的 A/B 页码引用）、Anweisung、Menschenkunde 和 Summering（见下文）。凡有英译本可资参照者，我都一并提供出处。以下是在引用各篇著作和讲义笔记时所使用的缩写（并附其推定的成文年代）：Anth.（Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht，1798；Mary Gregor 英译，Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View，Martinus Nijhoff，1974），Anweisung（Anweisung zur Menschen- und Weltkenntnis，1790/1 年冬季学期讲义笔记，由 F.C. Starke 编，1831；1976 年作为 Menschenkunde 的附录重印，Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag），Aufklärung（Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?，1784；Ted Humphrey 英译，An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?，收入 Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays，Humphrey 译，Hackett Publ.，1983），Beweisgrund（Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes，1763），Colleg. Anth. 70s（“Entwürfe zu dem Colleg über Anthropologie aus den 70er Jahren”），Colleg. Anth. 80s（“Entwürfe zu dem Colleg über Anthropologie aus den 80er Jahren”），Deutlichkeit（Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral，1764；D.E. Watford 英译，Enquiry concerning the Clarity of the Principles of Natural Theology and Ethics，收入 Kant, Selected Pre-Critical Writings，Kerferd 和 Watford 编，Manchester U.P.，1968），Frieden（Zum Ewigen Frieden，1795；Ted Humphrey 英译，To Perpetual Peace，收入 Humphrey，op. cit.），Geschichte（Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht，1784；Ted Humphrey 英译，Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent，收入 Humphrey，op. cit.），Theorie des Himmels（Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels，1755），Kr.d.p.V.（Kritik der praktischen Vernunft，1788；L.W. Beck 英译，Critique of Practical Reason，Bobbs-Merrill，1956），Kr. d. r. V.（Kritik der reinen Vernunft，1781［第一版］/1787［第二版］；Norman Kemp Smith 英译，Critique of Pure Reason，Macmillan，1933），Kr. d. U.（Kritik der Urteilskraft，1790；J. H. Bernard 英译，Critique of Judgment，New York: Hafner Press，1951），Logik（由 Jäsche 编，1800；R.S. 译）

Original · #5

Hartman and W. Schwarz as Logic, Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), M.A.d.N. (Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, 1786; translated by James Ellington as Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Hackett Publ., 1985), Menschenkunde (anthropology lecture notes from

Translation

哈特曼和 W.施瓦茨编《逻辑学》（Logic，Bobbs-Merrill，1974），M.A.d.N.（《自然科学的形而上学初始根据》，1786；詹姆斯·埃林顿英译为《自然科学的形而上学基础》，Hackett Publ.，1985），《人类学》（Menschenkunde，人类学讲义笔记，摘自

Original · #6

1778/9 or 1787/8, edited by F.C. Starke, 1831, reprinted in 1976, Hildesheim: Georg Olms

Translation

1778/9年或1787/8年，F. C. 斯塔克编，1831年出版，1976年重印，希尔德斯海姆：Georg Olms出版社

Original · #7

2 Steve Naragon

Translation

2 史蒂夫·纳拉贡

Original · #8

claims is straight-forward, if not convincing: the behavior of brutes, but not of humans, is explicable in purely mechanical terms.^2 In this paper, however, I wish not to defend or attack Descartes' hypothesis, but rather to discuss Kant's reaction to it. In doing so several key issues in the Kantian philosophy - especially the nature of consciousness, matter, and explanation - are considered from a helpful yet seldom assumed perspective, namely, Kant's views on the brutes.

Translation

这一主张本身倒是直截了当，尽管未必令人信服：禽兽的行为——而人的行为则不然——可以完全用机械论的方式来解释。^2 不过，在本文中，我无意为笛卡尔的这一假说辩护，也无意加以批驳；我想讨论的，毋宁是康德对此作何反应。通过这一讨论，康德哲学中的若干关键问题——尤其是意识、质料和解释的本性——将从一个有助于理解却少有人采取的视角得到考察，这一视角就是康德关于禽兽的看法。

Original · #9

Brutes appear to have the same mechanical status in Kant's system of nature as they have in Descartes': the doctrine of universal causality of the phenomenal world (which is a direct and desired consequence of arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason), coupled with Kant's belief that only humans enjoy a noumenal agency (if anything does) certainly suggests an animal-machine hypothesis similar to Descartes'. Likewise, Kant believed brute behavior to be explicable without attributing to them a nonsensuous faculty like reason or understanding.

Translation

在康德的自然体系中，动物似乎与它们在笛卡尔那里一样，具有同样的机械性地位：现象世界普遍因果性的学说（这是《纯粹理性批判》中诸论证一个直接且有意追求的结果），再加上康德相信只有人类才拥有一种本体界的能动性（如果真有任何东西拥有这种能动性的话），无疑使人想到一种与笛卡尔相似的动物-机器假说。同样，康德也认为，动物的行为无需诉诸理性或知性这类非感性的能力，也可以得到解释。

Original · #10

Consequently, one might feel well-advised to ignore the rejection of Descartes' hypothesis in Kant's metaphysics lectures from the early 1760's as part of a pre-critical position that was later abandoned; likewise with similar comments in the Dreams of a Spirit-Seer (1766), another "pre-critical" work. But that the hypothesis is again rejected in the Critique of Judgment (1790), a mature work by any standards, suggests that we must reconcile Kant's doctrine of universal mechanism with his rejection of Descartes' animal-machine hypothesis. In § 2 I review those passages wherein Kant discusses and rejects Descartes' animal-machine hypothesis, while I suggest in § 3 the grounds for this rejection: Kant believed that brutes "act in accordance with representations", which he took to be incompatible with Descartes' hypothesis. Unfortunately, Kant repeatedly denies that brutes are conscious, making it appear that he endorsed something like Descartes' hypothesis after all; this and other problems raised by Kant's discussion of consciousness are addressed in §4.1 consider in §5 those passages in which Kant refers to brutes and animality as "mechanical", which are also seemingly inconsistent with Kant's earlier rejection of the animal-machine hypothesis, although consistent with his rejections of brute consciousness.

Translation

因此，人们或许会认为，最好将康德在1760年代初期形而上学讲座中对笛卡尔假说的拒斥，视为一种后来被抛弃的前批判立场而予以忽略；同样，《通灵者之梦》（1766）——另一部“前批判”著作——中的类似评论也应如此看待。然而，这一假说在《判断力批判》（1790）——无论以何种标准衡量都是一部成熟之作——中再次遭到拒斥，这表明我们必须调和康德的普遍机械论学说与他拒绝笛卡尔的动物机器假说。在第2节，我将回顾康德讨论并拒斥笛卡尔动物机器假说的那些段落；在第3节，我则提出这一拒斥的根据：康德相信禽兽“根据表象行动”，他认为这与笛卡尔的假说不相容。遗憾的是，康德反复否认禽兽有意识，这似乎表明他终究还是接受了某种类似笛卡尔的假说；这一点以及康德关于意识的讨论引发的其他问题，将在第4节处理。在第5节，我将考察康德将禽兽和动物性称为“机械的”的那些段落；这些说法也似乎与他早先对动物机器假说的拒斥不一致，尽管与他否认禽兽有意识是一致的。

Original · #11

Verlag), MP Arnoldt (lecture notes from a course on metaphysics given in WS 1794/5), MP Dohna (notes from WS 1792/3), MP Herder (notes from 1762-4), MP Mrongovius (notes from WS 1782/3), MP Pölitz (notes from WS 1778/9 or 1779/80), MP Volckmann (notes from WS

Translation

Verlag），MP Arnoldt（WS 1794/5冬季学期形而上学课程笔记），MP Dohna（WS 1792/3冬季学期笔记），MP Herder（1762—1764年笔记），MP Mrongovius（WS 1782/3冬季学期笔记），MP Pölitz（WS 1778/9或1779/80冬季学期笔记），MP Volckmann（WS冬季学期笔记）

Original · #12

1784/5), Phil. En. ("Philosophische Enzyklopädie", SS 1775), Refl.Anth. (Reflexionen zur

Translation

1784/5），Phil. En.（《哲学百科全书》，1775年夏季学期），Refl. Anth.（《人类学反思》）

Original · #13

Anthropologie), Sömmering (remarks printed with S. T. Sömmerings Über das Organ der Seele,

Translation

《人类学》），索默林（其评语刊载于S.T.索默林的《论灵魂的器官》一书中，

Original · #14

1796; reprinted in Weischedel, ed., Werkausgabe, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch

Translation

1796年；重印于魏谢德尔编《著作集》，美因河畔法兰克福：苏尔坎普袖珍图书。

Original · #15

Verlag, 1977, vol. xi, pp. 235-59), Syllogism (Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren erwiesen, 1762; translated by Thomas Abbott as The Mistaken Subtlety of the Four Figures in Kant's Introduction to Logic, London: Longmans, Green, 1885), Träume (Träume eines Geistersehers, 1766; translated by Emmanuel Goerwitz as Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, London:

Translation

出版社，1977年，第11卷，第235—259页）；《三段论》（《四种三段论格的虚假精妙性辨正》，1762；托马斯·阿博特英译，题为《四种三段论格的伪巧辨》，载于《康德〈逻辑学〉导论》，伦敦：Longmans, Green，1885）；《梦》（《一个通灵者之梦》，1766；埃马纽埃尔·戈尔维茨英译，题为《一位通灵者的梦》，伦敦：

Original · #16

Swan Sonnenschein, 1900), Tugendlehre (Part two of Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 1797; translated by Mary Gregor as The Doctrine of Virtue, Harper and Row, 1964). Kant on Descartes and the Brutes 3 In the final three sections (§ 6-8) I attempt to illuminate certain broad motivations behind Kant's discussion of brutes, motivations which also dispel the apparent inconsistency of Kant assigning brutes to the mechanism of nature while rejecting Descartes' hypothesis. Kant believed brutes to be completely enmeshed in the mechanical nexus of the phenomenal world, with nothing like noumenal agency to offer them the theoretical underpinnings of practical freedom. Consequently, Kant thought of brutes as machines - but not as the materially-explicable machines of Descartes. Kant found the needed distinction in Leibniz: brutes are machines of a spiritual as opposed to a material nature.

Translation

Swan Sonnenschein, 1900), Tugendlehre（《道德形而上学》第二部分，1797；Mary Gregor 译为 The Doctrine of Virtue，Harper and Row，1964）。《康德论笛卡尔与禽兽》3 在最后三节（§6—8）中，我试图阐明康德讨论禽兽背后某些广泛的动机；这些动机同时也消解了一种表面上的不一致性：康德一方面将禽兽归入自然的机械机制，另一方面却拒绝笛卡尔的假说。康德认为，禽兽完全卷入现象世界的机械因果关联之中，不具备任何类似物自体层面的能动性，无法为其实践自由提供理论依据。因此，康德视禽兽为机器——但并非笛卡尔所设想的那种可以从物质上解释的机器。康德在莱布尼茨那里找到了所需的区分：禽兽是精神性的机器，而非物质性的机器。

Original · #17

II. Kant's rejection of the hypothesis

Translation

二、康德对这一假说的拒斥

Original · #18

We have first to consider a passage from one of Kant's lectures on empirical psychology recorded by Herder in the early 1760's. In this passage concerning the nature of freedom is the comment that "Animals are not machines, but they act like them, where desire is considered an extra gear".^3 And later in the semester, in a lecture on rational psychology, we find this startling paragraph: "Consequently, merely according to the similarity [of our external behavior] do I judge that the inner condition of the other [i. e. the brute] involves thinking and sensing like mine, for my behavior is regarded by him just as his is regarded by me. I therefore have just as much cause not to take him as a machine as to take myself as one. The dog moves itself, seizes things, cries - thus are animals thinking beings that have desires, grounds for acting. Just as Descartes had the paradoxical opinion of animal-machines, so must I likewise say of humans and of myself as well, only to a greater degree: if that one howls like a machine, then I speak like one".^4 In his Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, published in 1766, Kant again rejects the animalmachine hypothesis, this time for explanatory reasons. He first mentions the hypothesis in a discussion of the different biological theories of Maupertuis, Boerhaave, Hoffmann, and Stahl: "Maupertuis attributed the lowest level of life to organic food particles of animals; other philosophers [e. g. Hoffmann, Boerhaave] see nothing in them but dead clumps which only serve to enlarge the gears of the animal machines".^5 Kant then

Translation

我们首先要考察康德关于经验心理学的一段讲课，这份记录由赫尔德记于18世纪60年代初。在这段论及自由本性的文字中，康德评论道：“动物不是机器，但它们的行动却像机器——在这里，欲望被视作一个额外的齿轮。”^3 而在该学期稍后的一堂理性心理学课上，我们又读到一段颇为惊人的文字：“因此，仅仅基于（我们外在行为）的相似性，我便判断另一个（即动物）的内在状态也包含与我相同的思维和感觉，因为他看待我的行为，正如我看待他的行为一样。所以，我不把他当作机器的理由，正如我不把自己当作机器的理由一样充分。狗会自行移动，会抓取东西，会叫喊——由此可见，动物是有欲望、有行动根据的思维存在。正如笛卡尔曾持有动物即机器的悖谬看法，我也同样必须对人类、乃至对我自己说同样的话，只不过程度更高而已：如果那个东西像机器一样嚎叫，那么我就像机器一样说话。”^4 在1766年出版的《灵视者之梦》中，康德再次拒绝了动物机器的假说，而这次是基于解释性的理由。他首先是在讨论莫佩尔蒂、布尔哈夫、霍夫曼和施塔尔的不同生物学理论时提及这一假说的：“莫佩尔蒂将最低层次的生命归于动物的有机食物微粒；其他哲学家（例如霍夫曼、布尔哈夫）在其中看到的不过是死的团块，它们仅仅用来增大动物机器的齿轮。”^5 康德随后

Original · #19

notes his reservations concerning non-mechanistic accounts in science, but suggests that

Translation

他指出，自己对科学中的非机械论解释持保留态度，但同时也提出，

Original · #20

3 MP Herder (Ak 28:99). Another rejection of the Cartesian hypothesis can be found in the

Translation

3 MP Herder（Ak 28:99）。对笛卡尔假说的另一种拒斥可以见诸下文。

Original · #21

metaphysics lecture-notes stemming from the late 1770's and edited by Pölitz (the MP Politz, Ak

Translation

出自18世纪70年代后期、由珀利茨（Pölitz）编辑的《形而上学》讲义笔记（即 Pölitz 版《形而上学》讲义，Ak）

Original · #22

28:274-75): "Animals are not merely machines or matter, but have souls..."

Translation

“动物并不只是机器或质料，而是具有灵魂……”

Original · #23

4 Steve Naragon

Translation

4 史蒂夫·纳拉贡

Original · #24

such accounts are at times appropriate - a foreshadowing of his later view, most notably expressed in the Critique of Judgment, that non-mechanical accounts must comprise the bulk of the life sciences: "The appeal to immaterial principles [as Stahl had done] is a refuge of lazy philosophy, and is a mode of explanation to be avoided if at all possible... I am nevertheless convinced that Stahl, who wished to explain animal changes organically, was often closer to the truth than Hoffmann, Boerhaave, and others, who omitted immaterial powers, holding instead to mechanical grounds.. ."^6 Kant again explicitly rejects the animal-machine hypothesis in the Critique of Judgment. Towards the end of that work, he considers possible proofs of the existence of God, including proofs by analogy, and in a footnote explains how an analogy between humans and God might work by considering analogies between humans and brutes. This context offered him yet another occasion to mention Descartes' hypothesis: "We conceive of the artificial constructions of beasts by comparing them with those of men, by comparing the ground of those effects brought about by the former, which we do not know, with the ground of similar effects brought about by men (reason), which we do know... Yet from the similarity of the kind of effect of beasts (the ground of which we cannot immediately perceive) to that of humans (of which we are immediately conscious), we can quite rightly conclude according to analogy that beasts too act in accordance with representations (not as Descartes has it, that they are machines), and that despite their specific difference they are yet generically (as living beings) one and the same as humans".^7 There is much of interest in this passage, but what concerns us is that, first, it provides a rejection of the Cartesian hypothesis from late in Kant's career, and second, it suggests why Kant rejected that hypothesis.

Translation

这类说明有时是恰当的——这预示了他后来的观点，而这一观点最鲜明地表述于《判断力批判》：生命科学中的说明必须以非机械论的为主。“诉诸非物质原则［正如施塔尔所做的那样］，乃是懒惰哲学的避难所，是一种如果可能就应尽量避免的解释方式……尽管如此，我仍然确信，施塔尔试图以有机的方式解释动物的变化，在很多时候比霍夫曼、布尔哈夫以及其他人更接近真理；后者排除了非物质力量，转而坚持机械的根据……”^6 康德在《判断力批判》中再次明确拒绝了动物—机器假说。在这部著作将近结尾处，他考察了关于上帝存在的几种可能证明（包括类比证明）；在一个脚注中，他通过考察人与兽类之间的类比，说明了人与上帝之间的类比可能如何成立。这一语境又给了他一次提及笛卡尔假说的机会：“我们通过将兽类的人工构造与人的人工构造相比较，来构想前者；也就是说，将兽类所产生的那些效果（我们不知道其根据）的根据，同人产生类似效果的根据（理性，这是我们所知道的）加以比较……然而，由于兽类产生的这类效果（其根据我们不能直接感知）与人类产生的这类效果（我们对其有直接意识）在种类上相似，我们完全可以依照类比而正当地推断：兽类同样是按照表象而行动的（并不像笛卡尔所说的那样是机器）；而且，尽管它们在种上有特定的差异，但在属上（作为生命存在）却仍与人是相同的东西。”^7 这段话中有许多值得注意之处，但与我们此处相关的是：第一，它表明康德在其晚期思想中依然拒绝笛卡尔的假说；第二，它也提示了康德为何拒绝这一假说。

Original · #25

III. Brutes have representations, feelings, and desires

Translation

III. 禽兽具有表象、感受和欲望

Original · #26

The above passage suggests that Kant believed "that beasts too act in accordance with representations [Vorstellungen]", which he considered incompatible with their being machines. That it is the brute's capacity for representations which is at issue here is further supported by the Volckmann notes of a metaphysics lecture on psychology:

Translation

以上引文表明，康德相信“野兽也依照表象［Vorstellungen］而行动”，而他认为这与它们是机器这一点并不相容。这里的关键在于动物具有表象能力；这一点还可以从沃尔克曼关于一次心理学形而上学讲座的笔记中得到进一步佐证：

Original · #27

"We call an animal 'living' because it has the capacity to follow its own representations, even to alter its condition. Descartes, and later Malebranche, maintained that the animal's principle of life has no vim repraesentativam, and that they act only according to general laws of matter. But to think of animals as machines is not possible, for one would then deviate from all analogies of experience, and the proposition that man himself is a machine is utter lunacy, for we are even conscious of our own representations, and all of natural science rests on the proposition that matter cannot have representations. Everything machine-like is external and consists in relations in space: our thought can of course concern itself with things in space, but it is not itself in space; Kant on Descartes and the Brutes 5 but thoughts would have to be objects of outer intuition if they were machines. That thought is a mechanism is therefore absurd, which would be to make thought an object of outer sense for its own consciousness. Matter might indeed be a necessary requirement for the support of our thoughts, but thought itself is not mechanical".^8 Machines lack mental lives in both Descartes' and Kant's accounts, and representations are taken as unequivocally mental. But since brutes have representations, according to Kant, then brutes are not machines. Further, while Kant may have believed that thoughts depend upon certain motions within the central nervous system (CNS), he explicitly rejected the view that thoughts and the mind are located in the CNS.^9 Given the many passages attributing representations to brutes, we would appear to have found in this a satisfactory motivation for Kant's rejection of the animal-machine hypothesis.^10 Kant further expanded the mental lives of brutes by attributing feelings and desires to them, as is implied in the following denial of brute understanding: "The human has sense to perceive, understanding to think, and a will to choose or reject. If he had nothing more than a sensitive faculty for representing and desiring, he would be like a sensitive plant or a mollusk. Only he has understanding".^11 Likewise, in a discussion in the Herder notes on the properties of a thinking being, we find that "all thinking beings have three dimensions: (1) representation - e. g. Leibniz's monads, (2) representations and feelings, thus desire, actions, and nothing more, e. g. animals [acting] outwardly not from thoughts. The outer change of a being from the inner principle is thinkable merely through choice [Willkür], (3) consciousness of the entire condition of the representations and desires. We know of only humans with these three abilities, and more are not thinkable".12 and a faculty of desire" to brutes; and indeed, the mere fact that brutes can sense

Translation

我们之所以称动物是“活的”，是因为它具有遵循自身表象、甚至改变自身状态的能力。笛卡尔以及后来的马勒伯朗士主张，动物的生命原则并不具有 vim repraesentativam，它们只是依照质料的一般法则行动。但是，把动物设想为机器是不可能的，因为那样一来就背离了经验的一切类比；而“人本身也是机器”这一命题更是十足的狂言，因为我们甚至意识到我们自己的表象，而整个自然科学都建立在这样一个命题之上：质料不能具有表象。一切机械性的东西都是外在的，都由空间中的关系构成；我们的思想当然可以关涉空间中的事物，但它本身并不在空间之中；然而，如果思想是机器，它就必须是外部直观的对象。因此，说思想是一种机制乃是荒谬的，因为这等于使思想对于它自身的意识而言成为外感的对象。质料固然可能是支撑我们思想所必需的条件，但思想本身并不是机械的。^8 无论在笛卡尔还是在康德那里，机器都没有心灵生活，而表象都被明确无误地看作心灵性的东西。然而，按照康德的看法，既然禽兽具有表象，那么禽兽就不是机器。进一步说，尽管康德可能相信思想依赖于中枢神经系统（CNS）内部的某些运动，但他明确拒绝了思想和心灵位于中枢神经系统之中的观点。^9 鉴于有许多段落都把表象归于禽兽，我们似乎由此找到了一个令人满意的理由，说明康德为何拒绝动物—机器假说。^10 康德还把情感和欲望归于禽兽，从而进一步扩展了禽兽的心灵生活；这一点可从他在下面这段话中对禽兽知性的否认看出：“人有感官以感知，有知性以思考，还有意志以选择或拒斥。若他除了感性的表象与欲求能力之外别无其他，他就会像感性植物或软体动物一样。只有人有知性。”^11 同样，在《赫尔德笔记》中关于一个有思想的存在者的性质的讨论里，我们看到：“一切有思想的存在者都有三个维度：（1）表象——例如莱布尼茨的单子；（2）表象和情感，因而有欲望、行动，而无其他，例如动物，其外在行动并非出于思想。一个存在者基于其内在原则而发生的外在变化，仅仅只能通过选择［Willkür］来设想；（3）对于表象和欲望之整个状态的意识。我们所知道的，只有人具有这三种能力，而更多则是不可设想的。”^12 康德还把“欲求能力”归于禽兽；实际上，禽兽能够感知这个单纯的事实，

Original · #28

8 MP Volckmann (Ak 28:449). See the parallel definitions of 'life* mentioned in §6, below.

Translation

8 MP Volckmann（Ak 28:449）。参见下文第6节提到的“生命*”的相关定义。

Original · #29

9 See § 6, below, where I discuss Kant's belief that matter cannot generate thoughts, and also MP

Translation

9 见下文第6节，我将在那里讨论康德所持的如下看法：质料不能产生思想；另见 MP。

Original · #30

Pölitz (Ak 28:225,281-82), and the discussion and passages cited in Karl Ameriks, Kant's Theory of Mind, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, pp. 99-108.

Translation

Pölitz（Ak 28:225, 281-82）；另可参见 Karl Ameriks《康德的心灵理论》（牛津：Clarendon Press，1982年）第99—108页中的相关讨论与引文。

Original · #31

1^0 See MP Herder (Ak 28:117): if Leibniz's monads have representations, so do brutes; MP

Translation

见 MP Herder（Ak 28:117）：如果莱布尼茨的单子有表象，那么禽兽也有；MP

Original · #32

Pölitz (Ak 28:274): "beings, which have mere sensitivity and the power of representations - and these are animal souls"; ibid. (28:276): "therefore animals have all the representations of the outer senses"; Logik Mrongovius (Ak 29:1047): "Animals have such representations, but still (if I thought of myself as an animal) be bound together as representations"; Letter to Beloselsky (summer 1792, Ak 11:330-33): "the mere apprehension of the representations ... is solely for the brutes"; MP Arnoldt (Ak 29:929, 1033): the vis repraesentiva of Leibniz's monads; Refl. Anth. (Ak 15:166): "Animals have apprehensions, but not apperceptions and cannot, therefore, make their representations universal."

Translation

Pölitz（Ak 28:274）：“存在者具有单纯的感受性和表象能力——这些就是动物的灵魂”；同上（28:276）：“因此，动物具有外感官的一切表象。”《Logik Mrongovius》（Ak 29:1047）：“动物具有这样的表象，但这些表象仍然——如果我把自己设想为动物的话——只是作为表象被联结在一起”；致别洛谢尔斯基书信（1792年夏，Ak 11:330–33）：“对表象的单纯把握……只属于禽兽”；《MP Arnoldt》（Ak 29:929, 1033）：莱布尼茨单子的表象力；《Refl. Anth.》（Ak 15:166）：“动物有感知，但没有统觉，因此不能使它们的表象成为普遍的。”

Original · #33

6 Steve Naragon

Translation

6 史蒂夫·纳拉贡

Original · #34

suggests that they share with humans the standard panoply of feelings and with these feelings the desires to experience pleasures and avoid pains.

Translation

这表明，它们和人类一样具有通常意义上的一系列情感，并且伴随这些情感，也产生着体验快乐和避免痛苦的欲望。

Original · #35

IV. Are brutes conscious?

Translation

IV. 禽兽有意识吗？

Original · #36

Kant clearly attributed representations to brutes, but whether he considered them to be conscious as well is problematic given his several denials of brute consciousness.

Translation

康德明确将表象赋予了动物，但鉴于他曾多次否认动物具有意识，他是否将这些表象同样视为有意识的，便成了一个有争议的问题。

Original · #37

Patricia Kitcher poses a dilemma concerning the brutes: either brutes are without consciousness (in which case Kant is saddled with the animal-machine hypothesis), or brutes serve as examples of conscious beings which are not self-conscious (which, according to certain interpretations, is inconsistent with his claims in the Transcendental Deduction).^13 This captures part of the problem we are facing, but not quite all, for it appears beyond dispute that Kant believed brutes to have representations, and this alone is incompatible with Descartes' animal-machine hypothesis. There are, rather, two problems that need to be addressed: first, how shall we deal with Kant's denials of brute consciousness? These denials are problematic because it is widely assumed that any being that has representations must also be conscious, which means that Kant would either have to ascribe consciousness to brutes or hold that they do not have representations after all (the latter alternative would be the more difficult to justify textually, and would also amount to accepting Descartes' hypothesis); what is more, Kant has written elsewhere, if not as often, that brutes are conscious.^14 The second problem is that some scholars have attributed to Kant the belief that consciousness implies self-consciousness,15 finding this belief in no less central a text than the Transcendental Deduction. Now this is a problem because just as there is no question that Kant attributed representations to brutes, there is also no question that he

Translation

帕特里夏·基彻就动物提出了一个两难：要么动物没有意识（这样一来，康德就不得不背负“动物机器”假说）；要么动物是虽有意识却无自我意识的存在的例子（而根据某些解释，这与他《先验演绎》中的主张不一致）。^13 这确实抓住了我们面临问题的一部分，但尚未穷尽其全部。因为康德相信动物具有表象这一点似乎无可争议，而仅凭这一点就与笛卡尔的“动物机器”假说不相容。 实际上，需要处理的是两个问题。首先，我们应如何理解康德对动物意识的否认？这些否认之所以成问题，是因为人们普遍认为，任何拥有表象的存在者也必定拥有意识；这意味着康德要么必须将意识赋予动物，要么就要主张它们终究没有表象（后一种选择在文本上更难辩护，也等于接受了笛卡尔的假说）。更何况，康德在其他地方也写过，尽管不那么经常，动物是有意识的。^14 第二个问题是，一些学者将这样一种信念归于康德：意识蕴含着自我意识，^15并认为这一信念可见于《先验演绎》这样一篇核心文本。这之所以成为问题，是因为正如毫无疑问康德将表象归于动物一样，同样毫无疑问的是，他也承认动物拥有意识。

Original · #38

1^3 Patricia Kitcher, Kant's Real Self, in Allen Wood, editor, Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophyy

Translation

1^3 帕特里夏·基彻，《康德的真实自我》，载艾伦·伍德编：《康德哲学中的自我与自然》

Original · #39

Cornell U. P., 1984, p. 140.

Translation

康奈尔大学出版社，1984年，第140页。

Original · #40

1^5 E. g. Norman Kemp Smith believes that consciousness is "an awareness of meaning", which

Translation

1^5 例如，诺曼·肯普·史密斯认为，意识是“对意义的觉知”，这

Original · #41

amounts to self-consciousness (A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London:

Translation

等同于自我意识（《康德〈纯粹理性批判〉评注》，伦敦：

Original · #42

Macmillan, 1918, p. xli); accordingly, Kemp Smith holds that brutes are not conscious in Kant's system (ibid., pp.xlvii-1). See also Kitcher, Kant's Real Self, pp. 116-17, 139-41; Jonathon Bennett, Kant's Analytic, Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1966, pp. 104 f.; Paul Guyer, Kant on Apperception and a priori Synthesis, in American Philosophical Quarterly, 17:205-1^2 (1980), pp. 209—11. - A passage commonly cited from the Kr. d. r. V. to support this view is the opening sentence of § 16: "The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not at all be thought, which amounts to saying that the representations would be either impossible, or at least nothing to me" (B

Translation

麦克米兰出版社，1918年，第xli页）；因此，肯普·史密斯认为，在康德的体系中，动物并不具有意识（同上，第xlvi—xlvii页）。另见Kitcher，《Kant's Real Self》，第116—117、139—141页；Jonathon Bennett，《Kant's Analytic》，剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1966年，第104页以下；Paul Guyer，“Kant on Apperception and a priori Synthesis”，载《American Philosophical Quarterly》17:205-1^2（1980），第209—211页。——《纯粹理性批判》中通常被引来支持这一观点的一段文字，是第16节的开头一句：“‘我思’必须能够伴随我所有的表象；因为否则，在我之中就会有某种东西被表象出来，而它根本不能被思；这就等于说，这些表象要么是不可能的，要么至少对我来说什么也不是。”（B

Original · #43

131—32). That is, 'having a representation* is read as 'being conscious* and attaching the Ί think*

Translation

131—32）。也就是说，“拥有一个表象*”被理解为“具有意识*”，并且附加上“我思*”。

Original · #44

to other representations is seen as equivalent to being self-conscious. Note that the Kemp Smith translation obscures the disjunctive character of the closing phrase, which is of some importance when considering the claim that representations are impossible apart from self-consciousness. Kant on Descartes and the Brutes 7 denied them self-consciousness;16 but if brutes have representations, and having representations implies being conscious, and being conscious implies being selfconscious, then either Kant was wrong to ascribe to them representations, or wrong to deny them self-consciousness. We can avoid this unpleasant choice only by rejecting one of the other premises, and, since it is obvious to many that having representations implies being conscious, we are left with rejecting the claim that consciousness implies self-consciousness. This last alternative may strike many readers as rather felicitous, since the claim itself appears as anything but obviously true. But unfortunately this implication may be needed for the Transcendental Deduction. Thus the problem.

Translation

与其他表象发生关联，被看作等同于具有自我意识。请注意，Kemp Smith的译文掩盖了末尾短语的“或此或彼”的性质；这一点在考察“离开自我意识，表象便不可能”这一主张时相当重要。康德在论及笛卡尔与禽兽时，否认禽兽具有自我意识；16 但是，如果禽兽有表象，而有表象即意味着有意识，有意识又意味着有自我意识，那么康德要么错在将表象归于禽兽，要么错在否认它们具有自我意识。要避免这种令人不快的两难，我们只能拒斥其他前提中的一个；而既然对许多人而言，“有表象意味着有意识”是显而易见的，那么我们就只剩下否定“意识意味着自我意识”这一主张了。最后这一种选择在许多读者看来或许相当可取，因为这一主张本身看起来绝非不言自明为真。但不幸的是，先验演绎或许正需要这一蕴含关系。问题就在于此。

Original · #45

In treating these two problems, I will argue for the following: (a) Kant clearly believes that representations are separable from consciousness (in some sense), and thus that a being might be capable of having representations and yet be unconscious, but that he leaves open the possibility that such a being could be even incapable of consciousness; still, it appears likely that Kant did consider brutes to be conscious in some more limited sense (which I will explore below), (b) Kant does not conflate consciousness and self-consciousness or hold that the former implies the latter, but his use of 'Bewußtsein' is inconsistent, sometimes meaning an "awareness" of representations (i. e. having clear representations), and sometimes the more involved notion of having an inner sense.

Translation

在处理这两个问题时，我将论证如下几点：（a）康德显然认为，表象在某种意义上可以与意识分离；因此，存在可能拥有表象却无意识。但他同时保留了一种可能性：这样的存在甚至可能完全不具备意识能力。尽管如此，康德似乎仍很可能认为，禽兽在某种更为有限的意义上是有意识的（这一点我将在下文探讨）；（b）康德并未将意识与自我意识混为一谈，也不认为前者蕴含后者；然而，他对“Bewußtsein”一词的使用并不一致：有时它指对表象的“觉知”（即拥有清晰的表象），有时则指一种更复杂的概念——即具有内感官。

Original · #46

Given Kant's pre-occupation with the brute psyche, and his belief that brutes are conscious (in some minimal sense) and are capable of having representations, and given Kant's multiple rejections of brutes being self-conscious (even having an inner sense), it is almost certain that consciousness could not have implied self-consciousness for Kant, unless he forgot this important point while writing the Transcendental Deduction. (As to whether the Deduction nevertheless depends upon this implication is a question too large for the present paper, but a convincing argument that it does not has been offered recently by Ameriks.)^17 (a) Representations and consciousness Must one be conscious to have representations? Kant's answer is not clearly affirmative.^18 For in several places, Kant suggests that brutes, in whose ability to have

Translation

鉴于康德一向关注动物那种未经教化的心灵，并且他相信动物是有意识的（至少在某种最低限度的意义上），也能够具有表象；又鉴于康德曾多次否认动物具有自我意识（甚至否认它们拥有内感官），那么几乎可以确定，在康德看来，意识不可能意指自我意识，除非他在写作《先验演绎》时遗忘了这一要点。（至于《演绎》是否仍然依系于这种涵蕴关系，此问题对于本文而言过于庞大；然而，Ameriks 近来已提出一个颇有说服力的论证，表明其并非如此。）^17 （a）表象与意识 要有表象，是否就必须有意识？康德的回答并非明确肯定。^18 因为康德在若干处所表示，动物具有形成表象的能力，而他对此并不怀疑。

Original · #47

1^6 See Anth. (Ak 7:127; Gregor, p. 9); MP Herder (Ak 28:74); Anweisung (Stark, p. 3); Menschen-

Translation

1^6 见 Anth.（Ak 7:127；Gregor，第9页）；MP Herder（Ak 28:74）；Anweisung（Stark，第3页）；Menschen-

Original · #48

kunde (Stark, pp. 9, 207); MP Pölitz (Ak 28:275-76); Phil. En. (Ak 29:44-45); MP Mrongovius (Ak 29:879).

Translation

纯粹的世界知识（Stark，第9、207页）；《波利茨形而上学》（Ak 28:275–76）；《哲学百科全书》（Ak 29:44–45）；《姆龙戈维乌斯形而上学》（Ak 29:879）。

Original · #49

8 Steve Naragon

Translation

8 史蒂夫·纳拉贡

Original · #50

representations he clearly believes, are not conscious (at least in some sense). Consider a passage from the Herder notes (which stem from 1762-64): "Animals (by hypothesis) have a faculty for acting according to choice, but they cannot represent to themselves the grounds of motion: they are not conscious so as [to be able] to act according to a desire for this choice. This desire is a desire in a desire and is with humans the essence of freedom: otherwise I could not distinguish the soul from the other necessitating grounds in nature".^19 In his 1762 essay on the syllogism, Kant reminds the reader that our only knowledge of the nature of brutes comes from their overt actions and that, even though this behavior might at times suggest that brutes are conscious, Kant claims that (at least in one sense) they are not: "In observing [brutes] we are aware only of overt actions, the difference of which indicates different determinations of their desire. But it by no means follows that this behavior is preceded by an act of the faculty of knowledge within them, such that they are conscious of the agreement or disagreement of what is contained in one sensation with what is contained in another, and thus that they judge".^20 In the 1775 lectures collected under the title Philosophical Encyclopaedia, Kant opens his discussion of empirical psychology with the topic of consciousness: "The first thing that I notice is consciousness. This is not a special thinking, but rather that under which I can bring all remaining representations, etc.; it is the condition and the form under which we are thinking beings, or intelligences. All living beings are either substantia bruta repraesentativa or intelligentia. The main, and nearly the only, difference between animals and humans is consciousness, but that is also so great that it can never be replaced with something else. Many animals behave and build so craftily that they come quite close to humans, but all are without consciousness".^21 In the lecture notes collected by Pölitz, and thought to stem from the Winter semester of 1778/9 or 1779/80, we find the following: "Accordingly we attribute to [animals] a faculty of sensation, imagination, etc., but all only sensible as lower faculties, and not connected with consciousness. We can explain all the phenomena of the animals from this outer sensibility and from the mechanical grounds of their bodies, without accepting consciousness or inner sense. The philosopher must not increase the principles of cognition without cause".^22 In a sketch of a letter to Alexander, Prince of Beloselsky, dating from the summer of

Translation

他显然认为，表象并不是有意识的（至少在某种意义上并非如此）。请看《赫尔德笔记》中的一段话（成于1762–1764年）：“动物（按假设说）具有按照选择而行动的能力，但它们不能向自己表象运动的根据：它们没有意识，因而不能［能够］按照对这种选择的欲望来行动。这种欲望是一种欲望中的欲望，在人这里，它就是自由的本质；否则，我便不能把灵魂同自然中其他必然的根据区分开来。”^19 在1762年关于三段论的论文中，康德提醒读者，我们关于禽兽本性的全部知识都来自它们外在可见的行动。尽管这种行为有时似乎表明禽兽是有意识的，但康德主张（至少在某一种意义上）它们不是：“在观察［禽兽］时，我们意识到的只是外在的行动，这些行动的差异表明它们欲望的不同规定。但绝不能由此推出：这种行为之前，在它们内部已发生了知识能力的一种活动，以至于它们意识到一种感觉中所包含的东西与另一感觉中所包含的东西之间的一致或不一致，并因此作出判断。”^20 在1775年以《哲学百科全书》为题汇编的讲课中，康德以意识为主题开启其经验心理学的讨论：“我首先注意到的是意识。这并不是一种特殊的思维，而是我能够在其之下统摄其余一切表象等等的东西；它是我们作为思维的存在者或理智的条件和形式。一切有生命的存在要么是 substantia bruta repraesentativa，要么是 intelligentia。动物与人之间主要的、几乎是唯一的差异，就是意识；但这一差异又如此之大，以至于绝不能由别的东西来替代。许多动物的行为和营造都极为灵巧，几乎接近人类，但所有动物都没有意识。”^21 在波利茨汇编的讲稿中（一般认为出自1778/1779年或1779/1780年冬季学期），我们看到如下说法：“相应地，我们赋予［动物］以感觉、想象等能力，但所有这些都是感性的、作为较低级的能力，并不与意识相关联。我们可以仅凭这种外在感性以及它们身体的机械根据，来解释动物的一切现象，而无须承认意识或内感官。哲学家不应无故增加认识的原则。”^22 在一封致别洛谢尔斯基亲王亚历山大的书信草稿中，写于

Original · #51

1792, Kant elaborates on the relationship between representations and consciousness:

Translation

1792年，康德进一步阐明了表象与意识之间的关系：

Original · #52

"[First, in] the division of the faculty of representation, [there is the sphere of] mere apprehension of the representation: apprehensio bruta without consciousness (which is Kant on Descartes and the Brutes 9 solely for animals), and the sphere of apperception, i. e. the concept; the last comprises the whole of the sphere of the understanding".^23 Here Kant claims that brutes apprehend but do not apperceive, a point made earlier by Leibniz.^24 Finally, we read in Donna's lecture notes from the Winter semester of 1792/3 that "consciousness is wholly lacking in animals, their behavior occurs according to laws of the power of imagination, which nature has laid in them".^25 A second reason for thinking that Kant considered representations separable from consciousness is found in the many passages discussing obscure representations (dunkele Vorstellungen); these are, after all, representations of which we are not conscious.

Translation

“［首先，在］表象能力的划分中，［有］对表象的单纯把握这一领域：无意识的粗朴把握（apprehensio bruta）（康德在《论笛卡尔与禽兽》9中仅将其赋予动物），以及统觉的领域，即概念；后者包含知性的整个领域。”^23 康德在这里主张，禽兽能够把握，却不能统觉；这一点莱布尼茨先前已经提出过。^24 最后，我们从唐纳1792/3年冬季学期的讲课笔记中读到：“动物完全缺乏意识；它们的行为是依照想象力的法则发生的，而这些法则乃是自然赋予它们的。”^25 认为康德把表象看作可与意识分离，第二个理由可以在许多讨论晦暗表象（dunkle Vorstellungen）的段落中找到；毕竟，这些终究是我们并未意识到的表象。

Original · #53

Following tradition, Kant distinguished between clear (klar), obscure (dunkele), and distinct (deutliche) representations. Clear representations are those of which we are conscious; distinct, those of whose features we are also conscious; obscure, those of which we are not at all conscious.^26 Guyer cites the section in the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View where obscure representations are discussed, but he suggests that Kant's belief in such representations does not amount to a belief in representations wholly divorced from consciousness - for we may later become conscious of these unconscious representations.^27 That is of course possible, but Kant seems to have believed that there are many obscure representations of which we never have been and never will be conscious.

Translation

沿袭传统，康德区分了清楚（klar）、模糊（dunkele）和明晰（deutliche）的表象。清楚的表象是那些我们能够意识到的；明晰的表象是那些其特征我们也能够意识到的；模糊的表象则是那些我们完全意识不到的。^26 盖耶（Guyer）引用了《实用人类学》中讨论模糊表象的那一节，但他认为，康德对于这类表象的承认，并不意味着他相信存在与意识完全脱离的表象——因为我们可能后来会意识到这些无意识表象。^27 这固然是可能的，但康德似乎认为，有诸多模糊表象是我们从未且将永远不会意识到的。

Original · #54

Vladimir Satura, in his helpful discussion of Kant's beliefs about the unconscious, finds five different kinds of obscure representations discussed by Kant, among which are:

Translation

弗拉基米尔·萨图拉在他对康德的无意识信念的有益讨论中，梳理出康德论及的五种不同类型的模糊表象，其中包括：

Original · #55

(1) die Gedächtnislatenz: representations of which we were once conscious but are no longer, such as whatever we once noticed or thought about, e. g. books and articles read and since forgotten; and (2) die unterschwelligen Empfindungen: representations of which we were never conscious because they were not intense or large enough (distant stars or microscopic images), or because there were too many to be noticed individually, e. g. the sounds of each instrument and vibrating string in a symphony.^28 The latter

Translation

（1）die Gedächtnislatenz：我们曾经意识到但如今已不再有的表象，例如所有我们曾留意或思考过的事物，比如读过却已忘记的书籍和文章；以及（2）die unterschwelligen Empfindungen：我们从未有意识到的表象，要么是因为它们不够强烈或不够大（如遥远的恒星或显微镜下的图像），要么是因为数量太多而无法逐一被注意到，例如交响乐中每种乐器和每根振动琴弦的声音。^28 后者

Original · #56

2^3 Letter to Beloselsky, Summer 17^92 (Ak 11:330-33). See also Refl.Anth. (Ak 15:166). Kant

Translation

2^3 致别洛谢尔斯基的信，1792年夏（Ak 11:330–33）。另见 Refl. Anth.（Ak 15:166）。康德

Original · #57

owned a copy of Beloselsky's book, Dianyologie on tableau pkilosophique de I'entendement, Dresden: 1790, upon which Kant was commenting in his letter; see Warda, Immanuel Kants Bücher, Berlin: Martin Breslauer, 1922, p. 44. On Kant's relation to Beloselsky and Russian culture and science of the time, see Arsenij Gulyga, Immanuel Kant, translated into German by Sigrun Bielfeldt, Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1981, pp.268, 323-29.

Translation

康德藏有别洛谢尔斯基所著《Dianyologie ou tableau philosophique de l'entendement》（德累斯顿，1790）一书，其书信中评论的正是此书；参见 Arthur Warda 所著《Immanuel Kants Bücher》，柏林：Martin Breslauer，1922年，第44页。关于康德与别洛谢尔斯基以及当时俄国文化和科学的关系，见 Arsenij Gulyga 的《Immanuel Kant》（由 Sigrun Bielfeldt 译为德文，美茵河畔法兰克福：Insel出版社，1981年），第268，323-329页。

Original · #58

2^4 See Leibniz's New Essays (Remnant and Bennett transl., Cambridge U. P., 1982, pp. 133-34);

Translation

2^4 见莱布尼茨《人类理智新论》（雷姆南特与贝内特英译本，剑桥大学出版社，1982 年，第 133 – 134 页）；

Original · #59

Discourse on Metaphysics, §34-35; The Principles of Nature and of Grace, §4-5 (in Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, translated and edited by L. E. Loemker, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956, pp. 1036-37); and Monadology, §28-30.

Translation

《形而上学论》§34—35；《自然与恩典的原则》§4—5（见莱布尼茨：《哲学论文与书信》，L. E. Loemker 译并编，芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1956年，第1036—1037页）；以及《单子论》§28—30。

Original · #60

1^0 Steve Naragon

Translation

1^0 史蒂夫·纳拉贡

Original · #61

is perhaps the most remarkable species of obscure representation for these are wholly estranged from any consciousness: "When we cast our eyes through a telescope at the furthest heavenly bodies, that telescope is doing nothing more than awakening in us the consciousness of countless heavenly bodies which could not be seen with the naked eye, but which already lay obscure in our soul. If only man could be conscious of everything that he perceives of bodies through the microscope, he would have a vast knowledge of bodies, such as he actually now has, except that he is not conscious of it... Thus there lies in the field of obscure representations a treasure which constitutes the deep abyss of human cognition which we cannot attain".^29 Of course, Kant might still have believed that representations, while clearly separable from consciousness, are still inseparable from conscious beings, that is, that perhaps only conscious beings can have representations, whether obscure or clear. But he never says this explicitly despite ample opportunity, and at least traditional arguments such as those offered by Locke against separating representations from consciousness are ineffective against taking the further step of attributing representations to unconscious beings, once that first step of accepting the doctrine of obscure representations is taken.

Translation

或许，最值得注意的一类晦暗表象，正是那些与任何意识都完全隔绝的表象：“当我们透过望远镜望向最遥远的天体时，望远镜所做的，无非是在我们心中唤起对无数天体的意识；这些天体凭肉眼无法看见，但它们原本就已晦暗地存在于我们的灵魂之中。倘若人能够意识到自己借助显微镜对于物体所感知的一切，那么他就会拥有关于物体的广博知识；事实上，这种知识他现在实际上已经拥有，只是并未意识到而已……因此，在晦暗表象的领域中，蕴藏着一笔宝藏，它构成了人类认知那不可企及的深渊。”^29 当然，康德或许仍然认为，表象虽然可以同意识清楚地区分开来，却仍不能同有意识的存在者分离；也就是说，也许只有有意识的存在者才能拥有表象，无论这些表象是晦暗的还是清晰的。但他从未明确这样说过，尽管他本有充分机会这样说。并且，一旦迈出了第一步，接受了晦暗表象这一学说，那么至少像洛克所提出的那类反对把表象与意识分离的传统论证，就无法有效反对进一步主张无意识的存在者也具有表象。

Original · #62

A third reason for thinking that Kant did not accept the claim that having a representations implies being conscious is that Kant suggests the opposite in his discussion of the different levels of cognition, as found in the Logik:

Translation

认为康德并不接受‘拥有表象就意味著有意识’这一主张的第三个理由在于，康德在《逻辑学》关于认知不同层级的讨论中，似乎提出了相反的看法。

Original · #63

The first level of cognition is: to represent something to oneself.

Translation

认知的第一个层次是：将某物表象给自己。

Original · #64

The second: to represent something to oneself with consciousness, or perception (percipere); The third: to know (noscere) something, or to represent to oneself something in comparison with other things, according to the similarity as well as the difference; The fourth: to know something with consciousness, i. e. to cognize (cognoscere). Animals also know objects, but they do not cognize them.

Translation

第二：有意识地向自己表象某物，亦即感知（percipere）；第三：认识（noscere）某物，或者说，依据相似性与差异，将某物与其他事物相比较而向自己表象；第四：有意识地认识某物，也就是说，对其加以认知（cognoscere）。动物也认识对象，但并不认知对象。

Original · #65

The fifth: to understand something (intelligere), i.e. to cognize or conceive through the understanding by means of concepts. This is quite different from conception. Much can be conceived, although it cannot be conceptualized, e.g. a perpetual motion machine, whose impossibility is shown in mechanics.^30 Anth.; to which I might also add the following: MP Mrongovius (Ak 29:879-80), MP Arnoldt (Ak 29:1033), MP Herder (Ak 28:92), Deutlichkeit (Ak 2:290; Walford, p. 22).

Translation

第五，理解某物（intelligere），即通过知性、借助概念来认知或把握某物。这与单纯的构想不同。有许多事物可以被构想，尽管它们不能被概念化，例如永动机；力学的论证已表明其不可能性。^30 Anth.; 对此我还可以补充：MP Mrongovius（Ak 29:879-80）、MP Arnoldt（Ak 29:1033）、MP Herder（Ak 28:92）、Deutlichkeit（Ak 2:290；Walford，第22页）。

Original · #66

2^9 MP Pölitz (Ak 28:227, 228). See the parallel account in Anth. (Ak 7:135-37; Gregor, p. 16). It

Translation

2^9 见《Pölitz 形而上学》（Ak 28:227、228）。另可参见《人类学》中的相关平行论述（Ak 7:135–37；Gregor，第16页）。

Original · #67

perhaps goes without saying that Kant's views here are incompatible with current views on the physiology of sensation.

Translation

这或许不言而喻：康德在这里的看法与当今关于感觉生理学的观点并不相容。

Original · #68

3^0 Logik, "Introduction", sect, viii (Ak 9:64-65). These are only the first five of the seven levels

Translation

3^0《逻辑学》，“导论”，第 viii 节（Ak 9:64–65）。这只是七个层次中的前五个。

Original · #69

described. See also Kant's brief taxonomy of the genus of representation in Kr. d. r. V. B Kant on Descartes and the Brutes 1^1 At the first level of cognition we seem to have representations without consciousness, since consciousness does not make its appearance until the second level. This would seem to indicate that representations and consciousness were separable (although, once again, one might argue that Kant would not allow the (further?) step of separating the ability to have representations and the ability to be conscious).

Translation

如上所述。另可参阅康德在《纯粹理性批判》B版中对“表象”这一属的简要分类。\n\nB. 康德论笛卡尔与禽兽\n\n1^1 在认知的第一个层次上，我们似乎拥有没有意识的表象，因为意识直到第二个层次才出现[^1]。这似乎表明，表象与意识是可以分离的（尽管，我们同样可以辩称，康德不会允许[把拥有表象的能力与具有意识的能力分离开来]这一步（进一步？））。

Original · #70

Despite this wealth of evidence, it is still not clear what Kant's views were on the matter. For, as the more observant reader will have noticed, Kant tells us in the very passage just quoted that brutes are conscious, indeed, that they even attain to the third level of cognition (which would involve, presumably, the capacities of levels one and two as well). Another passage that suggests Kant attributed consciousness to brutes is (b) Consaousness and self-consciousness More important than these few passages where Kant directly (if ambiguously) attributes consciousness to brutes would be to show in those passages where he denies them consciousness that he is actually denying them something else, such as the possession of an inner sense. This can be done, although a thorough untangling of Kant's different uses of 'Bewußtsein' and its related terms would require an essay in itself, so I will here only sketch what I take to be a plausible account.

Translation

尽管有如此丰富的证据，康德在这一问题上的看法究竟如何，仍然并不清楚。因为，正如更为细心的读者已经注意到的，康德恰恰在刚才引述的那段文字中告诉我们，禽兽是有意识的；不仅如此，它们甚至还能达到认知的第三层次（这大概也意味着，它们同样具备第一和第二层次的能力）。另一段似乎表明康德将意识归于禽兽的文字是：（b）意识与自我意识。比起这几处康德直接——尽管并不明确——将意识归于禽兽的段落，更重要的是要表明：在那些他否认禽兽具有意识的地方，他实际上否认的是别的东西，例如拥有内感官。这一点是可以做到的；不过，要彻底梳理康德对“Bewußtsein”及其相关术语的不同用法，本身就需要专门写一篇文章，因此我在这里只能概略勾勒出一种我认为较为可信的说明。

Original · #71

The principle work from which Kant lectured in his courses in metaphysics was Baumgarten's Metaphysica, a Latin text composed of sections on ontology, cosmology, psychology (empirical and rational), and natural theology, each of which Kant discusses in turn.^32 Herder attended Kant's lectures in the years 1762-4, including lectures on metaphysics, and his notes of these include much of interest regarding the inner lives of brutes and the nature of consciousness, including the following: "Animal clear representations and human consciousness are the two main faculties of our understanding, which unite us with the animals and raise us above them. Give us representations of the senses and we would never be able to consider consciousness as possible, not merely because this behavior itself does not happen without consciousness, but rather because both powers are essentially different".^33 Clear representations are those of which we are conscious, and yet in the above this ability of having clear representations is said to be "essentially different" from human consciousness. It appears that Kant's 'Bewußtsein' is here referring more narrowly, if not to something else entirely. If by 'consciousness' is meant responsiveness to

Translation

康德在其形而上学课程中所依据的主要文本，是鲍姆加登的《形而上学》。这是一部拉丁文著作，由本体论、宇宙论、心理学（经验的和理性的）以及自然神学等部分构成；康德依次讨论了其中每一部分。^32 赫尔德在1762至1764年间听了康德的课，其中包括形而上学讲座。他的笔记中有许多值得关注的内容涉及动物的内在生活和意识的本性，其中包含如下段落：“动物的清晰表象和人的意识，是我们知性的两种主要能力：前者将我们与动物联结起来，后者则将我们提升到动物之上。倘若只给我们感官的表象，我们将永远无法认为意识是可能的，这不仅是因为这种行为本身离开意识就不会发生，更是因为这两种能力在本质上是不同的。”^33 清晰表象就是我们有意识（bewußt）的那些表象。然而在上述引文中，具有清晰表象的这种能力却被称为与人的意识“在本质上不同”。看来，康德的“Bewußtsein”在这里所指的范围更窄——即便不是指完全不同的东西。若此处“意识”指的是对……的回应能力，

Original · #72

1^2 Steve Naragon

Translation

1^2 史蒂夫·纳拉贡

Original · #73

representations, then Kant certainly allows that brutes are conscious. What he disallows is the brute's ability to represent to itself some representation that it has,34 or to bring several or all representations together,35 or to compare two separate representations.^36 The latter two instances clearly involve an act of judging, which ability Kant elsewhere denies the brutes. All of them involve the ability to have "a representation that another representation is in me", which is the description given to consciousness in the Logik?^7 This use of 'consciousness' appears similar to that of 'inner sense'.

Translation

那么，如果所说的是表象，康德当然承认动物具有意识。他所否认的，是动物能够把自己所具有的某个表象再表象给自己，34 或者把若干乃至全部表象汇聚起来，35 或者比较两个彼此分离的表象。^36 后两种情形显然都涉及判断活动，而康德在别处否认动物具有这种能力。所有这些都涉及这样一种能力，即拥有“一个表象，意识到我之中有另一个表象”；这正是《逻辑学》中对意识所作的描述。^7 这里“意识”的用法似乎与“内感官”的用法相近。

Original · #74

Throughout his career, Kant distinguished inner and outer sense. Rather simply, outer sense is the ability to have representations of "outer things", while inner sense is the ability to have representations of "inner things" (namely, other representations).^38 Elsewhere in Herder's notes we find the claim that "consciousness - inner sense - is thus the distinguishing character of the rational being",39 and so it appears that Kant at least occasionally means by 'Bewußtsein' this ability to have representations of other representations. Kant offers us such a description of consciousness several times, as in the Logik and the MP Pölitz: "Consciousness is a knowledge of that which I receive. It is a representation of my representations, it is a self-perception".^40 This is also how inner sense is described in the 1762 essay on the syllogism ("the faculty of inner sense, i. e. to make its own representations objects of thought").^41 And if we look back at some of the passages wherein Kant denies brutes consciousness, what

Translation

在其整个学术生涯中，康德始终区分内感官与外感官。简言之，外感官是具有关于“外在事物”的表象的能力，而内感官则是具有关于“内在事物”（即其他表象）的表象的能力。^38 在赫尔德的笔记中别处，我们还发现这样的主张：“意识——内感官——因此是理性存在的区别性特征”，^39 因此看来，康德至少有时用‘Bewußtsein’来指这种具有关于其他表象的表象的能力。康德多次向我们提供对意识的这种描述，例如在《逻辑学》和《MP Pölitz》中：“意识是一种关于我所接受之物的知识。它是我的表象的表象，是一种自我知觉。”^40 这也正是1762年关于三段论的文章中对内感官的描述（“内感官的能力，即把它自己的表象作为思维的对象”）。^41 而如果我们回头看康德否认动物具有意识的一些段落，那么

Original · #75

3^4 See Kant's 1786 or 17^88 Latin discourse, On Philosophers' Medicine of the Body (Ak 15:944;

Translation

3^4 参见康德的拉丁文演说《论哲学家的身体药方》（1786 年或17^88 年）（Ak 15：944；

Original · #76

transl. by Mary Gregor in L. W. Beck, ed., Kant's Latin Writings, P.Lang, 1986, p.231): "For there is in cattle, as well as in man, that remarkable faculty we call imagination, the principle of perception and motion, by which things that are absent can really exist in the soul as though they were present, as can things that never have been and perhaps never can be. But in cattle, this force is not directed by any choice or deliberate intention of the animal, but is put into play by stimuli and impulsions implanted by nature itself, apart from any influence of the will." See also MP Herder (Ak 28:99): "The animals (by hypothesis) have a faculty to act according to choice, but they cannot represent to themselves the grounds of motion: they are not conscious so as to [be able to] act according to a desire for this choice."

Translation

（见 Mary Gregor 译，载 L. W. Beck 编《康德拉丁文著作》，P. Lang，1986年，第231页）：“因为在牲畜身上，同样在人身上，都存在一种值得我们关注的能力，我们称之为想象力。它是知觉与运动的原则；通过它，不在场的事物如同在场一般真实地存在于心灵中，就连那些从未存在、且或许永不可能存在的事物也不例外。但在牲畜那里，这种力量并不受任何选择或深思熟虑的意图所引导，而是由自然本身植入的刺激和冲动所驱动，完全不受意志的影响。”另见《赫尔德人类学讲义》（Ak 28:99）：“动物（根据假设）具有一种按照选择行动的能力，但它们不能向自己表象运动的根据；它们不具备那种能使其依照对此选择的欲求来行动的意识。”

Original · #77

3^5 Phil. En. (Ak 29:44-45). See the passage quoted earlier.

Translation

3^5 《哲学百科全书》（Ak 29:44–45）。见前引段落。

Original · #78

3^6 Syllogism (Ak 2:59-60; Abbott, p. 94). See also Kant's Prize Essay (Ak 2:285; Walford transl.,

Translation

3^6 三段论（Ak 2:59-60；Abbott 译本，第 94 页）。另见康德《获奖论文》（Ak 2:285；Walford 译本，第

Original · #79

p. 16).

Translation

第16页）。

Original · #80

3^7 Logik (Ak 9:33; Hartman and Schwarz, p. 37).

Translation

3^7《逻辑学》（Ak 9:33；Hartman and Schwarz，第37页）。

Original · #81

3^8 MP Herder (Ak 28:78), M.A.d.N. (Ak 4:542; Ellington, p. 103), Kr.d.r. V. (B 37, 50-51,

Translation

3^8 MP Herder (Ak 28:78), M.A.d.N. (Ak 4:542; Ellington, p. 103), Kr.d.r. V. (B 37, 50-51,

Original · #82

152-54, 220, 427-30; A 367-8, 386-7). Saying exactly what inner sense is supposed to be for

Translation

152-54，220，427-30；A 367-8，386-7）。要准确说清内感官究竟应当是什么，这一点对于

Original · #83

Kant is not easy; Ameriks delineates some five varieties of inner sense (Kant's Theory of Mind, pp. 239-55). I have chosen to speak of inner sense in terms of abilities, but one could just as well define it in terms of its content. -1 should add that on the present reading of the text, Kant is not contrasting outer and inner sense when he contrasts objective and subjective consciousness in the MP Pölitz (Ak 28:226-27). Rather, both of these seem to be forms of empirical consciousness. Kant on Descartes and the Brutes 13 we find him saying is that brutes lack this ability to have representations of their representations: brutes are not able "to act according to a desire for this choice" or that this desire is "a desire in a desire";42 brutes are not "conscious of the agreement or disagreement of what is contained in one sensation with what is contained in another".^43 All of this requires a certain reflective ability such as we find in inner sense, and which seems to underlie the ability to judge, which itself is often noted by Kant as the critical difference between humans and brutes.^44 In one passage, Kant suggests that judging does assume this ability: "...to make my own representation on object of representation - and thus distinct. Through this are judgments possible and through that distinct concepts and consequently of the understanding".^45 On the reading I have been advancing, it is yet an additional ability to be selfconscious in the sense of having a representation of the "I" and the ability to attach this representation to all the rest.^46 Of course, brutes lack this ability as well, and so are incapable, for instance, of experiencing happiness and unhappiness — as we learn in the following passage: "To be able to say T [is] the special faculty of being an object to oneself (small children do not [have this faculty]). Personality. There is not just pain, but distress over the pain etc. Happiness and unhappiness (not just pleasure, but joy).

Translation

康德并不容易理解；阿默里克斯区分了内感官大约五种不同的样态（Kant's Theory of Mind, pp. 239-55）。我这里选择从能力的角度来谈内感官，不过同样也完全可以从其内容来界定它。——我还应补充一点：按照这里对文本的解读，当康德在 MP Pölitz（Ak 28:226-27）中区分客观意识与主观意识时，他并不是在区分外感官与内感官。相反，这两者似乎都属于经验意识的形式。 在《康德论笛卡尔与禽兽》13 中，我们看到他这样说：禽兽缺乏对其表象加以表象的能力：禽兽不能“按照对这种选择的欲望而行动”，或者说，这种欲望是一种“欲望中的欲望”；^42 禽兽也并不“意识到一个感觉中所包含的东西与另一个感觉中所包含的东西之间的一致或不一致”。^43 所有这一切都要求某种反思能力，正如我们在内感官中所发现的那样；而这种能力似乎构成了判断能力的基础。康德自己也常常指出，判断能力是人与禽兽之间的关键差异。^44 在一段文字中，康德暗示，判断确实预设了这种能力：“……使我自己的表象成为表象的对象——从而使之清晰区分。由此判断才成为可能，并由此产生清晰的概念，进而才有知性”。^45 按照我一直在推进的这种解读，除此之外还需要另一种能力，即以拥有“我”的表象这种意义上的自我意识，以及把这一表象附加到其他一切表象之上的能力。^46 当然，禽兽同样缺乏这种能力，因此，例如，它们不可能体验幸福与不幸——正如我们在下面这段话中所学到的：“能够说‘我’［是］成为自己对象的特殊能力（小孩子并不［具有这种能力］）。人格。这里不只是有痛苦，而且还有对痛苦的苦恼，等等。幸福与不幸（不只是快感，而是喜悦）。”

Original · #84

Merit and guilt. Understanding and reason. In this faculty, to relate one's condition to oneself".^47 While brutes may experience all or most of what humans do of the external world, they experience nothing of that inner world which looms so vast and deep in our daily lives.

Translation

功过。知性与理性。在这种能力中，人能够“将自己的状态与自己联系起来”。^47 禽兽或许经验着与人类全部或大部分相同的外部世界，但对那个内在世界，它们却毫无经验，而这个世界在我们的日常生活中显得如此广大而深邃。

Original · #85

Let us now return to Kant's relation to Descartes. Kant believed brutes were capable of pain and pleasure, but incapable of happiness or despair, and this for the reason that the latter (but not the former) require an ability to make judgments, which brutes lack.

Translation

现在让我们回到康德与笛卡尔的关系上来。康德认为，禽兽能够感受痛苦和快乐，却不能体验幸福或绝望；其理由是，后者（而非前者）需要判断的能力，而禽兽并不具备这种能力。

Original · #86

Interestingly, Descartes' three-fold distinction between grades of sensory-information helpfully lays out the difference between his and Kant's views of brute experience.^48 While Descartes attributed to brutes only the first and mechanical grade of sensation,

Translation

有意思的是，笛卡尔对感觉信息所作的三级区分，恰好有助于理清两人在动物经验问题上的差异：笛卡尔与康德的观点。^48 笛卡尔仅将第一级，亦即机械性的感觉，归给动物，

Original · #87

4^2 MP Herder (Ak 28:99).

Translation

4^2 MP 赫尔德（Ak 28:99）。

Original · #88

4^3 Syllogism (Ak 2:60n; Abbott, p.94n).

Translation

4^3 三段论（Ak 2:60n；Abbott，第94页注）。

Original · #89

4^4 Ameriks holds that Kant is simply denying brutes this ability to judge when he denies them

Translation

4^4 阿默里克斯认为，康德在否认动物具有这种判断能力时，不过是在单纯地否认它们会作出判断。

Original · #90

consciousness; see Kant's Theory of Mind, p.242n 10.

Translation

意识；见《康德心灵理论》，第242页脚注10。

Original · #91

4^5 MP Herder (Ak 28:79).

Translation

4^5 MP Herder（Ak 28:79）。

Original · #92

4^6 See, for example, MP Pölitz (Ak 28:584): "A kind of representation can accompany all our

Translation

4^6 例如，见 MP Pölitz (Ak 28:584)：“一种表象能够伴随我们所有的……

Original · #93

representations, this is the representation of ourself. The representation of ourself is called consciousness, apperceptio."

Translation

表象，这就是我们自身的表象。我们自身的表象被称为意识，即统觉。

Original · #94

1^4 Steve Naragon

Translation

1^4 史蒂夫·纳拉冈

Original · #95

reserving the latter two to human beings, Kant would have attributed the first two grades to brutes, denying them only the third on grounds that they cannot judge. For having a representation is more than the merely mechanical stimulus and response such as a thermostat might respond to a change in temperature.^49 Rather, representations are mental items or events for Kant, and as such set him at odds with Descartes' animalmachine hypothesis.

Translation

康德将后两级专属于人类，而会将前两级归于禽兽；他之所以只否认禽兽具有第三级，其根据在于它们不能作出判断。因为，拥有表象并不只是那种纯然机械的刺激—反应过程，就像恒温器会对温度变化作出反应那样。毋宁说，对康德而言，表象是心灵中的项目或事件；正因如此，他与笛卡尔的动物—机器假说相抵牾。

Original · #96

V. Animality as mechanical

Translation

就

Original · #97

Unlike Descartes, Kant allowed representation, feelings, and desires to the brutes, as well as a minimal sort of consciousness.^50 Nevertheless, Kant often emphasized the mechanistic nature of animality, again suggesting adherence to Descartes' animalmachine hypothesis. In The Metaphysical Elements of Justice he makes plain his belief that animals operate solely within a mechanical world: we must trust the moral law that we sense within, Kant writes, for "to regard the moral law within us as deceptive would bring about the horror-inspiring wish to dispense with reason altogether, and to consider it and its principles as thrown into the same mechanism of nature as the rest of the animals".^51 In his Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, the animality of humans is characterized as "physical and purely mechanical self-love",52 and this animal existence is elsewhere described as being characterized by a "mechanical organization".^53 Prior to the rise of a nature which was specifically human, according to the 1796 essay on a perpetual peace in philosophy, nature worked in humans as it does now in the brutes, namely, in a wholly mechanical fashion: "Here is nature represented in humans, just as it is active in animals, a nature prior to humanity and therefore in its generality, acting solely in order to develop powers which man can later employ according to laws of freedom; but this activity and its stimulation is not practical [i. e. free], but rather only mechanical".^54 In a peculiar closing statement to his essay on enlightenment, Kant is

Translation

与笛卡尔不同，康德认为，禽兽也有表象、情感和欲望，并且具有一种最低限度的意识。⁵⁰ 尽管如此，康德仍常常强调动物性的机械性质，这再次让人觉得，他依然接受笛卡尔的“动物机器”假说。在《正义的形而上学要素》中，他清楚表明自己相信，动物完全是在一个机械世界中活动的：康德写道，我们必须信赖我们在内心中感受到的道德法则，因为“若把我们内在的道德法则看作是骗人的，就会生出一种令人恐惧的愿望：要彻底抛弃理性，并把理性及其原则看作和其余动物一样，被投入自然的同一机制之中”。⁵¹ 在《单纯理性限度内的宗教》中，人的动物性被刻画为“物理的、纯然机械的自爱”，⁵² 而这种动物性的存在在别处又被描述为具有一种“机械的组织”。⁵³ 根据1796年那篇论哲学中的永久和平的文章，在一种特别属于人的自然兴起之前，自然在人身上的作用方式，正如它如今在禽兽身上一样，完全是机械的：“这里所表象的自然，是在人身上的自然，正如它在动物身上活动那样；这是先于人性的自然，因此就其普遍性而言，它的活动仅仅是为了发展出人后来可以按照自由法则来运用的能力；但这种活动及其激发并不是实践的［即自由的］，而只不过是机械的。”⁵⁴ 在其论启蒙的文章结尾一段颇为奇特的表述中，康德

Original · #98

4^9 Cf. MP Herder (Ak 28:78): "Mirrors do not represent themselves".

Translation

4^9 参见《形而上学讲座》赫尔德版（Ak 28:78）：“镜子并不表象它自身”。

Original · #99

5^0 That he attributes consciousness to them is seem in 4a, above. That he views this consciousness as

Translation

5^0 他将意识归之于它们，这一点可见于上文4a。他视此种意识为

Original · #100

of a different or lesser kind than that ascribed to humans is seen in 4b, above. Kant on Descartes and the Brutes 15 perhaps alluding to this mechanical past of humans: "Once nature has removed the hard shell from this seed for which she has most fondly cared, viz. the inclination to and vocation for free thinking, the germ gradually reacts upon a people's mentality (whereby they become increasingly able to act freely), and it finally even influences the principles of government, which finds that it can profit by treating men, who are now more than machines, in accord with their dignity".^55 Is all of this talk of animal mechanism purely metaphorical? Or is there some non- Cartesian sense where animals are mechanical? In the following three sections I explore three related topics in Kant's system that explain his view of animality as "mechanical", and also provide additional motivations for Kant's rejection of Descartes' hypothesis.

Translation

上文4b中已表明，属于人类的某种性质若赋予动物、就会被视为一种不同的或较低等的性质。康德在《论笛卡尔与禽兽》15 中或许就暗指了人类的这种机械性过往：“一旦自然为她最钟爱呵护的这颗种子——即自由思想的倾向与天职——剥去坚硬的外壳，此萌芽便会逐渐反作用于民族的心智（从而他们日益能够自由地行动），最终甚至影响政府的原则；政府发现，按照人的尊严来对待这些如今已不止是机器的人，是对自身有利的。”^55 所有这些关于动物机械性的讨论，是否纯属比喻？抑或是在某种非笛卡尔的意义上，动物确实是机械的？接下来三节，我将探究康德体系中的三个相关主题，它们既解释了他为何视动物性为‘机械的’，也为康德拒绝笛卡尔假说提供了更多动机。

Original · #101

(1) First, although he agreed with Descartes that matter was inert, Kant also believed that, given this inertness, life could not arise out of mere matter. Consequently, Kant often spoke of an "immaterial principle" in brutes, and even of them possessing souls which might survive into an afterworld after the decay of their bodies.

Translation

第一，虽然康德同意笛卡尔关于质料是惰性的看法，但他也认为，鉴于这种惰性，生命不可能仅从质料本身产生。因此，康德常常谈到动物身上有一种'非物质（或非质料）的原则'，甚至认为它们拥有灵魂，在其身体朽坏后，灵魂还可能在来世继续存续。

Original · #102

(2) Nevertheless, methodological considerations disallowed attributing to brutes any non-sensible cause for their actions.^56 Consequently, some form of determinism for brutes was in order, although Descartes' was not acceptable given the above problem.

Translation

（2）尽管如此，方法论上的考虑仍不允许将任何非感性的行动原因归于禽兽。^56 因此，有必要为禽兽设定某种形式的决定论，尽管鉴于上述问题，笛卡尔式的决定论并不可接受。

Original · #103

There was available to Kant, however, a Leibnizian version of determinism which fell on the ideal rather than the material plane. With such a choice in view, Kant was able to reject Descartes' determinism for Leibniz's more attractive form.

Translation

不过，康德还可以选择一种莱布尼茨式的决定论，它所立足的不是物质层面，而是观念层面。正因为面前有这样一种选择，康德才能拒绝笛卡尔的决定论，转而采纳莱布尼茨那种更具吸引力的形式。

Original · #104

(3) Finally, and for related reasons, Kant did not believe, as Descartes did, that mechanical explanations were possible in much of the life sciences, and certainly not in explaining reproduction and growth, regeneration, and even common patterns of behavior. I will now look more closely at each of these three points.

Translation

最后，基于相关的理由（更准确地说：鉴于相关原因），康德并不像笛卡尔那样认为：在生命科学的很大一部分领域中，机械论解释是可能的；而在解释繁殖与生长、再生，乃至常见的行为模式时，这种解释就更不可能了。现在，我将更细致地考察这三点中的每一点。

Original · #105

VI. Inert matter, life, and thought

Translation

六、惰性质料、生命与思想

Original · #106

The nature of matter, according to Kant, disallows the material determination of brutes. Like Descartes, Kant took matter to be inert in the sense that it lacks any self-

Translation

按照康德的观点，质料的本性不容许对动物进行质料规定。与笛卡尔相似，康德认为质料是惰性的，意即它缺乏任何自我——

Original · #107

5^5 Aufklärung (Ak 8:41—42; Humphrey, pp. 45-46). I see several possible readings of this passage.

Translation

启蒙（Ak 8:41—42；Humphrey，第45—46页）。我对这段文字有以下几种可能的解读。

Original · #108

First, if we view human animality as mechanical (as Kant does) then this suggestion that humans were once machines is just a reference to a prior animality. Or, this may simply refer to an earlier and (for Kant) unacceptable mode of governing: "the mechanical management of men under the regiment of others is everywhere the surest means of maintaining lawful order" (Anth.y Ak 7:210; Gregor, p. 80). Or, the statement might be meant ironically, condemning the government's practice of treating humans as if they were machines. Compare with frieden (Ak

Translation

首先，如果我们像康德那样把人的动物性看作机械性的，那么“人类曾经是机器”这一说法，就只是指一种更早先的动物性。或者，它也可能只是指一种更早的、并且在康德看来不可接受的治理方式：“在他人管束之下对人进行机械式管理，始终是维持合法秩序最可靠的手段”（Anth. y Ak 7:210；Gregor，第80页）。又或者，这句话可能本来就是反讽，旨在谴责政府把人当作机器来对待的做法。可参见《论永久和平》（Ak

Original · #109

8:378; Humphrey, p. 133).

Translation

8:378；Humphrey， 第133页）。

Original · #110

1^6 Steve Naragon

Translation

1^6 史蒂夫·纳拉贡

Original · #111

organizing powers, and thus is lifeless;57 but unlike Descartes, and like La Mettrie, he did not believe that animal behavior was reducible to statements of motion and extension.^58 Consequently, Kant appealed to an immaterial principle which vivified each living being, plants as well as animals.

Translation

(它)缺乏组织性力量，因此是无生命的；^57 但与笛卡尔不同，而是像拉美特里那样，他并不认为动物行为可以还原为关于运动和广延的陈述。^58 因此，康德诉诸一种非物质原则，正是这一原则赋（予）每一个生命以生机，植物和动物皆是如此。

Original · #112

Kant's concept of matter played a large role in several of his views about humans and brutes. For example, he rejected any attempt at grounding human mentality in matter, or providing a material explanation of it, because the unity of our consciousness ("the unity of apperception") could not be based on something infinitely divisible, which matter is.^59 Apart from being infinitely divisible, matter is also inert, which precluded for Kant the derivation of anything living from mere matter. Life cannot emerge from what is lifeless.

Translation

康德的质料概念在他关于人类与禽兽的若干观点中起到了重要作用。例如，他拒绝任何试图将人的心灵奠基于质料之上或为其提供质料性解释的努力，因为我们的意识统一性（“统觉的统一性”）不可能建立在某种可无限分割的东西之上，而质料恰恰正是如此。^59 质料不仅是可无限分割的，而且是惰性的；因此在康德看来，任何有生命之物都不可能仅仅从质料中推导出来。生命不可能从无生命之物中产生。

Original · #113

Both of these claims appear to be rooted in the lack of any unity in matter; unity is manifested by form, and matter is formless.^60 The reasoning behind these two claims that matter can support neither thought nor life can be summarized as follows:

Translation

这两项主张似乎都根源于质料缺乏任何统一性；统一性由形式体现，而质料是无形式的。^60 关于质料既不能承载思想也不能承载生命的论证，其背后的推理可概括如下：

Original · #114

(1) Matter cannot think. A concept is a unity of representations, judgments unify representations or concepts, and thus thought itself demands a high-level of unity, such as is found in the unity of apperception. It follows that matter, wholly lacking in any principle of unity, cannot think.

Translation

（1）质料不能思维。概念是表象的统一，判断则统一表象或概念；因此，思维本身要求一种高度的统一，正如统觉的统一所体现的那样。由此可见，质料由于完全缺乏任何统一原则，不可能思维。

Original · #115

(2) Matter is inert. Living processes in general involve a high degree of unity, being directed towards some form which guides the growth and reproduction of the organism.

Translation

（2）质料是惰性的。一般而言，生命过程具有高度的统一性，并且朝向某种形式；正是这种形式引导着有机体的生长与繁殖。

Original · #116

It again follows that matter, being devoid of any formal unity, cannot support or give rise to living things.

Translation

这也再次表明，质料由于缺乏任何形式的统一性，既无法支撑生命体，也无法催生生命体。

Original · #117

5^7 See Kr.d.U. (Ak 5:374, 394; Bernard, pp.221, 242), Kr.d.r.V. B 876, MP Herder (Ak

Translation

5^7 见 Kr.d.U.（Ak 5:374、394；Bernard，第221、242页），Kr.d.r.V. B 876，MP Herder（Ak

Original · #118

28:115-16), Träume (Ak 2:329; Goerwitz, p. 55), and . . d. N. (Ak 4:544; Ellington, p. 106),

Translation

28:115-16）、《梦》（Ak 2:329；Goerwitz，第55页）以及《……d. N.……》（Ak 4:544；Ellington，第106页），

Original · #119

MP L^2 (Ak 28:594), and see Ameriks, Kant's Theory of Mind, pp. 27-8. Kant viewed matter as essentially dynamic (see ch. 2 of M. A. d. N.} but here we are speaking of inertia in the sense of being lifeless.

Translation

见《形而上学讲义》L^2（Ak 28:594），并参见 Ameriks《康德的心灵理论》第27–28页。康德认为，质料本质上是动力性的（参见《自然科学的形而上学基础》第二章）；但此处我们谈论的“惰性”，指的是无生命意义上的惰性。

Original · #120

5^8 LaMettrie held that humans were machines as well as brutes but, to make this position at all

Translation

拉梅特里认为，人既是机器，也是禽兽；但要使这一立场好歹能成立，

Original · #121

plausible, he needed to find in matter (in addition to extension and motion) the faculty of feeling - something that Kant was unable to accept, given his firm commitment to matter's inertness. See LaMettrie, Natural History of the Soul, as partially reprinted in his Man a Machine, translated by Gertrude Bussey, Open Court Press, 1912, pp. 159-61.

Translation

为了让这一观点显得可信，他必须在质料中发现某种感觉能力（除广延和运动之外）；但康德由于坚定地持守质料的惰性原则，无法接受这一点。参见拉美特利《灵魂的自然史》，该书的节选重印于其《人是机器》中，Gertrude Bussey 译，Open Court Press，1912年，第159–161页。

Original · #122

5^9 There are several sources of this view in Kant. (1) The best known is in the B-edition

Translation

5^9 在康德那里，这一观点有若干来源。最为人所知的一处在 B 版序言中。

Original · #123

"Paralogism" section of the Kr.d.r. V. B 419-20. See also (2) the letter from Carl Arnold One of Der Streit der Facultäten, in drei Abschnitten, translated by Mary Gregor as The Conflict of the Faculties, New York: Abaris Books, 1979; (3) Kant's letter to Wilmans written sometime brain (Sömmering, W, xi. 259); (5) Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die die Metaphysik seit Leibnitzens und Wolffs Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat? (Ak 20:308), translated by Ted Humphrey as What Real Progress has Metaphysics Made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff, New York: Abaris Books, 1983, p. 151. As for the infinite divisibility of matter, see

Translation

《纯粹理性批判》“谬误推理”一节，V. B 419–20。另见：（2）卡尔·阿诺德的一封信件，出自《学院之争》（全书分为三部分），玛丽·格雷戈尔英译为 The Conflict of the Faculties，纽约：Abaris Books，1979年；（3）康德在某个时间写给威尔曼斯的一封信；（4）涉及大脑（Sömmering，W，xi. 259）；（5）Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die die Metaphysik seit Leibnitzens und Wolffs Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat?（Ak 20:308），特德·汉弗莱英译为 What Real Progress has Metaphysics Made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff，纽约：Abaris Books，1983年，第151页。至于质料的无限可分性，见

Original · #124

Chapter Two, prop. 4, of the M. A. d. N.: "Matter is divisible to infinity, and indeed into parts

Translation

《自然学的形而上学基础》第二章命题4：“质料是可无限分割的，并且确实可分至无穷部分。”

Original · #125

each of which is again matter" (Ak 4:503; Ellington, p. 49). Kant on Descartes and the Brutes 1^7 Some non-material principle seems to be required for each of these properties. Matter can be the principle neither of the self (qua conscious being) nor of life; it is this latter claim which I will now explore.^61 The Herder lecture notes provide an early example of Kant's view of matter: "As soon as we see matter moving itself, we judge that it is an animal, no matter how shapeless it may be... [revealing by its motion] an inner principle of movement. This principle must be immaterial because matter in itself is dead and must be moved by some different being".^62 Hylozoism is the doctrine that matter itself is alive, or possesses as pan of its nature a life-principle. In rejecting this doctrine in the Critique of Judgment, Kant argued that "the possibility of living matter cannot even be thought: its concept involves a contradiction, because lifelessness, inertia, constitutes the essential character of matter".^63 The fullest explanation as to why Kant believed matter to be inert can be found in the Third Chapter of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (prop. 3), where Kant claims that "every change of matter has an external cause".^64 This is the law of inertia, the second of the three laws of "universal mechanics". Here matter is construed in its entirety as an object of the outer (public or intersubjective) world so that any and all of its changes must be brought about by principles which, in order to be intersubjective, cannot be "inner" or in any manner hidden from the public view.

Translation

‘其中每一个又都是质料’（Ak 4:503；Ellington，第49页）。对于这些属性中的每一项，似乎都需要某种非物质性的原则。质料既不能成为自我（作为有意识的存在者）的原则，也不能成为生命的原则；我现在要探讨的正是后一种主张。^61 《赫尔德讲义笔记》为康德的质料观提供了一个早期例证：‘只要我们看见质料自行运动，我们就会判断它是动物，不论其形状多么不成形……（这运动显示）它有一个内在的运动原则。这个原则必定是非物质的，因为质料自身是死的，必须由某个不同的存在者来推动。’^62 物活论是这样一种学说：认为质料本身是活的，或者说，在其本性中就包含生命原则。康德在《判断力批判》中拒斥这一学说时指出，‘活的质料的**可能性**甚至是不可设想的：它的**概念**包含一个矛盾，因为无生命性、惰性，构成了**质料**的本质特征。’^63 至于康德为何认为质料是惰性的，最完整的解释可见于《自然科学的形而上学基础》第三章（命题3），康德在那里声称，‘**质料**的每一变化都有一个外在**原因**。’^64 这就是惯性**法则**，是‘普遍力学’三条**法则**中的第二条。在这里，质料被完全理解为外在（公共的或主体间的）世界的**对象**，因此，它的一切变化都必须由某些原则所引发；而这些原则若要具有主体间性，就不能是‘内在的’或以任何方式隐藏在公共视野之外。

Original · #126

If changes in matter are wholly brought about through outer determinations, what would an inner determination or principle be? Since they are inner, we could only know of them privately through introspection, and of these Kant wrote that "we know of no other internal principle of a substance to change its state but desire and no other internal activity whatever but thought, along with what depends upon such desire, namely, feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and appetite or will".^65 These are the inner determinations of living beings, 'life' being defined as "the capacity of a substance to determine itself to act [viz. to think or feel or will] from an internal principle [viz. desire]".66

Translation

如果质料中的变化完全是由外在规定所引起的，那么内在规定或内在原则又会是什么呢？既然它们是内在的，我们只能通过内省在私下里认识它们。对此，康德写道：“就实体改变其状态而言，我们不知道还有任何别的内在原则，除欲求之外；而就一般的内在活动而言，我们也不知道还有任何别的，除思维以及依赖于这种欲求的东西，即愉快或不愉快的感觉，以及欲念或意志之外。”^65 这些就是生命存在的内在规定；“生命”被界定为“一个实体依其内在原则[即欲求]来规定自身以行动[即思维、感觉或意志]的能力”。^66

Original · #127

6^1 As to the former claim see Ameriks, Kant's Theory of Mind, p. 25-83.

Translation

至于前一主张，参见 Ameriks，《Kant's Theory of Mind》，第25—83页。

Original · #128

6^2 MP Herder (Ak 28:115). See also Kr.d.r. V. B 420, 876: "The mere concept of matter

Translation

6^2 MP Herder（Ak 28:115）。另见《纯粹理性批判》V版，B 420， B 876：“仅凭质料这一概念”

Original · #129

(impenetrable, lifeless extension)..."; Anth. (Ak 7:177n; Gregor, p. 53); MPPölitz (Ak

Translation

（"不可穿透的、无生命的广延"）……》；Anth.（Ak 7:177n；Gregor，p. 53）；MPPölitz（Ak

Original · #130

28:272); MP Dohna (Ak 28:687).

Translation

28:272）；MP Dohna（Ak 28:687）。

Original · #131

6^3 Kr.d. U. (Ak 5:394; Bernard, p. 242).

Translation

6^3 Kr.d.U.（Ak 5:394；Bernard，第242页）。

Original · #132

6^4 M.A.d.N. (Ak 4:543; Ellington, p. 104).

Translation

6^4 M.A.d.N.（Ak 4:543；Ellington，第104页）。

Original · #133

1^8 Steve Naragon

Translation

1^8 史蒂夫·纳拉贡

Original · #134

But still one might think that life could emerge from lifeless matter; and indeed, Kant suggests this possibility in a famous passage from §80 of the Critique of Judgment: "The agreement of so many genera of animals in a certain common schema .. allows a ray of hope ... that here something may be accomplished by the aid of the principle of the mechanism of nature (without which there can be no natural science in general). This analogy of forms ... strengthens our suspicions of an actual relationship between them in their production from a common parent..., i. e. from man, down to the polyp, and again from this down to mosses and lichens, and finally to the lowest stage of nature noticeable by us, viz. to crude matter. And so the whole technique of nature ... seems to be derived from matter and its powers according to mechanical laws (like those by which it works in the formation of crystals)".^67 Other passages from the Critique of Judgment indicate, however, that Kant did not believe that life could be thought to emerge from mere matter; only organized matter, i. e. matter with certain dispositions to combine and act in certain ways, could give rise to living organisms: "In all physical explanations of these formations, [Blumenbach] starts from organized matter. That crude [i.e. unorganized] matter should have originally formed itself according to mechanical laws, that life should have sprung from the nature of what is lifeless, that matter should have been able to dispose itself into the form of a self-maintaining purposiveness - this he rightly declares to be contradictory to reason.^68 Finally, if life cannot emerge from mere matter (requiring instead an immaterial principle), then the existence of immaterial beings gains plausibility. Twenty years before the publication of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant had similarly argued for the inertness of matter, tying this to the belief in immaterial beings.

Translation

不过，人们仍可能认为，生命能够从无生命的质料中产生出来；事实上，康德在《判断力批判》第80节一段著名文字中确实暗示了这种可能性：“如此众多动物属在某种共同图式上的一致……带来一线希望……也许能借助自然机械作用原理（没有这一原理，根本就不会有一般意义上的自然科学）在此有所成就。形式的这种类比……加强了我们的猜测：它们在由一个共同亲本产生时，彼此之间存在某种现实的亲缘关系……也就是说，从人一直到水螅，再由此到苔藓和地衣，最后到我们所能注意到的自然的最低阶段，即粗陋的质料。因此，自然的全部技艺……似乎都是按照机械法则（正如它在晶体形成时起作用的那种法则）从质料及其各种能力中派生出来的。”^67 然而，《判断力批判》中的其他段落却表明，康德并不认为生命可以被设想为从单纯的质料中产生；只有有组织的质料，即具有以某些方式结合和活动的特定禀赋的质料，才能产生出生命有机体：“在对这些形成物的一切物理学说明中，[布卢门巴赫]都从有组织的质料出发。粗陋的[即无组织的]质料竟然能原初地依照机械法则自行形成，生命竟然能从无生命之物的本性中产生，质料竟然能将自身组织成一种自我维持的合目的性的形式——他正当地宣称这些都是与理性相矛盾的。^68” 最后，如果生命不能从单纯的质料中产生（而是需要某种非物质的原则），那么非物质存在的存在就获得了更大可信性。在《自然科学的形而上学基础》出版前二十年，康德就曾以类似方式论证质料的惰性，并将此与对非物质存在的信念联系起来。

Original · #135

He wrote in Dreams of a Spirit Seer (1766) that "the characteristics of dead matter which fills the universe are stability and inertia; it further possesses solidity, expansion, and form... But let us direct our attention to the kind of beings which contain the cause of life in the universe - those which therefore neither add to the mass and extent of lifeless matter..., but which by inner activity move themselves and dead matter as well - and we shall find ourselves convinced ... that immaterial beings exist".^69 While Kant and Descartes agreed that there were immaterial beings or souls, Kant attributed souls even to the brutes. Since life could not be materially grounded, Kant found himself returning to a view similar to Aristotle's in that an immaterial principle was necessary for any living being, and not just humans. What is more, Kant suggested that these animal souls might be immortal, passing into the afterworld upon the dissolution of the creature's body where they might further serve the souls of departed Kant on Descartes and the Brutes 19 humans.^70 Although this was mere speculation on Kant's part, it is a view suggested by the irreducibility of living organisms to material terms. As a consequence, while it initially appeared that Kant should have accepted the Cartesian hypothesis of animalmachines, it now appears that Kant was in total opposition to Descartes on the nature and destiny of the brutes.71

Translation

他在《一位通灵者的梦》（1766）中写道：“充满宇宙的死质料，其特征是稳定与惰性；此外，它还具有坚实性、广延和形式……但是，让我们把注意力转向这样一类存在：它们自身包含着宇宙中生命的原因——因此，它们既不增加无生命质料的总量和广延……却凭借内在活动推动自身，也推动死质料——那么我们就会确信……非物质的存在确实存在。”^69 虽然康德和笛卡尔都承认有非物质的存在者或灵魂，康德却甚至把灵魂归于禽兽。由于生命不可能在物质上得到根据，康德于是回到了一个与亚里士多德相近的观点：对于任何生物，而不仅仅是人，都有必要设定一种非物质的原则。更进一步，康德还提出，这些动物的灵魂也许是不朽的；当动物身体解体之后，它们会进入来世，在那里继续侍奉已故人类的灵魂。^70 尽管这不过是康德本人的一种推测，但这种看法乃是由如下观点所提示的：活的有机体不能被还原为物质性的规定。因此，虽然起初看起来康德本应接受笛卡尔关于动物机器的假说，但现在看来，在禽兽的本性与命运问题上，康德与笛卡尔完全对立。^71

Original · #136

VII. Material vs. ideal determinism

Translation

七、物质决定论 versus 观念决定论

Original · #137

Kant nevertheless did not ascribe non-determination or free behavior to brutes for that would result in their being moral agents, which was probably unthinkable for Kant. Fortunately, there was an alternative to Cartesian mechanism, namely, Leibniz's "spiritual determinism": "All necessary events in time according to natural law can be called the 'mechanism of nature' ... whether the subject in which this evolution occurs be called automaton materiale when the machine is impelled by matter, or, with Leibniz, automaton spirituale when it is impelled by ideas. And if the freedom of our will were nothing else than the latter, i. e. psychological and comparative and not at the same time also transcendental or absolute, it would in essence be no better than the freedom of a turnspit which when once wound up also carries out its motions of itself.72 - "When the dog is served-up meat, motions set in action... With animals ...

Translation

尽管如此，康德并没有把非规定性或自由行为归于禽兽——因为那样一来，它们就会成为道德行动者，而这（可能）对康德而言是不可想象的。幸运的是，在笛卡尔式机械论之外，尚有一种替代方案，即莱布尼茨的“精神决定论”：“凡按照自然法则在时间中必然发生的一切事件，均可称为‘自然的机械作用’……无论此演进发生于何者之中，若机器由质料推动，则称其为 automaton materiale（物质自动机）；或如莱布尼茨所言，若它由观念推动，则称其为 automaton spirituale（精神自动机）。倘若我们的意志自由无非就是后者——亦即仅是一种心理学的、相对的自由，而并非同时是超验的或绝对的自由——那么它在本质上与一个烤肉转叉的自由并无二致；后者一旦上紧发条，也会自行运转。72 ——‘当肉端给狗时，运动便被激发……对动物而言……’” }</think>```json1234567891011121314151617181920212223```json124124124124124124124124124124124124124124124124124124124124124124124124124{124

Original · #138

7^0 See MP Herder (Ak 28:116-17), MP Mrongovius (Ak 29:906-7), MP Dohna (Ak 28:690).

Translation

7^0 可参见《形而上学讲座》Herder版（Ak 28:116–17）、《形而上学讲座》Mrongovius版（Ak 29:906–7）以及《形而上学讲座》Dohna版（Ak 28:690）。

Original · #139

7^1 Kant's doctrine of inert matter motivates a functionalist reading of these "immaterial princip-

Translation

7^1 康德关于惰性质料的学说，促使我们对这些“非物质的原则做出一种功能主义的解读。

Original · #140

les", for if all living organisms have such a principle, but none have noumenal agency save for humans (if they even do), then we are left with interpreting this immateriality as part of the phenomenal world — and the likeliest interpretation is that it is merely a functional feature of that world (on this see Timothy Lenoir, Kant, Blumenbach, and Vital Materialism in German Biology, in Isis, 71:77-108, 1980, and his discussion of vital materialism and functionalism in The Strategy of Life, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1982). - Such an account seems required for the brutes, given their determined behavior, and is also a plausible account of the place of human mentality in Kant's system, given his belief that human reason was understandable apart from any noumenal agency as the property of a merely phenomenal being. See, for example, his references to the eventual emergence of reason within the human species out of a prior instinctive animality: the Review of Moscati (Ak 2:422-25), Anth. (Ak 7:327n; Gregor, p. 188), Colleg. Anth.70s (Ak 15:645^6), Refl.Anth. (Ak 15:555, 604, 616, 645), Kr.d.p.V. (Ak 5:61; Beck, p.63), Tugendlehre (Ak 6:433-34, 438n; Gregor, pp.99, 104n), Geschichte (Ak 8:25; Humphrey, p. 35), and Mutmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte, 17^86 (Ak 8:25; translated by Ted Humphrey as Speculative Beginnings of Human History, in Perpetual Peace and other Essays, p. 53). There is, of course, a problem with reason not belonging to the phenomenal world, since "thinking involves a reflection which can itself only happen in time" (Das Ende aller Dinge, 1794, Ak 8:333, translated by Ted Humphrey as The End of All Things, in Perpetual Peace and other Essays, p. 98).

Translation

……原则”，因为如果一切生物都具有这样一种原则，而除了人类之外没有任何存在具有本体界的能动性（即便人类是否真的具有这种能动性，也仍成问题），那么我们就只能把这种非物质性理解为现象世界的一部分——而最可能的解释是，它不过只是这个世界的一种功能性特征（关于这一点，参见 Timothy Lenoir, “Kant, Blumenbach, and Vital Materialism in German Biology,” Isis, 71:77-108, 1980，以及他在 The Strategy of Life, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1982 中对生命唯物论与功能主义的讨论）。——鉴于动物的行为是被决定的，这样一种说明对于畜类而言似乎是必要的；而且，鉴于康德相信，人的理性即使撇开任何本体界的能动性，也可以被理解为一个仅仅属于现象界的存在的属性，因此这也完全可以被看作是对人在康德体系中精神位置的一种可信说明。例如，他曾多次提及，理性最终是在人类物种内部，从一种先前受本能支配的动物性中产生出来的（参见 Review of Moscati (Ak 2:422-25), Anth. (Ak 7:327n; Gregor, p. 188), Colleg. Anth.70s (Ak 15:645^6), Refl. Anth. (Ak 15:555, 604, 616, 645), Kr. d. p. V. (Ak 5:61; Beck, p. 63), Tugendlehre (Ak 6:433-34, 438n; Gregor, pp. 99, 104n), Geschichte (Ak 8:25; Humphrey, p. 35), 以及 Mutmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte, 1786 (Ak 8:25；Ted Humphrey 英译为 “Speculative Beginnings of Human History,” 载 Perpetual Peace and other Essays, p. 53)。当然，理性不属于现象世界，这会产生一个难题，因为“思维包含一种反思，而这种反思本身只能在时间中发生”(Das Ende aller Dinge, 1794, Ak 8:333；Ted Humphrey 英译为 “The End of All Things,” 载 Perpetual Peace and other Essays, p. 98)。

Original · #141

2^0 Steve Naragon

Translation

2^0 史蒂夫·纳拉贡

Original · #142

this is an external necessity as in machines: thus are they called spiritual automata. But with humans, the chain of determining causes is cut in every case.. ,"^73 These passages suggest a reconciliation of Kant's attributing both mentality and determinism to the workings of brutes: Kant views brutes as turnspits but, with Leibniz, as spiritual turnspits, not as the material machines of Descartes' hypothesis.

Translation

这是一种外在的必然性，就像机器中的情况一样；因此，它们被称为“精神自动机”。但是对于人类而言，决定性原因的链条在每一种情形下都会被切断。（……^73）这些段落表明，康德既把心灵性（mentality）也把决定论归于动物的运作，这两者是能够协调的：康德将动物视作转烤叉机，但依照莱布尼茨的观点，它们是精神性的转烤叉机，而非笛卡尔假说中的物质机器。

Original · #143

Kant unequivocally denied brutes any chance of transcendental freedom, making them some sort of turnspit - and his rejection of Descartes' materialism leaves them with the only alternative of being turnspits of the spiritual variety.

Translation

康德明确否认动物具有任何先验自由的可能，这就使它们成了某种意义上的“烤肉转叉”；而他对笛卡尔唯物主义的拒斥，又只给它们留下了唯一的另一种可能：成为精神性的“烤肉转叉”。

Original · #144

Kant's position is further developed in the lecture notes on metaphysics written rational psychology wherein he discussed the topic of animal souls and Descartes' rejection of such: "Can life be a property of matter? Animals are wholly lacking in consciousness; their conduct occurs according to laws of imagination, which nature has laid within them — by analogy. That principle, which guides the animal as analogon rationis, is called instinct, the faculty to carry-out actions without consciousness, for which humans require consciousness... Descartes and Malebranche wanted to deny animals of souls, the latter from theological grounds (why should they suffer?, they have committed no offence, &c.); but this is a weak argument. It is clear that we do not need to attribute understanding to animals for they practice without instruction, nature having laid within them the drive. The subject of representation in each living being is something different from matter, and animals have souls.. ,"^74 The second paragraph is especially revealing. Note that immediately after rejecting Descartes' and Malebranche's position, Kant claims that it is not necessary to attribute understanding to the brutes on his own view. This is a legitimate worry, for it might appear that attributing souls to brutes would involve attributing cognitive faculties like the understanding as well; Kant wanted to make clear that this was not the case, and offers some reasons why a besouled creature need not have an understanding. He then makes the claim that the subject of representations "in each living being is something different from matter".

Translation

康德的立场在其论及理性心理学的《形而上学》讲义笔记中得到了进一步展开；在那里，他讨论了动物灵魂的问题以及笛卡尔对它的否认：“生命能够是质料的一种属性吗？动物完全没有意识；它们的行为是按照想象力的法则发生的，而自然以类比的方式将这些法则置入它们之中。那个作为 analogon rationis 引导动物的原则，被称为本能；本能是一种无需意识便能完成行动的能力，而人类在这种行动中则需要意识……笛卡尔和马勒伯朗士都想否认动物有灵魂；后者是出于神学上的根据（它们为什么要受苦？它们并未犯下任何罪过，等等）；但这是一个薄弱的论证。显然，我们并不需要把知性赋予动物，因为它们无需教导便能行动，自然已将这种驱力置入它们之中。每个有生命之物中的表象主体，都是某种不同于质料的东西，而动物是有灵魂的……”^74 第二段尤其发人深省。请注意，康德在驳斥笛卡尔和马勒伯朗士的立场之后，紧接着就声称，按照他自己的看法，并没有必要把知性赋予禽兽。这种担忧是合理的，因为乍看之下，把灵魂归于禽兽，似乎也就意味着要把知性之类的认知能力一并归于它们；康德希望明确表明，事实并非如此，并且给出了一些理由，说明一个有灵魂的造物并不一定拥有知性。随后他又主张，表象的主体“在每一个有生命之物中，都是某种不同于质料的东西”。

Original · #145

This is apparently equivalent to his rejecting certain physiological projects such as those involving Descartes' doctrine of "material ideas";75 for Kant believed that our sciences are inadequate to the task of giving such physiological explanations. These representations determine (i. e. necessitate) the behavior of the brutes, but they are not to be considered as material; the determinism that Kant is here affirming must therefore be of the Leibnizian variety. Brutes are spiritual, not material, turnspits. Kant on Descartes and the Brutes 21

Translation

这等于明确表明，他拒绝某些生理学方案，例如那些涉及笛卡尔‘物质观念’学说的方案；75因为康德认为，我们现有科学的水平不足以胜任对此类现象作出生理学解释的任务。这些表象决定（即促使必然发生）着动物的行为，但它们不应被视为物质性的；因此，康德在这里所主张的决定论，必定属于莱布尼茨式的变种。动物是精神性的而非物质性的转叉。康德论笛卡尔与动物 21

Original · #146

VIII. Mechanical and teleological explanation

Translation

八、机械论解释与目的论解释

Original · #147

A final reconciliation of Kant's determinism with his rejection of Descartes' animalmachine hypothesis is found in his views on explanation in the life sciences. Much can and has been said on this score;^76 I wish merely to note what should by now be obvious, given the above. While Descartes believed that all natural events were amenable to mechanical explanations, Kant felt that teleological explanations were necessary for human inquirers, given the complexity of the mechanical nexus in the phenomenal world.

Translation

康德的决定论与他对笛卡尔“动物机器”假说之拒斥，最终可在其生命科学中的解释观上达成调和。关于此点，已有许多讨论，也确实还可以说得更多；^76 我在此只想指出，鉴于上文所述，有一点如今应该已很明显：笛卡尔相信，一切自然事件皆可诉诸机械解释；而康德则认为，鉴于现象世界中机械因果关联的复杂性，对人类探究者而言，目的论解释是必要的。

Original · #148

Both Descartes and Kant accepted these two separate modes of explanation;77 to explain an event for either of them was to describe the conditions sufficient for bringing about the event, and this was expressed in terms of causality.^78 But they differed in the status and scope they ascribed to each kind of causality. Kant's view of the status of non-mechanical causality was rather more guarded than Descartes': the most that Kant wished to claim was that "causality through freedom is at least not incompatible with nature".^79 But the scope of explanation that Kant ascribed to this "causality through freedom" was considerably wider than Descartes had allowed: while Descartes appealed to non-mechanical causation to explain only a fraction of human actions (explaining the rest of nature mechanically), Kant's appeal ranged across the entirety of organic nature.

Translation

笛卡尔与康德都接受了这两种彼此分离的解释方式。^77 对于他们中的任何一位来说，解释一个事件，就是描述足以使该事件发生的条件，而这种描述都是用因果性概念来表达的。^78 然而，他们赋予每一种因果性的地位与适用范围却有所不同。康德对非机械因果性地位的看法，要比笛卡尔谨慎得多：至多，康德只愿主张“借由自由的因果性至少与自然并不相抵触”。^79 但是，康德赋予这种“借由自由的因果性”的解释范围，却远较笛卡尔所允许的更广：笛卡尔诉诸非机械的因果作用，仅用来解释一小部分人类行动（自然界的其余部分，他都用机械来解释），而康德的诉求则遍及整个有机自然界。

Original · #149

Like Descartes, Kant favored mechanical explanation, but he did not think that our limited intellects were capable of providing this in the organic realm: "The privilege of aiming at a merely mechanical method or explanation of all natural products is in itself quite unlimited, but the faculty of attaining thereto is by the constitution of our understanding, so far as it has to do with things as natural purposes, not only very much limited but also clearly bounded. [...] It is therefore rational, even meritorious, to

Translation

和笛卡尔一样，康德也偏好机械论的解释；但他并不认为，我们有限的知性有能力在有机体领域提供这种解释：“以纯然机械的方法或解释来说明一切自然产物，这种权利本身是全然不受限制的；但根据我们知性的架构，当它所涉及的是作为自然目的的事物时，达到这一目标的能力不仅非常有限，而且有着清晰的边界。……因此，去

Original · #150

7^6 See Clark Zumbach, The Transcendent Science: Kant's Conception of Biological Methodology,

Translation

7^6 见克拉克·宗巴赫：《先验科学：康德的生物学方法论概念》，

Original · #151

The Hague: Nijhoff, 1984; Robert Butts, Kant and the Double Government Methodology, Boston: D.Reidel, 1984, esp.ch.9.

Translation

海牙：Nijhoff，1984年；Robert Butts，《Kant and the Double Government Methodology》，波士顿：D. Reidel，1984年，尤见第9章。

Original · #152

7^7 But for Kant these modes were not of equal status, for mechanical causality enjoys a grounding

Translation

7^7 但对康德而言，这些方式的地位并不相同的，因为机械因果性有其根据。

Original · #153

in the phenomenal world (as argued in the "Second Analogy" of Kr. d. r. V.) which teleological causality does not. See Kr. d. U., §65: mechanical causality is considered real (viz. a product of the understanding, and as such an objective aspect of the phenomenal realm), whereas teleological causality is merely ideal (viz. a product of reason, employed regulatively to comprehend the existence and maintenance of organized beings) (Ak 5:372-73; Bernard, p. 219). This difference is indicated at Kr. d. £/., $ 61: "The teleological act of judgment is rightly brought to bear ... upon the investigation of nature, but only in order to bring it under principles of observation and inquiry .. without any pretense to explain it thereby. It belongs therefore to the reflective and not to the determinant judgment" (Ak 5:360; Bernard, p. 206).

Translation

在现象世界中（正如《纯粹理性批判》“第二类比”所论证的那样），机械因果性是成立的，而目的论因果性则不成立。参见《判断力批判》§65：机械因果性被视为实在的（即知性的产物，并且作为现象领域的一个客观方面）；而目的论因果性则仅仅是观念性的（即理性的产物，其规约性地用于理解有机存在者的存在及其维持）（Ak 5:372-73；Bernard，第219页）。这一差异在《判断力批判》§61中已有指出：“目的论的判断活动被正当地运用于……对自然的研究，但这只是为了使其服从于观察和探究的原则……而并不因此声称自己能据此解释自然。因此，它属于反思判断，而非规定判断”（Ak 5:360；Bernard，第206页）。

Original · #154

2^2 Steve Naragon

Translation

2^2 史蒂夫·纳拉贡

Original · #155

pursue natural mechanism ... as far as can be done with probability.^80 In an oftenquoted passage from § 76 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant wrote that "we cannot adequately cognize, much less explain, organized beings and their internal possibility according to mere mechanical principles of nature, and we can say boldly ... that it is absurd for men to make any such attempt, or to hope that another Newton will arise in the future who shall make comprehensible to us the production of even a blade of grass according to natural laws which no design has ordered".^81 Matter's inertness or lifelessness, its purely external and mechanical nature, that is to say, its lack of any inner principle of action, precludes a material grounding or explanation of any organized being. In a discussion of "purpose in nature" Kant contrasts the moving power (bewegende Kraft) of a machine with the formative power (bildende Kraft) of organized beings: "In a watch, one part is the instrument for moving the other parts, but the wheel is not the effective cause of the production of others... A watch wheel does not produce other wheels; still less does one watch produce other watches, utilizing (organizing) foreign material for that purpose... An organized being is then not a mere machine, for that has merely moving power, but it possesses in itself formative power of a self-propagating kind which it communicates to its materials ... it organizes them, and this cannot be explained by the mere mechanical faculty of motion".^82 Mechanical grounds of such features of the living world as reproduction, growth, and self-maintenance "can certainly be thought without contradiction, but cannot be comprehended [begriffen]".^83 This passage suggests what I take to be Kant's mature position on the animal-machine hypothesis: brutes can be thought of as machines and according to the universal causality of the phenomenal world they are machines, but they cannot be comprehended or understood as machines, and consequently, as a scientific (as opposed to a metaphysical) doctrine, Descartes' hypothesis is worthless.

Translation

探究自然机制……应尽可能推进到或然性所允许的限度。^80 在《判断力批判》第76节一段常被引述的话中，康德写道：“我们不能仅凭自然的机械原则，就充分认识有机存在者及其内在的可能性，更不用说加以解释；而且我们还可以大胆地说……人若作此尝试，或希望将来会出现另一位牛顿，向我们说明哪怕一根草叶如何依照并非由任何设计所安排的自然法则而产生，那都是荒谬的。”^81 质料的惰性或无生命性，即其纯然外在的、机械的本性——换言之，它缺乏任何内在的行动原则——排除了对任何有机存在者作出质料性的根据说明或解释的可能。在讨论“自然中的目的”时，康德将机器的运动力（bewegende Kraft）与有机存在者的形成力（bildende Kraft）对举：“在钟表中，一个部分是推动其他部分的工具，但轮子并不是其他部分得以产生的有效原因……钟表的一个轮子并不产生其他轮子；更不用说一只钟表会为了这一目的而利用（组织）外来的材料去生产其他钟表……因此，有机存在者并不只是一架机器，因为机器只有运动力；相反，它自身具有一种能够自我繁殖的形成力，并把这种力量传递给其质料……它组织这些质料，而这并不能仅凭机械性的运动能力来解释。”^82 至于生命世界中繁殖、生长和自我维持这类特征，其机械根据“当然可以被无矛盾地思维，但却不能被把握[begriffen]”。^83 这段话揭示了我所理解的康德关于动物—机器假说的成熟立场：兽类可以被思维为机器，并且根据现象世界的普遍因果性，它们也确实是机器；但是，它们不能被作为机器来把握或理解，因此，作为一种科学学说（区别于形而上学学说），笛卡尔的假说是毫无价值的。

Original · #156

IX. Summary

Translation

九、总结

Original · #157

Given Kant's central doctrine that everything within the phenomenal world is enmeshed within the nexus of natural causation, and given his belief that brutes lack noumenal agency or anything that might remove them in some sense from this web, then it appears that his view of brutes should be similar to Descartes'. Kant also denies (at least some form of) consciousness to brutes, and he often wrote of the mechanical Kant on Descartes and the Brutes 23 nature of animality. That Kant nevertheless rejects Descartes' animal-machine hypothesis leaves us with the problem of reconciling this rejection with his beliefs about phenomenal causality and the brute's lack of noumenal agency.

Translation

鉴于康德的这一核心学说——现象世界中的一切都被纳入自然因果性的关联之中，再加上他相信禽兽并不具有物自身层面的能动性，也不具有任何可能在某种意义上使它们脱离这一网络的东西，那么他对禽兽的看法似乎就应与笛卡尔相近。康德还否认禽兽具有意识——至少是某种形式的意识——他也经常论及动物性的机械性质。然而，康德终究拒绝了笛卡尔的动物-机器假说；这就给我们留下了一个问题：如何将这一拒绝与他关于现象因果性的信念，以及禽兽缺乏物自身能动性的信念协调起来。

Original · #158

Kant believed that brutes had representations of the world, and this was incompatible with their being material machines. Related to this is Kant's concept of matter as inert, which requires that any living being possess an immaterial principle (which, presumably, is what also underlies the brute's representational capacity). Yet Kant could not allow that brutes were in some way not determined (i. e. that they were noumenally free), and so attributed to them a "spiritual determinism". Having suggested how Kant avoided Descartes' mechanism, I note Kant's heuristic point that the animal-machine hypothesis was in any event useless for scientific inquiry, insofar as mechanical explanations of the biological world are beyond our human abilities. Kant's rejection of Descartes' hypothesis was thus far-reaching, as well as consistent with certain other of his views concerning brutes and nature.

Translation

康德认为，禽兽对世界具有表象，而这与它们是质料性的机器并不相容。与此相关的是，康德将质料理解为惰性的；既然如此，任何生命体都必须具有一种非物质的原则（而禽兽的表象能力，大概也是以此为基础）。然而，康德又不能容许禽兽在某种意义上不受决定（即具有本体性的自由），因此便将一种“精神的决定论”归于它们。在说明康德如何避免落入笛卡尔的机械论之后，我进一步指出，康德还有一个启发式的看法：无论如何，动物—机器假说对于科学探究都是无用的，因为对生物世界作出机械解释，超出了我们人类的能力。因而，康德对笛卡尔这一假说的拒斥，不仅影响深远，而且也与他关于禽兽和自然的其他某些观点相一致。

Original · #159

2 See, for instance, Descartes' comment in a reply to Arnauld: "all the actions of brutes resemble only those of ours that occur without the aid of the mind" (The Philosophical Works of Descartes, translated by Haldane and Ross, 2 vol., Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1968, ii. 104).

Translation

2 例如，可参见笛卡尔在答复阿尔诺时的一段评论：“动物的一切行为，都只与我们那些不借助心灵而发生的行为相似。”（《笛卡尔哲学著作》，霍尔丹与罗斯译，2卷本，剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1968年，第2卷，第104页）

Original · #160

4 MP Herder (Ak 28:116). This is one of the few passages where the "problem of other minds" is hinted at, and Kant's sympathy is clearly with an analogical argument from overt behavior. That he takes the analogy so much farther in this lecture than in more reliable works suggests that we have here more polemic than indication of Kant's true sentiments (if not merely Herder's own view at the time). Kant nowhere else, for instance, ever allows that brutes can think; thought is a product of the faculty of the understanding, which Kant denies the brutes. On the question of other minds, see also the section on egoism in Anth. (Ak 7:128—31; Gregor, pp. 10-13).

Translation

4 MP Herder（Ak 28:116）。这是少数几个隐约涉及“他心问题”的段落之一，且康德显然更倾向于一种基于外显行为的类比论证。他在这次讲座中推演类比的程度远超那些更可靠的著作，这表明我们面对的更可能是论战性表述，而非康德真实观点的流露（即便不算作赫尔德本人当时的看法）。比如，康德在其他地方从未承认禽兽能够思维；思维是知性能力的产物，而康德否认禽兽拥有这种能力。关于他心问题，另可参阅《人类学》中论自我主义的一节（Ak 7:128—31；Gregor，第10—13页）。

Original · #161

5 Träume (Ak 2:330; Goerwitz, p. 57).

Translation

5 Träume（Ak 2:330；Goerwitz，第57页）。

Original · #162

6 Träume (Ak 2:331; Goerwitz, p. 58-59).

Translation

6 梦（Ak 2:331；Goerwitz，第58—59页）。

Original · #163

7 Kr.d. U. (Ak 5:464n; Bernard, pp. 315-16n).

Translation

7 《判断力批判》（Ak 5:464n；Bernard，第315—316页注）。

Original · #164

1^1 Handschriftlicher Nachlaß: Logik (Ak 16:7).

Translation

1^1《手稿遗稿：逻辑学》（Ak 16:7）。

Original · #165

1^2 MP Herder (Ak 28:117). On the inconceivability of non-human thinkers, see also Anth. (Ak 7:172; Gregor, p. 48): "It is noteworthy that the only form we can think of as most suitable for a rational being is the human form"; and see Kr. d. r. V. B 409.

Translation

1^2 MP Herder（Ak 28:117）。关于非人类思维者的不可设想性，另可参见《人类学》（Anth.，Ak 7:172；Gregor，第48页）：“值得注意的是，在我们所能设想的各种形式中，唯一最适合理性存在的，就是人的形式”；另见《纯粹理性批判》（Kr. d. r. V.）B 409。

Original · #166

1^7 Karl Ameriks, Kant and Guyer on Apperception, in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 65:174-8^6 (1983), esp. pp. 185-86, and his Kant's Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument, Kant-Studien, 69:273-8^7 (1978).

Translation

1^7 卡尔·阿梅里克斯（Karl Ameriks），〈康德与盖耶论统觉〉，载《哲学史档案》（Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie）65：174-86（1983），尤其见185—86页；以及其〈作为一种回溯论证的康德先验演绎〉，载《康德研究》（Kant-Studien）69：273-87（1978）。

Original · #167

1^8 For the claim that Kant does answer this affirmatively, see Paton, Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1936, i.461. Kitcher seems to imply that having representations is equivalent to being conscious, but she also says that "to be enjoying conscious experience ... one must be making judgments" (Kant's Real Self, p. 139). Kitcher later notes that there are two different senses of 'consciousness* in Kant's writings - one for brutes and one for humans, the difference turning on the ability to form judgments - but she still insists that having a representation implies being self-conscious (ibid., p. 143).

Translation

1^8 主张康德对此问题给出肯定回答的观点，参见 Paton, Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1936, i.461。基切尔似乎暗示拥有表象就等同于拥有意识；但她又说：“要有有意识的经验……就必须做出判断”（Kant's Real Self, p. 139）。基切尔后来指出，康德著作中的“意识”有两种不同含义——一种适用于动物，另一种适用于人类，其差异在于是否具备形成判断的能力——但她仍然坚持认为，拥有表象就意味着具有自我意识（ibid., p. 143）。

Original · #168

1^9 MP Herder (Ak 28:99); see also ibid. (Ak 28:72, 83, 89, 92, 97, 105, 873, 878).

Translation

1^9 MP Herder (Ak 28:99)；另参见同书 (Ak 28:72, 83, 89, 92, 97, 105, 873, 878)。

Original · #169

2^0 Syllogism (Ak 2:60n; Abbott, p. 94n).

Translation

2^0 三段论（Ak 2:60n；Abbott，第94页注）。

Original · #170

2^1 Phil. En. (Ak 29:44-^5). This passage appears well-suited for answering Paton's remark that he knows of no passages wherein Kant denies consciousness in brutes; see Paton, Kant's Metaphysics, i. 334.

Translation

2^1《哲学百科全书》（Ak 29:44–45）。这段文字似乎很适合用来回应帕顿的如下评论：据他所知，康德并未在任何文本中否认动物具有意识；参见 Paton, Kant's Metaphysics, i. 334。

Original · #171

2^2 MP Pölitz (Ak 28:277); see also Ak 28:594 and MP Volckmann (Ak 28:449-50).

Translation

2^2 MP Pölitz（Ak 28:277）；另见 Ak 28:594 以及 MP Volckmann（Ak 28:449–50）。

Original · #172

2^5 MP Dohna (Ak 28:689-90).

Translation

2^5 MP Dohna（Ak 28:689-90）。

Original · #173

2^6 MP Pölitz (Ak 28:227).

Translation

2^6 MP Pölitz (Ak 28:227)。

Original · #174

2^7 Guyer, Kant on Apperception, pp. 209-1 On. Kant notes in this passage from the Anth. (Ak 7:135—37; Gregor, pp. 16—18) that brutes also have obscure representations.

Translation

2^7 Guyer，《康德论统觉》，第209—210页。康德在《人类学》的这段文字中指出（Ak 7:135—37；Gregor，第16—18页），动物也有模糊的表象。

Original · #175

2^8 Vladimir Satura, Kants Erkenntnispsychologie, vol.101 of the Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte, Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1971, pp. 55—64. Satura offers a host of passages on obscure representations from MP Pölitz, Menschenkunde, Refl.Anth., MP Dohna, Logik, and

Translation

2^8 Vladimir Satura, Kants Erkenntnispsychologie, 收录于 Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte 丛书第101卷，波恩：Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1971, 页 55–64。Satura 从 MP Pölitz、Menschenkunde、Refl. Anth.、MP Dohna、Logik 及……中，汇集了大量关于模糊表象的段落。

Original · #176

376-77, and in MP Herder (Ak 28:74) we read that "there can be beings with representations but without feelings". I should note that Kant elsewhere denies brutes the ability to discern that which is similar between two objects: see his helpful discussion of this in Syllogism, as partly quoted earlier in this section. In short, Kant denies brutes the ability to form judgments, for which see also: MP Herder (Ak 28:66-67, 78-79, 88, 857), Deutlichkeit (Ak 2:285; Walford, p. 16), Colleg. Anth.70s (Ak 15:713), Refl.Anth. (Ak 15:161-62). For a general discussion of this, see Chapter Six of the author's dissertation Reason and Animals: Descartes, Kant, and Mead on the Place of Humans in Nature, University of Notre Dame, 1987.

Translation

在第376—377页以及《MP Herder》（Ak 28:74）中，我们读到：“可能有这样一种‘存在’（beings）：它们拥有‘表象’（representations），却没有感觉。”我还应指出，康德在别处否认动物（brutes）具有辨识两个对象之间相似之处的能力；关于这一点，可参见他在《Syllogism》中的一段很有帮助的讨论，本节前面已部分引述。简言之，康德否认动物具有形成‘判断’（judgments）的能力；相关文本还可参见：《MP Herder》（Ak 28:66–67, 78–79, 88, 857）、《Deutlichkeit》（Ak 2:285；Walford, p. 16）、《Colleg. Anth.70s》（Ak 15:713）、《Refl.Anth.》（Ak 15:161–62）。关于这一问题的一般性讨论，可参见作者的博士论文《理性与动物：笛卡尔、康德及米德论人类在自然中的位置》第六章，圣母大学，1987年。

Original · #177

3^1 Kant's Philosophical Correspondence 1759-1799, edited and translated by A. Zweig, Chicago: Chicago U. P., 1967, p. 154. Paton cites both of these passages as supporting his view that Kant believed brutes to be conscious. Most of what he cites, however, only refer to brutes having representations, rather than being explicit statements of their consciousness. For these passages see §3 (above) and Paton, Kant's Metaphysics, i. 332-35.

Translation

3^1《康德哲学书信集，1759—1799》，A. Zweig 编译，芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1967年，第154页。Paton 援引这两段文字，认为它们支持他的观点，即康德相信动物具有意识。然而，他所援引的大部分材料实际上只是谈到动物具有表象，并非对其意识的明确断言。关于这些段落，见上文第3节及 Paton, Kant's Metaphysics, i. 332—35。

Original · #178

3^2 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, 4th ed., Halle: Karl Hermann, 1757.

Translation

3^2 亚历山大·戈特利布·鲍姆加登，第4版，哈勒：卡尔·赫尔曼，1757年。

Original · #179

3^3 MP Herder (Ak 28:945).

Translation

3^3 MP Herder（Ak 28:945）。

Original · #180

3^9 MP Herder (Ak 28:117).

Translation

3^9 见《形而上学·赫尔德》（Ak 28:117）。

Original · #181

4^0 MP Pölitz (Ak 28:227).

Translation

4^0 MP Pölitz (Ak 28:227)。

Original · #182

4^1 Syllogism (Ak 2:60; Abbott, p. 94). See also MP Herder (Ak 28:79): "The brute has different representations according to different emotions: different actions; but not explained through differentiation - it does not have the inner sense for representing its status reprasentationis"

Translation

4^1 三段论（Ak 2:60；Abbott，第94页）。另见《赫尔德讲授的形而上学》（MP Herder，Ak 28:79）：“动物会因不同的情绪而具有不同的表象，从而有不同的行动；但这并不能通过区分来解释——它并没有一种内感，能够表象其 status reprasentationis（表象状态）。”

Original · #183

4^7 Colleg.Anth. 70s (Ak 15:661). For other discussions of the lack of happiness in brutes, see MP Herder (Ak 28:117): "Animals are not capable of happiness, for this depends upon consciousness ..."; and Colleg.Anth. 80s (Ak 15:859): "Happiness, of which the animals know nothing, arises not from the tendency towards sensuousness, but from the principles of reason." See also Leibniz' remark in his Theodicee, §250: "perception is not sufficient to cause misery if it is not accompanied by reflection. It is the same with happiness: without reflection, there is none" (Huggard transl, pp. 280-81).

Translation

4^7 Colleg.Anth. 70年代（Ak 15：661）。关于动物（brutes）不具备幸福的其他讨论，见MP Herder（Ak 28：117）：“动物没有获得幸福的能力，因为幸福取决于意识……”；以及Colleg.Anth. 80年代（Ak 15：859）：“幸福——动物对此一无所知——并非产生于趋向感性（sensuousness），而是来自理性的原则。”另见莱布尼茨《神义论》第250节中的论述：“若不伴随反思，知觉（perception）不足以造成（cause）痛苦。幸福同样如此：没有反思，就没有幸福”（Huggard译本，第280—81页）。

Original · #184

4^8 "Reply to the Sixth Set of Objections" in Haldane and Ross, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, ii.251.

Translation

4^8 见 Haldane 和 Ross 编《笛卡尔哲学著作集》第二卷，第251页：“对第六组反驳的答复”。

Original · #185

5^1 "Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre", part one of Die Metaphysik der Sitten (Ak 6:355; translated by John Ladd as The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, Indianapolis: Bobbs- Merrill, 1965, p. 128).

Translation

5^1《法权学的形而上学初始根据》，《道德形而上学》第一部分（Ak 6:355；John Ladd英译本名为 The Metaphysical Elements of Justice，印第安纳波利斯：Bobbs-Merrill，1965年，第128页）。

Original · #186

5^2 Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (Ak 6:26, 35; translated by T. M. Green and H.H. Hudson äs Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, New York: Harper, 1960, pp. 21-22, 30).

Translation

5^2《单纯理性限度内的宗教》（Ak 6:26, 35；T. M. Green 与 H. H. Hudson 英译题为 Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone，纽约：Harper，1960年，第21—22、30页）。

Original · #187

5^3 See the 3rd Thesis of Geschichte (Ak 8:19-20; Humphrey, p. 31).

Translation

5^3 参见《历史》第三条命题（Ak 8:19-20；Humphrey，第31页）。

Original · #188

5^4 Verkündigung des nahen Abschlusses eines Traktat zum ewigen Frieden in der Philosophie (Ak 8:413). See also Frieden (Ak 8:378; Humphrey, p. 133): "in [this theory] man is thrown into the same class as other living machines..."

Translation

5^4 《哲学中永久和平论著即将完成的宣告》（Ak 8:413）。另见《和平》（Ak 8:378；Humphrey，第133页）：“在[这一理论]中，人被置于与其他‘活的机器’同属的一类……”

Original · #189

5^6 Namely, brute behavior was explicable without recourse to non-sensible causes, and therefore none should be attributed: see MP Herder (Ak 28:116-17), MP Mrongovius (Ak 29:906-7), MP Pölitz (Ak 28:277), Kr.d. U. (AK 5:377-78; Bernard, p. 224), Syllogism (Ak 2:60n; Abbott, p. 94n), and Kr. d. r. V. B 574.

Translation

也就是说，动物的行为无需诉诸非感性的原因便足以得到说明，因此不应将这类原因归于它们：见MP Herder（Ak 28:116-17）、MP Mrongovius（Ak 29:906-7）、MP Pölitz（Ak 28:277）、Kr. d. U.（Ak 5:377-78；Bernard，第224页）、Syllogism（Ak 2:60n；Abbott，第94页注）以及Kr. d. r. V. B 574。

Original · #190

6^0 See Kr. d. U., § 61: "Nature, considered as a mere mechanism, can produce its forms in a thousand different ways without stumbling upon unity..." (Ak 5:360; Bernard, p.206).

Translation

6^0 参见《判断力批判》（Kr. d. U.）第61节：“自然，若仅被视为一种机械作用，便能够以千百种不同方式产生其形式，而不会偶然触及统一性……”（Ak 5:360；Bernard，第206页）。

Original · #191

6^5 M.A.d.N. (Ak 4:544; Ellington, p. 105). See the parallel passage in Träume (Ak 2:328n; Goerwitz, p. 54n).

Translation

6^5《道德形而上学奠基》（Ak 4:544；Ellington，第105页）。另参见《一个视灵者的梦》中的平行段落（Ak 2:328n；Goerwitz，第54页注）。

Original · #192

6^6 M.A.d.N. (Ak 4:544; Ellington, p. 105). See also Träume (Ak 2:327n; Goerwitz, pp. 52-53n): "whatever in the world comprises a principle of life appears to be an immaterial nature. For all life rests on the inner faculty to determine oneself according to choice"; Tugendlehre (Ak 6:211; Gregor, p. 7): "The power of a being to act in accordance with its representations is called 'life"*. In the Opus postumum (Ak 21:566) we read: "Life, in the strict sense of the word, is the capacity of spontaneity of a physical being to respond [wirken] in accordance with certain of its representations". A gloss to 'physical being* in the above quote reads: "Matter responds, animals (e. g. spiders) act, humans behave".

Translation

6^6 M.A.d.N.（Ak 4:544；Ellington，第105页）。另见《Träume》（Ak 2:327n；Goerwitz，第52—53页注）：“凡在世界中包含生命原则的东西，似乎都有一种非物质性的自然。因为一切生命都基于这样一种内在能力：按照选择来规定自身”；《Tugendlehre》（Ak 6:211；Gregor，第7页）：“一个存在按照其表象而行动的能力，称为‘生命’。”* 在《Opus postumum》（Ak 21:566）中，我们读到：“严格就这个词的意义而言，生命是一个物理存在按照其某些表象的作出回应[wirken]的自发能力。”对上引文中‘物理存在’的一则旁注写道：“质料起反应，动物（如蜘蛛）行动，人类则表现其行为。”

Original · #193

6^7 Kr.d. U. (Ak 5:418-19; Bernard, pp. 267-68). On the formation of crystals, see also §5^8 (Ak 5:348-49; Bernard, pp. 194-95).

Translation

6^7 Kr.d. U.（Ak 5:418-19；Bernard，第267–268页）。关于晶体的形成，另参见§5^8（Ak 5:348–49；Bernard，第194–195页）。

Original · #194

6^8 Kr.d. U. (Ak 5:424; Bernard, p.274).

Translation

6^8《实践理性批判》（Ak 5:424; Bernard, S. 274）。

Original · #195

6^9 Träume (Ak 2:329; Goerwitz, pp. 55-56). Later in the same chapter, Kant described the two positions between which he wished to steer: "Hylozoism makes everything alive; materialism makes everything dead".

Translation

《梦》（Ak 2:329；Goerwitz，第55–56页）。在同一章稍后的地方，康德说明了他试图在其间把握中道的两种立场：“物活论使一切都有生命；唯物主义则使一切都失去生命。”

Original · #196

7^2 Kr. d.p. V. (Ak 5:97; Beck, pp. 100-1). See also MP Herder (Ak 28:96, 103) and the discussion of clocks and turnspits in MP Pölitz (Ak 28:267). Leibniz speaks of monads as spiritual automata in the Monadology, $ 18, and he contrasts humans and brutes in terms of this machine metaphor at: Monadology, §63-4, 83—4; "Letter to Arnauld, 9 October 1687" (Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. Loemker, p. 534); Principles of Nature and of Grace, § 3-4 (pp. 1034-35).

Translation

《实践理性批判》（Ak 5:97；Beck，第100—101页）。另见《形而上学讲义》Herder 版（Ak 28:96, 103），以及《形而上学讲义》Pölitz 版中关于钟表和“转叉狗”的讨论（Ak 28:267）。莱布尼茨在《单子论》第18节中将单子称为“精神性的自动机”；而在这一机器隐喻中，他也以此对比人类与禽兽，相关段落见：《单子论》第63–64、83–84节；《1687年10月9日致阿尔诺书》（收于 Loemker 编《哲学论文与书信》第534页）；《自然与恩宠的原则》第3–4节（第1034–1035页）。

Original · #197

7^3 Reflexion 38^55 (Ak 17:313).

Translation

7^3《反思》38^55（Ak 17:313）。

Original · #198

7^4 MP Dohna (Ak 28:690).

Translation

7^4 MP Dohna（Ak 28:690）。

Original · #199

7^5 On Kant's discussion of material ideas, see: Träume (Ak 2:326n, 345; Goerwitz, pp. 51n), Anth. (Ak 7:176; Gregor, pp. 51-52), Sömmering (Weischedel, xi. 256). On the vanity of physiological explanations of behavior, see esp. the "Preface" to the Anth. (Ak 7:119; Gregor, p. 3) and the Refl.Anth. (Ak 15:801).

Translation

关于康德对物质观念的讨论，参见： 《Träume》（Ak 2:326n, 345；Goerwitz，第51页注）、 《Anth.》（Ak 7:176；Gregor，第51–52页）、 《Sömmering》（Weischedel, xi. 256）。 关于用生理学解释行为的虚妄之处，可特别参阅《Anth.》的“前言”（Ak 7:119；Gregor，第3页）及《Refl.Anth.》（Ak 15:801）。

Original · #200

7^8 See, e. g. Kr. d. r. V. B 654: "Reason could never be justified in abandoning the causality which it knows for grounds of explanation which are obscure and indemonstrable"; and B 568.

Translation

7^8 例如，参见《纯粹理性批判》B 654：“理性绝不可能被证明为正当，如果它放弃其所知晓的因果性，转而诉诸那些晦涩且无法证明的解释根据”（另参 B 568）。

Original · #201

7^9 Kr. d. r. V. B 586. Kant argued in the Kr. d. r. V. that this teleological causality was possible, in some undefinedly stronger sense, because morality required it. But this still fell short of being an item of knowledge.

Translation

7^9 《纯粹理性批判》B 586。康德在《纯粹理性批判》中论证说，这种目的论的因果性之所以可能（这里的“可能”是在某种未加界定的、更强的意义上而言的），是因为道德对它有所要求。然而，这仍不足以构成知识。

Original · #202

8^0 Kr. d. £/., § 8^0 (Ak 5:417-18; Bernard, pp. 266-67). See also Kr. d. U., § 8^2 (Ak 5:429; Bernard, p. 279), and the early Beweisgrund (Ak 2:114): "it is absurd to consider the first production of a plant or animal as a mechanical effect according to general laws of nature..."

Translation

见《判断力批判》第80节（Ak 5:417-18；Bernard，第266—67页）。另可参见《判断力批判》第82节（Ak 5:429；Bernard，第279页），以及早期《证明根据》（Ak 2:114）中的说法：“将植物或动物的最初生成视为依照自然一般法则而产生的一种机械结果，这是荒谬的……”

Original · #203

8^1 Kr.d. U. (Ak 5:400; Bernard, p. 248). See also §6^7 (Ak 5:378; Bernard, p. 225) and §7^7 (Ak 5:409-10; Bernard, p. 258).

Translation

8^1 Kr.d. U. (Ak 5:400; Bernard, p. 248)。另参见 §6^7 (Ak 5:378; Bernard, p. 225) 和 §7^7 (Ak 5:409–10; Bernard, p. 258)。

Original · #204

8^2 Kr.d. U., §6^5 (Ak 5:374; Bernard, pp.220-21).

Translation

《判断力批判》，《导言》Ⅵ，第5段（Ak 5:374；Bernard，第220—221页）。

Original · #205

8^3 Kr.d. U., §6^4 (Ak 5:371; Bernard* p.217).

Translation

8^3 《判断力批判》，§6^4（Ak 5:371；Bernard*，第217页）。